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Attribute-based encryption is a promising cryptographic primitive that
allows users to encrypt data according to specific policies on the credentials of
the recipients. For example, a user might want to store data in a public server
such that only subscribers with credentials of specific forms are allowed to
access them. Encrypting the data once for each party is not only impractical
but also raises important privacy issues. Therefore, it would be beneficial to
be able to encrypt only once for all desired parties. This is achievable by
attribute-based encryption schemes, which come into several types and are
applicable to a wide range of settings.
Several attribute-based encryption schemes have been proposed and
studied with a wide range of characteristics. For example, initial construc-
tions proved to be significantly more challenging than constructing traditional
v
public-key encryption systems and they imposed restrictions on the expres-
siveness of the Boolean formulas used during encryption. For several proposed
schemes the total number of attributes was fixed during setup, while others al-
lowed any string to be used as attribute (“large universe” constructions), but
with considerable weaker security guarantees. Furthermore, these first con-
structions, although polynomial time, were impractical for wide deployment.
This thesis is motivated by two main goals for ABE schemes: robustness
and efficiency. For robustness, we propose a novel construction that achieves
strong security guarantees and at the same time augments the capabilities of
previous schemes. More specifically, we adapt existing techniques to achieve
leakage-resilient ABE schemes with augmented robustness features making
no compromises on security. For the second direction, our goal is to create
practical schemes with as many features as possible, such as “large universe”
and multi-authority settings. We showcase these claims with working imple-
mentations, benchmarks, and comparisons to previous constructions. Finally,
these constructions lead us to new directions that we propose and intend to
investigate further.
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Notation
The following standard notation is used throughout the thesis. Other notation
will be introduced close to the section being used.
N, Z Natural numbers and integers, respectively.
F, Fq General field and field of order q, respectively.
G, H, GT , . . . Various (multiplicative) groups.
1,1G,1H,1GT , . . . The identity element of various groups.
e(g, h) The bilinear mapping e : G × G → GT , where
g, h ∈ G.
A,A∗,Ai Access structures.
U ,UΘ Universe of attributes and universe of authorities,
respectively.
λ ∈ N Security parameter of our schemes.
‖p‖ The number of bits of p ∈ N, i.e. ‖p‖ = blog2 pc+1
for p ≥ 1.
|S| The number of elements of the set S.
poly(λ) A polynomially bounded function in λ. Namely,
there exists a constant c > 0 s.t. poly(λ) ≤ λc
for sufficiently large λ.
xiv
negl(λ) A negligible function in λ. Namely, for every con-
stant c > 0 it is true that negl(λ) ≤ λ−c for suffi-
ciently large λ.
[n] The set {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n ∈ N.
[n1, n2, . . . nk] The set [n1]×[n2]×. . .×[nk], where n1, n2, . . . , nk ∈
N.
Zp Integers modulo p ∈ N i.e. the set {0, 1, 2, . . .,
p− 1}.
Zm×np Matrices of dimension m× n with elements in Zp.
Special subsets are the set of row vectors of length
n: Z1×np , and the set of column vectors of length
n: Zn×1p .
〈~v1, ~v2〉 The inner product of the vectors ~v1 and ~v2 of same
length. Each of them can be either a row or a
column vector.
A, B, C PPT adversaries modeled as probabilistic interac-
tive Turing machines. Typically, A denotes the
attacker, B the simulator, and C the challenger.
Alg, Setup, . . . Polynomial - time algorithms (possibly probabilis-
tic).
s ..= Alg(args) Setting the variable s to the result of the determin-
istic polynomial-time algorithm Alg run on inputs
args .
s
R← Alg(args) Setting the variable s to the result of the proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithm Alg run on in-
puts args and uniformly sampled random coins.
s
R← S Setting the variable s to a uniformly random ele-
ment of the set S.
s1, s2, . . . , sk
R← S Same as s1 R← S, s2 R← S, . . ., sk R← S.
{Xi}i∈[n] The collection of terms X1, X2, . . . , Xn.
xv
{
Xi
R← Alg(args)
}
i∈[n]
The collection of terms X1, X2, . . . , Xn, where each
term is set to the result of the PPT algorithm Alg
run on inputs args and uniformly sampled random
coins, independently sampled on each call of the
algorithm.{
Xi
R← S
}
i∈[n]
The collection of terms X1, X2, . . . , Xn, where each
term is set to a uniformly random element of the
set S, independently from the rest.
⊥ Dummy value denoting a failed operation or “no
result”.
u~a With u ∈ G and ~a ∈ Zn, we define u~a =
(ua1 , ua2 , . . . , uan).
~ua With ~u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ Gn and a ∈ Z, we
define ~ua := (ua1, u
a
2, . . . , u
a
n).
en(~u1, ~u2) With ~u1 = (u11,u12,. . .,u1n)∈ Gn and ~u2 =
(u21, u22, . . ., u2n) ∈ Gn, we define the multi
- dimensional bilinear pairing as en(~u1, ~u2) =∏n
i=1 e(u1i, u2i) ∈ GT , where e : G × G → GT
is the bilinear mapping of G and the product is
the group operation of GT .
~u1 ∗ ~u2 With ~u1 = (u11, u12, . . . , u1n) ∈ Gn and ~u2 =
(u21, u22, . . . , u2n) ∈ Gn, we define the component-
wise multiplication (group operation) of the two
vectors. That is, ~u3 = ~u1 ∗ ~u2 ∈ Gn if and only if
for all i ∈ [n]: u3i = u1i · u2i where · denotes the
group operation.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Traditional public key cryptography has provided users with ways to achieve
secure communication over a public channel. After the seminal work of Gold-
wasser and Micalli, the security notions needed for public key systems were
formalized and opened the way for provably fully secure systems even against
extremely powerful adversaries. Even if these adversaries could deploy chosen
plaintext (or chosen ciphertext) attacks on a polynomial number of messages
(or ciphertexts), the security proofs showed that no information can be ex-
tracted from the challenge plaintext.
However with the wide expansion of the world wide web and the need for
secure communication in a wide network of users, each with complex creden-
tials, various researchers suggested the use of extended functionalities, which
would exceed the features of public key encryption in various ways. For ex-
ample, if the sender of the message wants to post his ciphertext on a public
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bulletin board such that only the parties with the required credentials being
able to decrypt, he would have to retrieve the public key of each party with
the required credentials and create a separate ciphertext for each.
This approach suffers from three main drawbacks making it inapplicable
to real world large scale networks. The first one is the obvious inefficient
procedure of having to encrypt separately for each specific user. The number
of users with the required credential might be prohibitively large. The second
major drawback is the privacy issues raised when any user of the system is
allowed to scan or acquire the credentials of any other user. It might be the
case that these credentials are supposed to be confidential and not publicly
available. Finally, in the common case that a new user is added with the
required credentials, the encryptor has to re-encrypt his message under the
public key of the new user. This places a large burden on the encrypting parties
to store their plaintexts and continuously update their posted ciphertexts.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic primitive that
addresses to the fullest the above issues and finds applications to a wide range
of settings, from regular users over the world wide web to large multi structural
corporations. It was a notion introduced by Sahai and Waters [99] that relates
the cryptographic components with attribute sets, corresponding to available
credentials for users, and access policies, corresponding to the possibly complex
restrictions that the credentials have to satisfy. In the most common form
of ABE, the ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE), the secret key of each user is
associated with a set of attributes/credentials and each ciphertext is associated
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with a policy on the universe of credentials. If the policy is satisfied by the set
of credentials of the key, then the owner of this key can decrypt successfully the
ciphertext. The second form of ABE is the key-policy ABE (KP-ABE), where
each key is associated with a policy on the attribute sets and each ciphertext
with a set of attributes. As in the former setting, if the policy of the key is
satisfied by the set of credentials of the ciphertext, then decryption is possible.
The main objectives of this work are to expand the state-of-the-art
ABE systems towards more efficient and more robust constructions. The first
goal aims at “bringing ABE to practice” through constructions that work with
the fastest possible cryptographic components, achieve advanced features, such
as large-universe and multi-authority settings, and admit the fewest possible
compromises in provable security. The second part of this thesis provides a
fully secure ABE construction that achieves resilience against extensive side-
channel attacks and showcases the use of the dual system encryption frame-
work towards a novel direction. Namely, it shows how this framework is not
only useful for providing full security, as presented in past works, but also for
contributing to the orthogonal feature of leakage resilience.
1.1 Brief History of Attribute-Based Encryption and
Related Functionalities
The first idea that was directly related to attribute-based encryption,
and the more general notion of functional encryption, was the Identity-Based
Encryption functionality (IBE), introduced by Shamir [100]. To encrypt using
3
an identity-based encryption scheme a user only needs the public parameters
of the scheme and the identity of the recipient, which can be for example his
e-mail address or any arbitrary string. In some sense the “public key” of a
user is his publicly known identity and no information has to be published
by the recipient such as a regular public key, thus alleviating the need for
a public key distribution system. The secret keys for each identity, which
are needed for decrypting the ciphertexts, are generated by a trusted master
authority and given to the corresponding users after authentication by the
authority. The next generalization of IBE was the Hierarchical Identity-Based
Encryption functionality (HIBE) in which a hierarchy is imposed on the set
of users/identities of the system. In these systems, each user can serve as the
trusted authority for a subset of other users by being able to generate secret
keys for them using its own secret key. These users can in turn generate secret
keys for a smaller subset of users using their secret keys, and so on. The master
trusted authority lies at the top of the hierarchy tree and is able to generate
secret keys for all identities.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), introduced by Sahai and Waters
[99], was another generalization of IBE. In its most natural form, called Ci-
phertext - Policy ABE (CP-ABE), each user possesses a set of attributes/cre-
dentials and a secret key corresponding to these attributes. The secret key
is provided by a trusted master authority that authenticates and verifies the
credentials of the users and provides the encryption functionality via a set of
public parameters. The encrypting party can define any Boolean formula on
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the set of attributes and produce a ciphertext that is decryptable by only the
users whose credentials satisfy the Boolean formula. This formula is referred
to as the policy of the ciphertext. As a result, the encryptor creates only one
ciphertext for all the target users and is oblivious of their exact identities.
Also, the ciphertext creation is independent of the creation and distribution
of secret keys. New users can acquire additional credentials and they might be
able to legally decrypt the previously created ciphertext. IBE is a special form
of ABE, since it can be seen as an attribute-based system where each user
can acquire only one attribute, his identity, and each ciphertext is build using
a policy that contains only one attribute, the required identity. Finally, we
mention here that all these functionalities are special cases of Functional En-
cryption systems [24], where each secret key and ciphertext is associated with
some information x and y, respectively, and the decryption of the ciphertext
with the secret key outputs the value of a function f(x, y). For example, in
IBE each secret key is associated with an identity ID = x and the ciphertext
with an identity / plaintext pair (ID′,M) = y. The function f(x, y) outputs
M if and only if ID = ID′.
Constructions The first construction of identity-based encryption
was given by Boneh and Franklin [20] and presented one of the first uses of
bilinear pairing groups in cryptography. The scheme was proved secure in
the random oracle model under a new computational assumption on bilinear
groups. The first construction in the standard model was given by Boneh and
Boyen [21], but it was proved secure under a weaker security notion called
5
selective security. The first works that provided fully secure IBE construc-
tions were given by Boneh and Boyen [17] and Waters [110]. Both of these
works used the common methodology of partitioning proofs. However the rich
structure of the keys of HIBE and ABE systems imposed an exponential degra-
dation to the security of these schemes using partitioning techniques. The first
fully secure constructions were given later along with the development of the
ABE notions.
Prior to our works, several attribute-based encryption schemes have
been proposed in the literature with a wide range of characteristics. The
refinement of the ABE notion was proposed shortly after its introduction in the
work of Goyal et al. [57], where they considered two dual notions. One is the
aforementioned notion of ciphertext-policy ABE, where the users possess a set
of attributes and the ciphertext is tagged with a policy. On the other hand, in
the Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE), each secret key is tagged by a policy/Boolean
formula while the ciphertext is related to a set of attributes. In that setting,
each user holds a number of secret keys that are tagged with specific policies,
and he can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if one of his keys has a policy that
is satisfied by the ciphertext’s attribute set. At the time of writing this thesis,
most ABE schemes can work natively using any monotone Boolean formula
as a policy. Non monotone Boolean formulas can be simulated by allowing
negative attributes with linear overhead. One exception is the ABE scheme by
Ostrofsky et al. [90] that supports natively non monotone Boolean formulas.
Several selectively-secure ABE schemes were presented in these works and
6
others [35, 56, 112].
The first fully secure constructions for HIBE under the standard model
were presented by Waters and Lewko-Waters [72, 111] using the so-called dual
encryption methodology. Using the same techniques Lewko et al. [68] and
Okamoto et al. [86] presented the first fully secure ABE schemes. In this the-
sis, among other techniques, we will leverage the same methods to achieve the
orthogonal direction of leakage resilience. Finally, we mention here the sug-
gestion of the multi-authority setting by Sahai and Waters [99], which defines
the problem of constructing an attribute-based scheme where several inde-
pendent master authorities authorize users for different credentials. The first
paper to attempt this was by Chase [33]. These constructions allow users to
encrypt data according to policies that contain attributes from different con-
trol domains and maps better to the real world, where the credentials of each
user are not all authorized by a central authority. For example, the author-
ity “University of Texas at Austin” might issue secret keys for the attribute
“PhD student”, while the “U.S.A.” authority might issue secret keys for the
attribute “U.S. Citizen”. These systems can be applied to numerous settings
and constituted one of the main directions in “bringing ABE to practice”.
1.2 Brief Overview of Side-Channel Attacks and
Leakage Resilience
Defining and achieving the right security models is crucial to the value
of provably secure cryptography. When security definitions fail to encompass
7
all of the power of potential attackers, systems which are proven “secure”
may actually be vulnerable in practice. It is often not realistic or desirable to
address such problems solely at the implementation level. For example, public
key cryptography alleviated the need for a hardware-secure communication
channel by allowing users to transmit messages securely using only public
information. Therefore, the ultimate goal of cryptography should be to provide
efficient systems which are proven secure against the largest possible class
of potential attackers. Additionally, these systems should provide the most
advanced functionalities available.
In the recent years, a long line of research is motivated by a variety of
side-channel attacks [12, 13, 18, 19, 49, 58, 65, 66, 81, 96], which allow attackers
to learn partial information about secrets by observing physical properties of
a cryptographic execution. The first techniques by Kocher and Boneh et al.
[18, 65] used timing measurements on the machines implementing the crypto-
graphic protocols to extract secret information about the public keys. Other
works like Kocher et al. and Bihma et al. [13, 66] used differential power anal-
ysis to achieve the same goal. For example by examining the power trace of a
device during elliptic curve operations one was able to extract the bits of the
secret key one by one [14]. Works by Quisquater et al. [96] and Gandolfi et al.
[49] used electromagnetic analysis. Finally, the cold-boot attack of Halderman
et al. [58] allows an attacker to learn information about memory contents of a
machine even after the machine is powered down. Following these works the
emergence of leakage-resilient cryptography has led to constructions of many
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cryptographic primitives which can be proven secure even against adversaries
who can obtain limited additional information about secret keys and other
internal state.
Leakage-resilient cryptography in the strongest security notion (see Sec.
2.2) models a large class of side-channel attacks by allowing the attacker to
specify an efficiently computable leakage function f and learn the output of f
applied to the secret key and possibly other internal state at specified moments
in the security game. Clearly, limits must be placed on f to prevent the
attacker from obtaining the entire secret key and hence easily winning the
game. One approach is to bound the total number of bits leaked over the
lifetime of the system to be significantly less than the bit-length of the secret
key [1, 80]. Another approach is to continually refresh the secret key and
bound the leakage between each update (this is called “continual leakage”)
[28, 39]. Both of these approaches have been employed successfully in a variety
of settings, yielding constructions of stream ciphers, signatures, symmetric key
encryption, public key encryption, and identity-based encryption (IBE) which
are leakage-resilient under various models of leakage [1, 4, 5, 27, 28, 30, 36, 38–
40, 43–46, 63, 80, 94].
1.3 Summary of Our Results
Leakage Resilient Constructions The first half of the thesis is fo-
cused on resilience against side-channel attacks. Several security notions were
presented to model the real world more closely and resulted in the so-called
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leakage resilient schemes (Akavia et al. [1]). A scheme which is leakage re-
silient is secure against all polynomial time attackers, who can not only gather
public information about the system (such as public keys and transmitted ci-
phertexts), but they can specify an arbitrary leakage function that acts on the
secret key of the system and receive its output. This function models the afore-
mentioned side-channel attacks and has to satisfy several restrictions that map
closer to the above attacks. For example, the timing measurements or power
dissipation attacks lead to the model “only computation leaks information”
by Micali et al. [77], where the leakage function is applied only on computa-
tions and can act only on the data (secret keys, random coins, etc.) that is
“touched” during these computations. The cold-boot attacks of Halderman
et al. [58] allow the attacker to gather some information from the memory
contents of the machine. This and similar works suggested the need for the
“bounded” and the “continual” leakage models, where the leakage function
is more general and is allowed to act on any data stored in the challenger’s
machine regardless of whether they are used in computations or not. In the
“bounded” model the function’s output size is bounded by a specific threshold
which is always less than the size of the secret key. If the attacker was able
to acquire the entire secret key he would be able to trivially break the secu-
rity of the scheme. Therefore, the main goal of these schemes is to allow as
much leakage as possible (optimally 1 − ε of the secret key size, where ε is a
very small positive constant), while at the same time remaining secure. In the
“continual” leakage model there exists one (or more) update algorithms that
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act on the secret parameters and “re-randomize” them suitably. The leakage
function is allowed to act only on the updated versions and the amount of
leakage is bounded only between two updates. The total amount of leakage
can be arbitrary. Several constructions have been presented in this setting
with a diverse variety of features [28, 39].
Following these works we propose several methods to achieve leakage
resilience for a variety of schemes. We present three identity-based encryption
systems that are secure under bounded leakage attacks. Identity-based en-
cryption is a simpler form of attribute-based encryption where the encryptor
uses only the identity (possibly a string or an email address) of the recipient
in order to encrypt. It is equivalent to the setting where a user owns only one
“attribute”: his name. We use a novel tagging technique to expand the secret
key space such that leakage from the secret key does not give to the attacker
any non-negligible advantage in breaking security of the scheme. This tech-
nique was applied to several non-leakage-resilient schemes to provide schemes
that are provably leakage-resilient. The original systems used random secret
keys with only one degree of freedom, which was explorable to the secret key
holder. This means that the owner of the secret key could re-randomize his
key arbitrarily without knowing the secret parameters of the IBE system (the
master secret key). In this sense the information each key holds is determin-
istic. The new technique we applied was to add another randomness to the
secret keys, called “tag”, coupled with some master secret key terms. As a
result, the secret-key holder cannot anymore re-randomize his key (in this de-
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gree of freedom). The added randomness allows the simulators of our security
proofs to provide the attacker leaked information from a properly distributed
secret key with a tag of our choice.
This idea of adding additional degrees of freedom to the secret keys
of our systems is used in the main construction of the first part of the the-
sis. We utilize the dual system methodology introduced by Waters [111] in
order to provide fully secure constructions of different IBE, HIBE, and ABE
schemes. Our idea was to use this methodology to modify existing dual system
encryption system to leakage-resilient ones. We show that the techniques of
dual system encryption naturally lead to leakage resilience. We demonstrate
this by providing leakage-resilient constructions of IBE, HIBE, and ABE sys-
tems which retain all of the desirable features of dual system constructions,
like full security from static assumptions and close resemblance to previous
selectively secure schemes. We present our combination of dual system en-
cryption and leakage resilience as a convenient abstraction and reduce proving
security to the establishment of three properties. Our approach not only com-
bines the benefits of dual system encryption and leakage resilience, but also
qualitatively improves upon the leakage tolerance of previous leakage-resilient
schemes. In particular, our system can tolerate leakage on the master key, as
well as leakage on several keys for each identity (this can be viewed as contin-
ual leakage, where secret keys are periodically updated and leakage is allowed
only between updates, and not during updates). Previous schemes only al-
lowed bounded leakage on one secret key per identity, and allow no leakage on
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the master key. Some works allowed bounded leakage on each of many keys per
identity, but allowed no leakage on the master key. We develop a simple and
versatile methodology for modifying a dual system encryption construction
and proof to incorporate strong leakage resilience guarantees. The change to
the constructions is minimal, and can be viewed as the adjoining of a separate
piece which does not interfere with the intuitive and efficient structure of the
original system. Essentially, we show that dual system encryption and leakage
resilience are highly compatible, and their combination results in the strongest
security guarantees available for cryptosystems with advanced functionalities.
Efficient Constructions While the dual system framework is highly
useful for the proofs, the current constructions use bilinear groups of large
composite order or a prime order framework, called dual pairing vector spaces
(DPVS) [69, 84–86, 89], that “emulates” the characteristics of the composite
order groups . Computations on group elements of composite order induce
a significant overhead on the constructions, since they are inherently slower
than their prime order counter-parts (see Sec. 3.3.4). On the other hand,
DPVS schemes work roughly by substituting a small number of composite
group elements with a vector of sufficiently high dimension of prime order
group elements. The dimension of the vectors, and thus the number of group
elements, should be high enough (10 ∼ 60) to ensure security. As a result, the
dual system schemes sustain a significant efficiency overhead in comparison to
prime order ABE constructions.
Therefore, our second line of work focused on bringing attribute-based
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encryption closer to practical implementations and at the same time providing
novel techniques to achieve augmented features and provable security. The
trade-off we have to sustain is that relaxed security notions were used due to
the fact that we did not use the dual system methodology and resorted to
older “program and cancel” techniques. More specifically, we had to embed
the terms of our complexity assumptions into the public parameters of ours
systems in the security proof so that we achieve the necessary calculations.
Our first work towards that direction focuses on the “large universe” feature
of the schemes. A common classification property of ABE constructions is
whether the attribute set is “small universe” or “large universe”. In “small
universe” constructions the size of the attribute space is polynomially bounded
in the security parameter and the attributes were fixed at setup. Moreover,
the size of the public parameters grew linearly with the number of attributes.
In “large universe” constructions, on the other hand, the size of the attribute
universe can be exponentially large and is thus desirable to have.
Achieving the large universe property can be challenging on its own.
Different works either imposed restrictions on the expressiveness of the policies
or were proved secure in the random oracle model. For constructions that
had no bounds on the expressiveness of policies and constant sized public
parameters, the random oracle security model was used. The above restrictions
place undesirable burdens on the deployment of ABE schemes. If the designer
of the system desires the benefits of avoiding the random oracle heuristic, he
has to pick a specific bound for the expressiveness of the system at the setup
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time; either the size of the attribute universe or the bound on the policies. If
the bound is too small, the system might exhaust its functionality and will
have to be completely rebuilt. For example, consider the design of a framework
that allows attribute-based encryption in a huge multinational company and
suppose that, as this company expands, a large number of new attributes have
to be added to the system. If this number exceeds the bound set during the
initial deployment of the system, then the company would have to re-deploy
the (expanded) system and possibly re-encrypt all its data spending a huge
amount of expenses. On the other hand, if the bound chosen is too big, the
increased size of the public parameters will impose an unnecessary efficiency
burden on all operations. The first large universe constructions in the standard
model were presented in the work of Lewko et al. [74]. They presented the
first large universe key-policy ABE construction, secure in the standard model
using the dual system framework on composite order groups to prove security.
The system was proved selectively secure under static assumptions.
We aim to get practical large universe ABE schemes by adapting and
expanding the system from this work into the prime order setting. In proving
security we go back to more traditional “program and cancel” techniques in-
stead of the dual system framework. We present two practical large universe
ABE constructions (one ciphertext-policy and one key-policy ABE) in prime
order bilinear groups both selectively secure in the standard model under two
different q-type assumptions. Our three main objectives in this work were
large universe constructions, efficiency, and security in the standard model.
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Both schemes support a “large universe” attribute space and their public pa-
rameters consist of a constant number of group elements. No bounds or other
restrictions are imposed on the monotonic Boolean formulas or the attribute
sets used by the algorithms of the schemes; thus eliminating the need for design
decisions at setup. The efficiency objective refrained us from using compos-
ite order groups or dual pairing vector spaces, while to achieve security in
the standard model we relied to non-static (q-type) assumptions and selec-
tive notions. These assumptions are non-static in the sense that a polynomial
number of terms is given to the adversary and therefore they are intuitively
stronger than the static ones. However, the polynomial number of terms gives
the ability to the simulator of the proof to embed the additional entropy in
the constant number of public parameters. We showcase different techniques
for harnessing the power of these assumptions to achieve our large universe
constructions. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of our constructions by
implementing our schemes. We compare performance results to other ABE
schemes in prime order groups.
Our second work towards more efficient ABE schemes focuses on the
multi-authority setting of attribute-based encryption. The typical scenario
presented for ABE is where a single authority issues all private keys. This
works well in the setting where data is managed within one organization or
trust domain. However, there are many scenarios when one will wish to de-
scribe a policy that spans multiple trust domains. For example, U.S. military
and defense are several organizations that wish to manage the distribution of
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their own credentials. If we wished to write an access policy that referenced
credentials from both of them using standard ABE, we would require one or-
ganization ceding control to another or a third party. To address this issue,
multi-authority or decentralized ABE systems were constructed by Chase [33],
where multiple parties could play the role of an authority. Initial attempts at
such systems sacrificed a significant amount of expressiveness compared to
analogs in the one authority setting. Lewko et al. in [73] provided a system
that roughly matched the expressiveness. In their system a policy could be
expressed as any monotonic Boolean formula over attributes that can be is-
sued by any authority which publishes a public key. Their main construction
technique is to use a hash over a global identifier. Upon decryption this extra
component serves as a “blinding factor” that only disappears if the cipher-
text is satisfied. While the expressiveness, of this distributed ABE system
is relatively strong, there are three major aspects that impact its practical
performance compared to single authority systems.
First, the construction is set in a group of composite order N where N
is the product of three primes. This alone can make certain operations such
as exponentiation over an order of magnitude slower (see Sec. 3.3.4). Second,
each authority in the system can “natively” support only a single attribute. If
in practice we would like one party to act as an authority for up to c attributes,
the party would have to create a public key consisting of c native public keys
(thus blowing up the size by a factor of c). Furthermore, this only works if
the attributes managed by that party can be enumerated ahead of time. This
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means that the attribute universe is restricted to polynomial size. Finally, the
system has the native property that each authority can be used only once in
each formula. In practice, if we want to get around this and let it be used up
to d times we can apply a simple encoding technique due to Lewko et al. [68].1
This encoding however comes at the cost of blowing up both the parameters
of the authority and the private key components issued by the authority by a
factor of d. To make things concrete suppose that we wanted a system with an
authority that managed 20 attributes each of which appeared at most 10 times
in the any formula. Then the published parameters for just that one authority
would need to blowup by a factor of 200 (compared to a contemporary single
use CP-ABE system [25, 112]) just to deal with the encoding overhead.
We construct and implement a new decentralized ABE cryptosystem
that aims to get performance close to existing single authority constructions.
Our approach is to use the aforementioned construction as a substrate from
which we make two significant changes to improve performance. First, we take
the existing construction and pare it down to the prime order setting. This
will make it inherently faster, but incompatible with the dual system proof
techniques used before. Second, we add an additional piece to each ciphertext
and private key component which allows us to use any string as an attribute —
thus addressing the problem of an authority only supporting a single attribute
and the small universe restriction. At the same time, the second change allows
1The one use restriction is needed to make the security proof of Lewko and Waters go
through, if the one use restriction were violated there is neither a known attack nor a security
proof.
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the system to utilize each attribute as many times as needed in each policy. We
create a proof of security in a static or selective model of security where both
the challenge ciphertexts and key queries are issued before the parameters are
published. In this setting we will extend the existing “program and cancel”
techniques to adapt to the multi-authority setting and introduce two new
ones. The trade-offs for our performance improvements are the use of the
static model and an assumption whose size depends on the complexity of
the challenge ciphertext policy. To demonstrate the abilities of our system we
implemented our algorithms in Charm [2, 32], a framework developed for rapid
cryptographic prototyping, and we provide timing results.
1.4 Related Work
Attribute-Based Encryption was introduced by Sahai and Waters [99].
In this work, the key-policy and ciphertext-policy notions were defined and
many selectively secure constructions followed [11, 35, 56, 90, 95, 112]. Most
of them work for non monotonic access structures with the exception of the
schemes by Ostrovsky, Sahai, and Waters [90], who showed how to realize
negation by incorporating specific revocation schemes into the GPSW con-
struction. Fully secure constructions in the standard model were first provided
by Okamoto and Takashima [86] and Lewko, Okamoto, Sahai, Takashima, and
Waters [68]. The first large universe KP-ABE construction in the standard
model was given by Lewko et al. [74] (composite order groups). Okamoto
and Takashima initiated the dual pairing vector space framework in various
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works [84–86, 89], which lead to the first large universe KP-ABE construc-
tion in prime order group groups by Lewko [70]. Parameterized (non static)
assumptions were introduced by Boneh et al. [21] and used in several subse-
quent works [53, 112]. The problem of an environment with multiple central
authorities in ABE was considered in [33, 34, 73], while several authors have
presented schemes that do not address the problem of collusion resistance
[3, 7, 8, 26, 78, 105].
We note that several techniques in ABE schemes have roots in Identity-
Based Encryption (IBE) and Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE)
[21–23, 37, 52, 53, 101, 110]. Finally, we mention here the related concept of
Predicate Encryption introduced by Katz, Sahai, and Waters [64] and further
refined in [24, 68, 85, 86, 102, 103].
Leakage resilience has been studied in many previous works, under
a variety of leakage models [1, 4, 5, 27–30, 38–46, 59, 61, 63, 77, 80, 93, 94, 107].
Exposure-resilient cryptography [29, 42, 61] addressed adversaries who could
learn a subset of the bits representing the secret key or internal state. Sub-
sequent works have considered more general leakage functions. Micali and
Reyzin [77] introduced the assumption that “only computation leaks informa-
tion.” In other words, one assumes that leakage occurs every time the cryp-
tographic device performs a computation, but that any parts of the memory
not involved in the computation do not leak. Under this assumption, leakage-
resilient stream ciphers and signatures have been constructed [45, 46, 94]. Ad-
ditionally, Juma et al. and Goldawasser et al. [54, 60] have shown how to
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transform any cryptographic protocol into one that is secure with continual
leakage, assuming that only computation leaks information and also relying
on a simple, completely non-leaking hardware device.
Since attacks like the cold-boot attack [58] can reveal information about
memory contents in the absence of computation, it is desirable to have leakage-
resilient constructions that do not rely upon this assumption. Several works
have accomplished this by bounding the total amount of leakage over the life-
time of the system, an approach introduced by Akavia et al. [1]. This has
resulted in constructions of pseudorandom functions, signature schemes, pub-
lic key encryption, and identity-based encryption [4, 5, 36, 40, 63, 80] which are
secure in the presence of suitably bounded leakage. For IBE schemes in par-
ticular, this means that an attacker can leak a bounded amount of information
from only one secret key per user. This does not allow a user to update/re-
randomize his secret key during the lifetime of the system.
Recently, two works have achieved continual leakage resilience without
assuming that only computation leaks information [28, 39]. Dodis, Haralam-
biev, Lopez-Alt, and Wichs [39] construct one-way relations, signatures, identi-
fication schemes, and authenticated key agreement protocols which are secure
against attackers who can obtain leakage between updates of the secret key.
It is assumed the leakage between consecutive updates is bounded in terms of
a fraction of the secret key size, and also that there is no leakage during the
update process. Brakerski, Kalai, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [28] construct
signatures, public key encryption schemes, and (selectively secure) identity-
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based encryption schemes which are secure against attackers who can obtain
leakage between updates of the secret key, and also a very limited amount of
leakage during updates and during the initial setup phase. The leakage be-
tween updates is bounded in terms of a fraction of the secret key size, while
the leakage during updates and setup is logarithmically small as a function of
the security parameter.
The dual system encryption methodology was introduced by Waters in
[111]. It has been leveraged to obtain constructions of fully secure IBE and
HIBE from simple assumptions [111], fully secure HIBE with short ciphertexts
[72], fully secure ABE and Inner Product Encryption (IPE) [68], and fully
secure functional encryption combining ABE and IPE [86].
Independently, Alwen and Ibraimi [6] have proposed a leakage resilient
system for a special case of Attribute-Based Encryption, where the ciphertext
policy is expressed as a DNF. Their work pursues a different technical direction
to ours, and provides an interesting application of hash proof systems to the
ABE setting. Security is proven from a “q-type” assumption.
1.5 Organization
In Chapter 2 we present some background information about access
structures and attributes, about the various leakage-resilience models, and
a brief overview of the ideas behind dual system encryption. In Chapter 3
we describe the cryptographic substrate, the building elements, used for our
constructions. We present both the abstract properties of these groups, which
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are needed for the constructions and the security proofs, and some information
about the concrete realizations of these objects in software. In Chapter 4 we
present the formal definitions and security notions of all the functionalities
presented in this thesis. The “robust” leakage-resilient ABE construction that
works on composite order groups is shown in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains
our “efficient” constructions along with their security proofs. These are the
three ABE schemes (CP-ABE, KP-ABE, MA-CP-ABE) that work on prime
order groups. In Chapter 7 we present implementation results and benchmarks
that compare the efficiency of the schemes of Chapter 6 to other deployed
ABE schemes. In Chapter 8 we discuss further work and future directions.
In Appendices A and B we present the proofs of security of our assumptions
in the generic group model and proofs of some lemmas not included in the
main body. Finally, the source code of our implementations is included in in
Appendix C.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 Access Structures & Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
In this section, we present the formal definitions of access structures
and linear secret-sharing schemes introduced by Amos Beimel [9], adapted
to match our setting. Intuitively, the access structures describe the abstract
notion of a policy on the attribute universe, while the linear secret sharing
schemes (LSSS) describe a concrete way to implement the sharing of a secret
according to a specific policy. All our constructions assume the use of an
LSSS to express the policies, although they can easily be adapted to other
secret sharing schemes, such as access trees [57], monotone span programs
[62], and others.
Definition 2.1 (Access Structures [9]). Let U be the attribute universe. An
access structure on U is a collection A of non-empty sets of attributes, i.e.
A ⊆ 2U \ {}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets and the sets not in
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A are called the unauthorized sets.
Additionally, an access structure is called monotone if ∀B,C ∈ A : if
B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A.
In our construction, we only consider monotone access structures, which
means that as a user in the CP-ABE setting acquires more attributes, he will
not lose his possible decryption privileges. In the KP-ABE setting, this means
that as the message is encrypted with more attributes, the set of users that
can decrypt it grows. General (not necessarily monotone) access structures in
large universe ABE can be realized by splitting the attribute universe in half
and treating the attributes of one half as the negated versions of the attributes
in the other half [57].
Definition 2.2 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [9]). Let p be a prime
and U the attribute universe. A secret-sharing scheme Π with domain of
secrets Zp realizing access structures on U is linear over Zp if
1. The shares of a secret z ∈ Zp for each attribute form a vector over Zp.
2. For each access structure A on U , there exists a matrix A ∈ Z`×np , called
the share-generating matrix, and a function δ, that labels the rows of A
with attributes from U , i.e. δ : [`]→ U , which satisfy the following:
During the generation of the shares, we consider the column vector ~v =
(z, r2, . . . , rn)
⊥, where r2, . . ., rn
R← Zp. Then the vector of ` shares of
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the secret z according to Π is equal to ~λ = A~v ∈ Z`×1p . The share λj
with j ∈ [`] “belongs” to attribute δ(j).
We will be referring to the pair (A, δ) as the policy of the access structure
A.
Each secret-sharing scheme (not only the linear ones) should satisfy the
reconstruction requirement, i.e. each authorized set can reconstruct the secret,
and the security requirement, i.e. any unauthorized set cannot reveal any par-
tial information about the secret. More concretely, let S denote an authorized
set of attributes and let I be the set of rows whose labels are in S. There
exist constants {ci}i∈I in Zp such that for any valid shares {λi = (A~v)i}i∈I
of a secret z according to Π, it is true that:
∑
i∈I ciλi = z. Equivalently,∑
i∈I ci ~Ai = (1, 0, . . . , 0), where ~Ai is the i-th row of A. Additionally, it has
been proved in [9] that the constants {ci}i∈I can be found in time polynomial
in the size of the share-generating matrix A.
On the other hand, for unauthorized sets S ′ no such constants {ci}
exist. In this case it is also true that if I ′ = {i|i ∈ [`]∧ ρ(i) ∈ S ′}, there exists
a vector ~d ∈ Z1×np , such that its first component d1 = 1 and
〈
~Ai, ~d
〉
= 0 for
all i ∈ I ′.
Finally, we note that if the access structure is encoded as a monotonic
Boolean formula over attributes there is a generic algorithm that generates the
corresponding access policy in polynomial time [9, 73] (See Sec. 2.1.2).
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2.1.1 Multi-Authority Attributes
In the multi-authority setting, each attribute is controlled by a specific
authority θ ∈ UΘ, where UΘ is the set (universe) of all authorities. We assume
there is a publicly computable function T : U → UΘ that maps each attribute
to a unique authority. Using this mapping a second labeling of rows is defined
in a policy (A, δ), which maps rows to attributes via the function ρ(·) def=
T(δ(·)).
As an example of the mapping T, in our implementation of a multi-
authority scheme, both the attribute id’s and the authority id’s consist of
case-sensitive alphanumeric strings. The full attributes’ names are of the form
“[attribute–id]@[authority–id]” and the mapping T just extracts the part after
the @ of the attribute string.
2.1.2 Converting Monotone Boolean Formulas to Share Generating
Matrices
In this section we present a general transformation from any monotone
access structure on the attribute universe, expressed as a Boolean formula
on attributes, to a share generating matrix A that can be used to express
this policy. Monotone access structures are expressed by monotone Boolean
formulas, i.e. formulas that contain only AND (∧) and OR (∨) gates and the
atoms consist of attributes in the attribute universe. For example, consider
the formula
F = ((V ∧ U) ∨ (V ∧W )) ∧ (U ∨X)
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where U = {V, U,W,X, Y }. This formula denotes an access structure A that
satisfies (contains) the sets of attributes {V, U}, {V,W,X}, {V, U, Y }, etc.,
but does not satisfy the set {U,X} or the set {W,Y }.
To create the share generating matrix A and the row labeling δ we
treat the formula as a binary tree where the nodes are labeled with the gates
and the leaves with the attributes (see Fig. 2.1). The algorithm will assign a
row vector to each node and leaf, starting from the root of the tree. Also, the
algorithm maintains a global counter c initially set to 1. The root is always
labeled with the vector (1). Then the algorithm goes down the tree one gate at
a time. If a node contains an OR (∨) gate and is labeled with the vector ~v, the
algorithm assigns ~v to both of its children nodes, without changing the value
of c. If a node contains an AND (∧) gate and is labeled with the vector ~v, the
algorithm first pads ~v with zeros until it gets length c. The algorithm assigns
the vector ~v|1 to the left child of the node and the vector (0, 0, . . . , 0)|−1 to the
right child, where (0, 0, . . . , 0) is of length c. Finally it updates the value of c
to c+1 and moves on to the remaining nodes. The algorithm terminates when
all leaves are assigned with vectors. The share generating matrix consists of
all the vectors assigned to the leaves padded with zeros to length c. Each row
is labeled in the δ mapping with the attribute of the leaf corresponding to it.
In the above example, the root node has the gate ∧ and is labeled
with the vector (1). Therefore the two children get (1, 1) and (0,−1) and c is
updated to 2. Both of them have ∨ gates, hence the two nodes with ∧ gates
in the right subtree get (1, 1) while the two leaves, U and X get labeled with
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∧∨
∧
V U
∧
V W
∨
U X
(1)
(1, 1)
(1, 1)
(1, 1, 1) (0, 0,−1)
(1, 1)
(1, 1, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 0,−1)
(0,−1)
(0,−1) (0,−1)
Figure 2.1: Binary tree and node vectors for the formula F = ((V ∧U)∨ (V ∧
W )) ∧ (U ∨X).
(0,−1). Following the same procedure we reach to the policy (A, δ) shown in
Fig. 2.2. Notice that the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span of a set of rows
if and only if the formula F is satisfied by the attributes labeling this set of
rows.
A =

1 1 1 0
0 0 −1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 −1
0 −1 0 0
0 −1 0 0
 δ =

V
U
V
W
U
X

Figure 2.2: Access policy for the formula F = ((V ∧U)∨ (V ∧W ))∧ (U ∨X).
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2.2 Leakage Models
Leakage resilience has been studied in many previous works, under a
variety of leakage models [1, 4, 5, 27–30, 38–46, 59, 61, 63, 77, 80, 93, 94, 107]. In
this section we present the various models ordered from the weakest to the
strongest security notion. Our robust ABE construction of Chap. 5 satisfies
the last one.
Exposure - resilient cryptography The first works in the area
of leakage-resilient cryptography [29, 42, 61] addressed adversaries who could
learn a fixed or variable subset of the bits representing the secret key or internal
state. Obviously the adversary was not allowed to retrieve all the bits of the
secret key, because in that case security was trivially compromised. However
many side-channel attacks leaked complicated functions of the secret key bits
and therefore the interest of the cryptographic community turned to leakage
models where the attacker had access to a polynomially computable function
on the secret key or the internal state of his choice. The following leakage
models consider this kind of leakage.
“Only Computation Leaks” Micali and Reyzin [77] introduced the
assumption that “only computation leaks information”. In other words, one
assumes that leakage occurs every time the cryptographic device performs a
computation, but that any parts of the memory not involved in the computa-
tion do not leak. Under this assumption, leakage-resilient stream ciphers and
signatures have been constructed [45, 46, 94]. Additionally, [54, 60] have shown
how to transform any cryptographic protocol into one that is secure with con-
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tinual leakage, assuming that only computation leaks information and also
relying on a simple, completely non-leaking hardware device. Continual leak-
age can occur indefinitely and the total amount of leaked bits can be more
than the size of the secret key. This implies that the secret keys of the system
have to be periodically updated and “reset” in some sense the leakage counter.
Bounded Leakage Model Since attacks like the cold-boot attack
[58] can reveal information about memory contents in the absence of compu-
tation, it is desirable to have leakage-resilient constructions that do not rely
upon the above assumption. Several works have accomplished this by bound-
ing the total amount of leakage over the lifetime of the system, an approach
introduced by Naor et al. [80] and Akavia et al. [1]. This has resulted in
constructions of pseudorandom functions, signature schemes, public key en-
cryption, and identity-based encryption [4, 5, 36, 40, 63, 80] which are secure in
the presence of suitably bounded leakage. For IBE schemes in particular, this
means that an attacker can leak a bounded amount of information from only
one secret key per user. This does not allow a user to update/re-randomize
his secret key during the lifetime of the system.
Continual Leakage Model Two subsequent works have achieved
continual leakage resilience without assuming that only computation leaks in-
formation [28, 39]. Dodis, Haralambiev, Lopez-Alt, and Wichs [39] construct
one-way relations, signatures, identification schemes, and authenticated key
agreement protocols which are secure against attackers who can obtain leak-
age between updates of the secret key. It is assumed the leakage between
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consecutive updates is bounded in terms of a fraction of the secret key size,
and also that there is no leakage during the update process. Brakerski, Kalai,
Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [28] construct signatures, public key encryption
schemes, and (selectively secure) identity-based encryption schemes which are
secure against attackers who can obtain leakage between updates of the secret
key, and also a very limited amount of leakage during updates and during the
initial setup phase. The leakage between updates is bounded in terms of a
fraction of the secret key size, while the leakage during updates and setup is
logarithmically small as a function of the security parameter.
2.3 Overview of Dual System Encryption
Dual System Encryption is a proof methodology introduced in [111] and
used to provide adaptively secure IBE, HIBE, and ABE systems. Our work in
[71] was the first to leverage this methodology to achieve leakage resilience for
all these functionalities and, at the same time, maintain full security for the
proposed schemes. The ABE system of this work is described in Chap. 5. In
this section we describe the framework of dual system encryption and describe
the intuition behind the security of our robust construction.
Adaptive Security of ABE Systems The formal definition of adap-
tive (or full) security of ABE systems is given in Chap. 4. For the purpose of
describing the dual system framework and the obstacles it tries to solve, we will
briefly describe the security definition of CP-ABE schemes. The main ideas
and challenges in the KP-ABE setting are similar. CP-ABE security is defined
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via a game between a challenger and an attacker. This game is a conservative
model of the real world interactions between an eavesdropper and the users of
the cryptographic scheme. The eavesdropper gets the public parameters of the
scheme and can impersonate or compromise a set of users by acquiring their
secret keys. We want to design the scheme in such a way that even in that case
the eavesdropper can not get any information from a ciphertext of a different
user. It is considered conservative since we give the attacker the possibility
to choose adaptively the compromised users, the encrypted messages, and the
challenge user.
More specifically the game works as follows: Initially, the challenger sets
up the CP-ABE system and provides the public parameters to the attacker.
Then the attacker can request a polynomial number of secret keys for various
attribute sets. The attacker may choose these sets any way it wishes and it can
do that in a fully adaptive fashion. That is, each of his choices may depend on
the previous ones and the previously acquired secret keys. At some point, the
attacker declares it wants to go into the challenge phase where it outputs a pair
of messages of equal length and an access policy. As before it can choose both
these challenge messages and the challenge access policy any way it wants
with the only restriction that the access policy must not be satisfied by any
of the attribute sets of the keys selected so far. Then the challenger flips a
uniformly random bit and, depending on the value of the bit, it encrypts either
the first or the second challenge message under the challenge access policy with
the set public parameters and sends the challenge ciphertext to the attacker.
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The attacker can then go into a second secret-key query phase, where it can
request adaptively additional secret keys with the same restriction; that their
attribute sets do not satisfy the access policy. Finally, it tries to guess the
message encrypted in the challenge ciphertext and outputs a bit to signify its
answer. We say that a scheme is secure when for all polynomial time attackers
the probability of guessing correctly is negligibly close to 1/2. Security is
proved formally via a security reduction, where we assume the existence of an
attacker in the above game and define a simulator algorithm that simulates
the challenger of the game and breaks a hard computational problem.
Notice that the restriction imposed on the queried keys ensures that the
attacker can not decrypt the challenge ciphertext with any of these keys, since
they correspond to non-authorized attribute sets. However, it can be the case
that the union of attribute sets of two or more secret keys is an authorized
set. This implies that our schemes should be resilient to the so-called collusion
attacks, where several users combine somehow their secret keys in order to
decrypt a ciphertext for which neither of them is individually authorized to
decrypt. Therefore in a secure CP-ABE scheme the attributes should not be
transferable among users. Security against collusion attacks was one of the
first challenges of the (non-adaptive) ABE constructions and could be solved
with careful personalization of the users’ secret keys.
An additional obstacle however is present in the adaptive setting: The
simulator of our reduction has to be ready to construct a secret key for any
attribute set requested by the attacker and a ciphertext for any challenge
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access policy. Since the simulator also tries to leverage the attacker’s success
to solve the hard computational problem, it looks like it does not need the
attacker’s help. It can create a secret key that decrypts the challenge ciphertext
and attack the scheme by itself. Since this appears to be impossible to achieve
(unless the simulator knows the challenge access policy at the beginning of the
game, as in the non-adaptive setting), dual system encryption aims in proving
that the success probability of any PPT attacker in the above security game
is negligibly close to the success probability of the same attacker in a game
where the challenger outputs “non-working” keys; thus bypassing the above
paradox. In the following paragraphs we describe how dual system encryption
achieves that and how it allows to achieve leakage resilience in ABE schemes.
Normal and Semi-functional Components In a dual system en-
cryption system the keys and the ciphertexts come in two flavors; either normal
or semi-functional. The normal keys and ciphertexts are utilized by the users
of the deployed system to decrypt and encrypt messages. The semi-functional
components appear only in the security proofs of the schemes. An authorized
normal key can decrypt a semifunctional ciphertext and a normal ciphertext
can be decrypted by an authorized semi-functional key. By authorized we
mean that the attribute set (of the key in CP-ABE or of the ciphertext in
KP-ABE) is one of the authorized sets of the access policy (of the ciphertext
in CP-ABE or of the key in KP-ABE). However when a semi-functional key is
used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext decryption fails (with very high
probability) even if the key is authorized.
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The proof of security works by providing a sequence of games starting
with the real security game where all keys and ciphertexts are normal and
ending with the same game but with all keys and ciphertexts semi-functional.
It is proved that the advantage of any PPT attacker in any of the games is
negligibly close to its advantage of the next game. The second game in the
sequence is one where the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional and all keys
are normal. Then if the adversary makes at most Q secret key queries, there
are Q subsequent games. In the i-th game the first i secret keys are semi-
functional while the remaining keys are normal. In the final game all keys and
the challenge ciphertext are semi-functional and therefore security can proved
relatively easy, since the simulator outputs only “useless” keys.
Nominal Semi-functionality However, the aforementioned para-
dox that the simulator can construct a secret key that can decrypt the cipher-
text seems now to have been moved to the transitions of the security games.
Namely, the point where a simulator creates a secret key, let’s say the i-th one,
that is either normal or semi-functional in order to advance from the (i−1)-th
game to the i-th. It is crucial that it does not know which form of secret key
it created, because otherwise it wouldn’t have to leverage the attacker. But
since we are in the adaptive setting, the simulator can create a secret key,
which is authorized for the semi-functional ciphertext and should be either
semi-functional or normal, but unknown to it. The question is if the simulator
tries to decrypt the challenge ciphertext with this key wouldn’t it detect its
nature?
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The above issue is resolved by introducing the notion of nominal semi-
functionality. A secret key is nominally semi-functional with respect to a semi-
functional ciphertext if it is semi-functional, authorized for this ciphertext,
and correlated to it in such a way that decryption succeeds. More specifically
the random coins used for the creation of the secret key is correlated to the
random coins used for the creation of the ciphertext and during decryption
the semi-functional components of both cancel each other out. If the random
coins were not correlated we would have a regular semi-functional key and
then decryption would fail. In the case where our simulator tries to create
the aforementioned secret key, the system and the reduction are set in such a
way that it will either create a normal secret key or a nominal semi-functional
key. Thus if it tries to decrypt the ciphertext and detect the nature of the
key, decryption will succeed unconditionally providing no information about
the nature of the key.
As it is implied by the previous paragraph, the randomness of some
secret keys created by the simulator is correlated to the randomness of the
challenge ciphertext. However the secret keys should be created using prop-
erly generated random coins. In the first dual system encryption schemes this
obstacle was by-passed using the fact that the attacker can not request an au-
thorized key. The fact that the keys could not decrypt the challenge ciphertext
regardless of being normal or semi-functional was enough to hide information
theoretically the aforementioned correlation by the attacker. However this was
not true anymore for the leakage resilient setting.
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Leakage Resilient Semi-functionality In the leakage resilient secu-
rity game the attacker is given the ability to request “leakage” from secret keys
keys of its own choice, even from authorized ones. Namely, the above game is
modified such that the attacker is allowed to send several polynomially com-
putable functions to its challenger before seeing the challenge ciphertext. Each
time the challenger applies the function on a secret key of the attacker’s choice
and returns the result to the attacker. We require that the size of the output
of the function is strictly smaller than the size of the entire key. Otherwise the
attacker would be able to use the secret key to decrypt the challenge ciphertext
and the security notion would be impossible to achieve. For our construction
we utilized the strongest leakage-resilient security notion, i.e. the continual
leakage model. In this model the attacker can request a bounded amount of
leakage from each key, but can also request that a specific key is updated to
a new one and essentially “reset” the leakage counter on it. We note that no
leakage queries are allowed after the challenge phase, because in this case it is
impossible to achieve security as the attacker can pick as the leakage function
the decryption of the challenge ciphertext. Formally the definition of leakage
resilient security is presented in Chap. 4.
Getting back to the dual system encryption framework, we see that we
can not use past techniques to hide the nominality of the secret keys we give
to the attacker. More specifically we can not hide with these techniques the
nominality of the secret keys that are authorized to decrypt the ciphertext,
but are leaked to the attacker. In our work [71], we presented the first tech-
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nique that hid information theoretically the correlation of these secret keys
with the challenge ciphertext and achieved a fully secure ABE scheme. Our
technique used an information theoretic lemma introduced in [28] stating that
“random subspaces are leakage resilient”. The authors of [28] showed how to
create selectively secure leakage resilient IBE, HIBE, and ABEschemes (in the
continual leakage model) by straight-forwardly utilizing this lemma.
The main idea of our work was to use dual system encryption, that
was known to provide fully secure schemes, to achieve the orthogonal goal of
leakage-resilience, as well. We build the keys and ciphertexts in such a way
that the two semi-functional components were nominally semi-functional to
each other if and only if specific vectors of their semi-functional space were
orthogonal to each other. Therefore they were nominal if and only if a vector
belonged to the orthogonal subspace of another one. According to the afore-
mentioned lemma this correlation was hidden by the view of the attacker and
the advantage it could acquire out of this correlation was only negligible.
In addition, we introduced secret key update algorithms and trans-
formed the master secret key of our construction to have a similar form as
the regular secret keys. As a result we achieved continual leakage and leakage
resilience against master secret key attacks. The final scheme was fully (adap-
tively) secure and resilient against master or user secret key leakage attacks in
the continual leakage model.
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CHAPTER 3
Bilinear Groups
In this chapter we introduce the primitive components of our cryptographic
constructions: the bilinear groups. In the first three sections we present the
abstract mathematical properties of these groups and the assumptions we re-
quire that they satisfy, in order to prove the security of our schemes. In the
fourth section we present explicit implementations of these groups using ellip-
tic curves and we pinpoint the differences from the abstracted objects.
The main feature of bilinear groups is that they admit an efficiently
computable mapping that takes two group elements and maps them to another
group, called the target group. This mapping should be non-degenerate, i.e.
it does not map everything to the identity element of the target group, and
it should be linear on both of its arguments. Bilinear groups opened the
way to numerous cryptographic primitives, such as identity-base encryption
[20], three-party key agreement, hierarchical identity based encryption and
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numerous others.
In this thesis we will be concerned with bilinear groups of prime and
composite order. The former are simpler and more efficient, but lack the nec-
essary structure to facilitate proofs of adaptive security. The properties of the
latter provide increased flexibility in proving the security of various schemes,
but the actual implementations of them are significantly slower than the ones
of prime order groups on the same security level. This reason has motivated
several researchers to implement the functionality and the properties of com-
posite order groups using prime order groups [47, 70]. Although these works
provided constructions that simulate the structure of composite order groups
and achieved a significant efficiency improvement with respect to them, they
are still several factors slower than the prime order group implementations.
These factors, as well as the exact simulation, depends on the application at
hand.
3.1 Abstract Properties of Bilinear Groups
In this section we present the abstract properties of the groups used by
our schemes and implementations. Throughout the thesis we use multiplicative
notation for the group operation.
3.1.1 Prime Order Bilinear Groups
Let G and GT denote cyclic groups of the same prime order p, where
‖p‖ = λ ∈ N. We say that the tuple (p, g,G,GT , e) is a bilinear group tuple if
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g is a generator of G and there exists a mapping e : G×G→ GT that satisfies
the following properties:
1. Efficiently computable: It can be computed in polynomial time in λ.
2. Non-degenerate: It is true that e(g, g) 6= 1GT . As a result, e(g, g) is a
generator of GT .
3. Bilinear: For all all a, b ∈ Zp, it is true that e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab.
For our assumptions and constructions we assume that there exists a
probabilistic polynomial time group generator algorithm G(1λ) that takes as
input the security parameter λ encoded in unary and outputs (a description
of) a bilinear group tuple (p, g,G,GT , e) with ‖p‖ = λ.
Remark 3.1. The above definition encompasses the so called symmetric bi-
linear groups. These are the only groups that we consider in our construc-
tions and our security proofs. In general the mapping can be asymmetric,
i.e. e : G × H → GT , where G,H,GT are all groups of prime order p. All
our assumptions, constructions, and security proofs can be generically trans-
formed to the asymmetric setting by substituting all terms of the form ga ∈ G
with terms ga ∈ G and ha ∈ H, where g, h are generators of the groups G,H
respectively.
3.1.2 Composite Order Bilinear Groups
Another very useful tool for the construction of cryptographic primi-
tives is the relaxation of the above definition such that the groupsG andGT are
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of composite order. In this case we will denote the order by N = |G| = |GT |.
For our constructions N will be the product of three prime numbers
p1, p2 and p3. According to Lagrange’s theorem this implies that G (and GT )
contains three prime order subgroups. We will denote the subgroups of order
p1, p2, and p3 by G1, G2, and G3, respectively.
Suppose that g ∈ G is a generator of the full group G, i.e. it has order
N = p1p2p3. Then a generator of the i-th subgroup is equal to
gi = g
∏
j∈[3] p
1−δi,j
j
where δi,j = 0 for i 6= j and δi,j = 1 for i = j; the Kronecker’s delta. Thus,
the generator of the i-th subgroup is obtained by raising the generator of the
entire group G to the exponent N/pi. For example, a generator of the G1
subgroup is g1 = g
p2p3 .
An important property of the composite order bilinear groups, called
orthogonality, is that pairing group elements from different subgroups always
outputs the identity element of the target group. To see this, consider pairing
an element A ∈ Gi to an element B ∈ Gi′ , with i, i′ ∈ [3] and i 6= i′. Since
gi and gi′ are the respective generators, we have that A = g
a
i and B = g
b
i′ for
some a ∈ Zpi and b ∈ Zpi′ . Then according to the properties of the pairing
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operation we have:
e(A,B) = e(gai , g
b
i′) = e(g
a
∏
j∈[3] p
1−δi,j
j , g
b
∏
j′∈[3] p
1−δi′,j′
j′ )
= e(g, g)ab·
∏
j∈[3] p
2−δi,j−δi′,j
j
= e(g, g)p1p2p3·ab·
∏
j∈[3] p
1−δi,j−δi′,j
j
= (e(g, g)p1p2p3)ab·
∏
j∈[3] p
1−δi,j−δi′,j
j
= 1
ab·∏j∈[3] p1−δi,j−δi′,jj
GT = 1GT
As it was the case for the prime order groups, we assume that there
exists a probabilistic polynomial time group generator algorithm G(1λ) that
takes as input the security parameter λ encoded in unary and outputs (a
description of) a bilinear group tuple (N, p1, p2, p3, g,G,GT , e) with ‖pi‖ = λ
for all i ∈ [3].
3.2 Computational Assumptions
In this section we present the computational assumptions which we
utilize to prove the security of our schemes. First, we present three q-type
assumptions on prime order groups needed for the security proofs of our large
universe ABE schemes of Chap. 6. Afterwards we present three subgroup
decision assumptions on composite order groups used in the security reductions
of the leakage-resilient ABE construction of Chap. 5.
All assumptions are defined via a security game between a challenger C
and an attacker A, both modeled as probabilistic interactive Turing machines.
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The challenger does not necessarily have to be efficient (polynomial time),
although in our implementations and schemes this happens to be the case. On
the other hand, we consider only polynomial time attackers for our security
definitions.
In each security game the challenger C generates a set of given terms
denoted by the D tuple, and two challenge terms denoted by T0 and T1. The
distributions of D,T0, T1 are defined by the assumption at hand, which in this
abstract example we denote by GenAss. Then C flips a uniformly random bit
b
R← {0, 1} and the attacker A is given (D,Tb). The goal of A is to correctly
guess the bit b, i.e. it outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The success of the attacker is
quantified by its advantage which is defined as
AdvGenAssA (λ)
..= |2 · Pr [b′ = b]− 1|
= |Pr [A(D,T1) = 1]− Pr [A(D,T0) = 1]|
3.2.1 Three q-Type Assumptions on Prime Order Groups
The three assumptions on prime order groups are similar to the q-
Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption introduced in
[112]. They are all q-type assumptions, meaning that they are parameterized
by an integer q, polynomial in the security parameter λ. We will be referring to
them as q-DPBDH1, q-DPBDH2, and q-DPBDH3, and we will use them in the
security proofs of our unbounded KP-ABE scheme, our unbounded CP-ABE
scheme, and our unbounded multi-authority CP-ABE scheme, respectively.
The original q-Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assump-
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tion, denoted by q-DPBDH, is almost the same as the q-DPBDH3 assumption
and for completeness it is described as the delta of q-DPBDH3 (see Rem. 3.6).
The generic security of all these computational assumptions is shown in ap-
pendix A.
We remind the reader that, for all assumptions, we require the existence
of a group generator algorithm G that gets a security parameter 1λ as input and
produces a description of a prime order bilinear group (see Sec. 3.1.1). This
algorithm outputs a tuple (p, g,G,GT , e) and is called by the challenger at the
beginning of the following security games. Also we remind that the notation
[q, q] or [q, q, 2q] denotes the set of integer pairs [q] × [q] or [q] × [q] × [2q],
respectively.
The q-DPBDH1 Assumption
After the challenger C calls the group generation algorithm G (1λ) →
(p, g,G,GT , e), it picks q+3 random exponents x, y, z, b1, b2, . . . , bq
R← Zp. The
given tuple D consists of the group description (p, g,G,GT , e) and all of the
following terms:
g, gx, gy, gz, g(xz)
2
gbi , gxzbi , gxz/bi , gx
2zbi , gy/b
2
i , gy
2/b2i ∀i ∈ [q]
gxzbi/bj , gybi/b
2
j , gxyzbi/bj , g(xz)
2bi/bj ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q] with i 6= j
The challenge terms are
T0 = e(g, g)
xyz and T1 = R
R← GT
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Definition 3.2. We say that the q-DPBDH1 assumption holds if for all PPT
attackers A it is true that Advq-DPBDH1A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
The q-DPBDH2 Assumption
After the challenger C calls the group generation algorithm G (1λ) →
(p, g,G,GT , e), it picks q + 2 random exponents a, s, b1, b2, . . . , bq
R← Zp. The
given tuple D consists of the group description (p, g,G,GT , e) and all of the
following terms:
g, gs
ga
i
, gbj , gsbj , ga
ibj , ga
i/b2j ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q]
ga
i/bj ∀(i, j) ∈ [2q, q] with i 6= q + 1
g
aibj/b
2
j′ ∀(i, j, j′) ∈ [2q, q, q] with j 6= j′
gsa
ibj/bj′ , g
saibj/b
2
j′ ∀(i, j, j′) ∈ [q, q, q] with j 6= j′
The challenge terms are
T0 = e(g, g)
saq+1 and T1 = R
R← GT
Definition 3.3. We say that the q-DPBDH2 assumption holds if for all PPT
attackers A it is true that Advq-DPBDH2A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Remark 3.4. Notice the absence of the term ga
q+1/bj in the third line of the
assumption. If this term were given to the attacker, then he could break the
assumption trivially by pairing it with the corresponding gsbj term. On the
other hand, the term g
aq+1bj/b
2
j′ is given, and this poses no problems in the
generic group model since j 6= j′ and by possible pairing the adversary cannot
get rid of the bj’s. See appendix A for further details.
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The q-DPBDH3 Assumption
After the challenger C calls the group generation algorithm G (1λ) →
(p, g,G,GT , e), it picks q + 2 random exponents s, a, b1, b2, . . . , bq
R← Zp. The
given tuple D consists of the group description (p, g,G,GT , e) and all of the
following terms:
g, gs
ga
i
, gbja
i ∀(i, j) ∈ [2q, q] with i 6= q + 1
gs/bi ∀i ∈ [q]
gsa
ibj/bj′ ∀(i, j, j′) ∈ [q + 1, q, q] with j 6= j′
The challenge terms are
T0 = e(g, g)
saq+1 and T1 = R
R← GT
Definition 3.5. We say that the q-DPBDH3 assumption holds if for all PPT
attackers A it is true that Advq-DPBDH3A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Remark 3.6. The q-DPBDH assumption is the same as the q-DPBDH3 with
the only difference that the {gsaibj/bj′} terms can not have i = q + 1.
3.2.2 Three Subgroup Decision Assumptions on Composite Order
Groups
To prove the security of our leakage-resilient construction of Chap. 5,
we will use the following three assumptions in composite order groups, also
used in [68, 72]. These are static assumptions, which hold in the generic group
model if finding a nontrivial factor of the group order is hard. The proof of
this can be found in [72].
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The first two of our assumptions belong to the class of the Source Group
Subgroup Decision Assumptions described in [10]. This class of assumptions
is defined as follows: in a bilinear group of order N = p1p2 . . . pn, there is a
subgroup of order
∏
i∈S pi for each subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. We let S0, S1 denote
two subsets. It is assumed to be hard to distinguish a random element from the
subgroup associated with S0 from a random element of the subgroup associated
with S1, even if one is given random elements from subgroups associated with
several subsets Zi which each satisfy either that S0 ∩ Zi = ∅ = S1 ∩ Zi or
S0 ∩ Zi 6= ∅ 6= S1 ∩ Zi. Note that when S0 ∩ Zi = ∅ = S1 ∩ Zi, pairing the
random element from Zi with the unknown element under the bilinear map
will always yield the identity element, while when S0 ∩ Zi 6= ∅ 6= S1 ∩ Zi,
pairing the random element from Zi with the unknown element will not yield
the identity element in either case. The third assumption is of similar flavor
but the two target terms reside in the target group.
We remind the reader that, for all assumptions, we require the existence
of a group generator algorithm G that gets a security parameter 1λ as input
and produces a description of a composite order bilinear group. That is, it
outputs three primes p1, p2, p3, two groups G,GT of order N = p1p2p3, a map
e : G × G → GT with the above properties, and three generators g1, g2, g3 of
subgroups G1,G2,G3, respectively. We also require that e is polynomial-time
computable with respect to λ.
We will denote the three assumptions on the composite order groups
by Comp1, Comp2, and Comp2. They are the following:
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The Comp1 Assumption
Given D = (N,G,GT , e, g1, g3) (notice that not all outputs of G are
given), no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing
T0 = g
z
1 from T1 = g
z
1g
ν
2 ,
where z, ν
R← ZN .
Definition 3.7. We say that the Comp1 assumption holds if for all PPT
attackers A it is true that AdvComp1A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
The Comp2 Assumption
Given D = (N,G,GT , e, g1, g3, gz1gν2 , g
µ
2 g
ρ
3), where z, ν, µ, ρ
R← ZN , no
PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing
T0 = g
w
1 g
σ
3 from T1 = g
w
1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 ,
where w, κ, σ
R← ZN .
Definition 3.8. We say that the Comp2 assumption holds if for all PPT
attackers A it is tru that AdvComp2A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
The Comp3 Assumption
Given D = (N,G,GT , e, g1, g2, g3, gα1 gν2 , gz1g
µ
2 ), where α, ν, z, µ
R← ZN ,
no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing
T0 = e(g1, g1)
αz ∈ GT from T1 R← GT .
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Definition 3.9. We say that the Comp3 assumption holds if for all PPT
attackers A it is true that AdvComp2A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
3.3 Implementation of Bilinear Groups using Elliptic
Curves
This section is a short introduction to the theory of elliptic curves and
their use in implementing bilinear pairing groups. We give a high level overview
of the elliptic curves over finite fields and the pairing operations on them. For
more information the reader is referred to [14, 15, 108].
3.3.1 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E defined over a field F contains the set of points of
the equation
y2 = x3 + Ax+B
where A and B are constants in F. The coordinates of the points can belong
possibly to an extension field L ⊇ F. The set of points of the curve also
includes a special point denoted by∞. Formally, the elliptic curve group with
points in the field L is defined as
E(L) = {∞} ∪ {(x, y) ∈ L× L|y2 = x3 + Ax+B}
A special “addition” operation is defined over the points of each elliptic
curve. We will not go into the details or the definition of addition on elliptic
curves, since we treat it as a black box operation with specific properties.
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When the underlying field L is the field of the real numbers R, the addition
of two points P1, P2 ∈ E(R) is defined as the symmetric point P3 = (x3, y3)
with respect to the x-axis of the intersection point −P3 = (x3,−y3) of the
straight line through P1 and P2 with the graph of the elliptic curve. The
important property of any elliptic curve is that the points of E(L) with the
addition operation form an abelian group with∞ as the identity element. For
our constructions, we will denote this operation by the multiplicative sign ·
which is more common in the cryptographic community. For clarity with our
multiplicative notation we denote the ∞ point as 1,1G, etc. However in this
section only we follow the additive notation for points of elliptic curves and
the definition of pairings.
In cryptography we are interested only in elliptic curve groups with
points in finite fields Fq. These are fields of order q = pn, where p is a prime
number and n a positive integer. Since there is only a finite number of possible
pairs (x, y) ∈ Fq×Fq, we know that the number of points in E(Fq) is finite and
therefore it is a finite abelian group. For finite elliptic curve groups there is
no geometric intuition for the group operation but the formulas are the same
as the case for R.
3.3.2 Tate-Lichtenbaum Pairing over Finite Fields
In this section we introduce the modified Tate-Lichtenbaum pairing
operation on elliptic curves of finite order. This is commonly used in applica-
tions of elliptic curves to cryptography, since it has several properties useful for
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simplifying the various implementations. However, the first pairing operation
used for cryptographic application [21] was the Weil pairing.
Let Fq be a finite field of order q and E be an elliptic curve defined
over Fq. Let r be a positive integer coprime to q which divides the order of
E(Fq). Let µr =
{
x ∈ F∗q|xr = 1
}
, i.e. the set of the r-th roots of unity in the
algebraic closure of Fq. Then the field K = Fq(µr) is some finite extension Fqk .
The number k is called the embedding degree of the elliptic curve and it is the
smallest positive integer such that r divides (qk − 1).
Let E(Fqk)[r] be the set of points in E(Fqk) of order r. Formally,
E(Fqk)[r] =
{
P ∈ E(Fqk)|rP =∞
}
The modified Tate-Lichtenbaum pairing is an efficiently computable
binary operation
τr : E(Fqk)[r]× E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk)→ µr
The first argument of the pairing is an element of the group E(Fqk)[r],
while the second argument is an element of the group of the equivalence classes
E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk). Both groups have size r. The equivalence relation defining
the classes of the second group acts on two points P1, P2 ∈ E(Fqk) and P1 ≡ P2
if and only if P1 − P2 ∈ rE(Fqk). The Tate-Lichtenbaum pairing satisfies the
properties required in Sec. 3.1.1 adapted to the asymmetric group case, where
G, H, GT are cyclic groups and G ⊆ E(Fqk)[r], H ⊆ E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk), and
GT ⊆ µr.
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3.3.3 Supersingular Curves and Distortion Maps
An important class of elliptic curves with many applications in pairing
based cryptography is the so called supersingular curves. An elliptic curve
E over the field Fq, where q is a power of a prime p, is called supersingular
if the order of E(Fq) is congruent to 1 modulo p, i.e. |E(Fq)| ≡ 1 (mod p).
For points on these curves there exists at least one efficiently computable
endomorphism on E that maps a point of E(Fq) to a point in E(Fqk) called
distortion map.
More specifically let P be a point in E(Fq) with prime order r. There-
fore P ∈ E(Fqk)[r]. Suppose the embedding degree k is greater than 1 and
E(Fqk) has no points of order r2. Let φ be an endomorphism of E. It can be
proved that if φ(P ) /∈ E(Fq), then τr(P, φ(P )) 6= 1.
The existence of the above distortion map φ allows as to consider sym-
metric bilinear groups where of order r. If we restrict the pairing to a single
cyclic subgroup of the elliptic curve, it can be proved that τr(Q, φ(P )) =
τr(P, φ(Q)) for any two points P,Q in the cyclic subgroup. As a result the
pairing defined as e(P,Q) ..= τr(P, φ(Q)) is symmetric. In the Table 3.1 you
can see the parameters and the distortion maps of the two types of supersin-
gular elliptic curves used in this thesis.
3.3.4 Prime vs Composite Order Group Operations
In order to demonstrate the generic difference in the efficiency of prime
order vs composite order implementations, we timed the group exponentiation
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Curve Fq k |E(Fq)| Distortion map
y2 = x3 + a q ≡ 2 (mod 3) 2 q + 1 (x, y) 7→ (ζ3x, y)
y2 = x3 + x q ≡ 3 (mod 4) 2 q + 1 (x, y) 7→ (−x, iy)
Table 3.1: Two types of supersingular elliptic curves. These are curves over
the field Fq where q satisfies the stated restrictions and k is the embedding
degree. ζ3 is a cubic root of unity in Fq, while i is the imaginary element such
that i2 = −1 in Fq.
(of a random group element with a random exponent) and pairing operations
(on random group elements) in the MIRACL framework [31] for different se-
curity levels. The benchmarks were executed on a dual core Intel R© Xeon R©
CPU W3503@2.40GHz with 2.0GB RAM running Ubuntu R10.04. The ellip-
tic curve utilized for all benchmarks was the super-singular (symmetric) curve
y2 = x3 + 1 mod p with embedding degree 2 for suitable primes p.
In table 3.2 we can see the significant gap between the timings in prime
and composite order groups for the same security levels. This is the main
reason that we tried to utilize prime order groups for our construction.
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Group exponentiation
Security Level (Bits) Prime Prod. of 2 primes Prod. of 3 primes
80 3.5 66.9 201.6
112 14.8 448.1 1404.3
128 34.4 1402.5 4512.5
192 273.8 20097.0 66526.0
Pairing
Security Level (Bits) Prime Prod. of 2 primes Prod. of 3 primes
80 13.9 245.3 762.3
112 65.7 1706.8 5485.2
128 176.6 5428.2 17494.4
192 1752.3 79046.8 263538.1
Table 3.2: Average timing results in milliseconds over 100 repeats of group
exponentiations and pairings in MIRACL.
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CHAPTER 4
Identity and Attribute-Based Encryption
Systems
In this chapter we present the formal definitions for identity and attribute-
based encryption systems. The former serve as an essential stepping stone
toward the latter, as it was the case for our leakage-resilient ABE construction
of Chap. 5.
4.1 IBE Definition
An Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) system (first introduced in [100])
is a public key cryptosystem which allows users to encrypt knowing only the
recipient’s identity and some public parameters of the systems (this means
that individual public keys are not needed). Formally, an IBE scheme consists
of four PPT algorithms. In order to allow leakage on many master keys, we
extend the functionality of the usual key generation algorithm by allowing it
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to take the empty string, denoted by , as input.
Setup(1λ) → (PP,MSK) The setup algorithm takes an integer secu-
rity parameter, λ, as input and outputs the public parameters, PP, and the
original master key, MSK. The remaining algorithms take implicitly the secu-
rity parameter and the public parameters as inputs. The security parameter
is encoded in unary, so that all algorithms run in polynomial time in λ.
KeyGen(MSK′, X)→ K The key generation algorithm takes in a mas-
ter key, MSK′, and either X = ID, an identity, or X = , the empty string1.
In the former case, it outputs a secret key, K = SK, for the identity ID.
In the latter case, it outputs another master key, K = MSK′′, such that
‖MSK′′‖ = ‖MSK′‖ 2. This new master key can now be used instead of the
original key in calls of Keygen (either with ID or with  as input).
Encrypt(M, ID)→ CT The encryption algorithm takes in a message,
M , and an identity, ID, and outputs a ciphertext, CT.
Decrypt(CT, SK) → M The decryption algorithm takes in a cipher-
text, CT, and a secret key, SK. It outputs a message M .
The correctness requirement is that if the identity ID used during
encryption is the same as the identity of the secret key used during decryption,
then the output of Decrypt is the encrypted message M . That is, for all
1This is not the standard definition of KeyGen in IBE systems. We augmented it to
accept the empty string in order to work as an update algorithm for the master key and
eventually achieve security in the Continual Leakage Model (see Section ).
2This restriction prevents expansion of the master key.
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MSK,PP generated by a call to Setup for all master keys MSK′ generated
by applying the KeyGen algorithm with the empty string and a previously
generated master key, and for all M, ID
Decrypt(Encrypt(M, ID),KeyGen(MSK′, ID)) = M
4.1.1 Dual System IBE
As noted in Sec. 2.3 a dual system encryption system admits semi-
functional secret keys and ciphertexts along with the normal components.
Therefore it consists of two additional algorithms:
KeyGenSf(MSK′, X) → K˜ The semi-functional key generation algo-
rithm takes in a normal master key, MSK′, and either X = ID, an identity,
or X = , the empty string. In the former case, it outputs a semi-functional
secret key, K˜ = S˜K, for the identity ID. In the latter case, it outputs a semi-
functional master key, K˜ = ˜MSK
′′
. Notice that the master key used as input
to the algorithm is always normal.
EncryptSf(M, ID) → C˜T The encryption algorithm takes in a mes-
sage, M , and an identity, ID, and outputs a semi-functional ciphertext, CT.
4.2 ABE Definitions
In this section we present the formal definitions of the different notions
of attribute-based encryption systems. For simplicity of notation, we do not
include the security parameter λ as input to the algorithms, except Setup and
59
GlobalSetup. We assume that it is implicitly included in the (global) public
parameters.
4.2.1 Ciphertext-Policy ABE
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme consists of the
following four PPT algorithms:
Setup
(
1λ,U) R→ (PP,MSK): The Setup algorithm takes as inputs the
security parameter λ ∈ N encoded in unary and a description of the attribute
universe U 3. It outputs the public parameters PP and the master secret key
MSK.
KeyGen (PP,MSK,S) R→ SK: The key generation algorithm takes as
inputs the public parameters PP, the master secret key MSK and a set of
attributes S ⊆ U . The algorithm generates a secret key corresponding to S.
Encrypt (PP,M,A) R→ CT: The encryption algorithm takes as inputs
the public parameters PP, a plaintext message M , and an access structure A
on U . It outputs the ciphertext CT.
Decrypt (PP, SK,CT) → {M,⊥}: The deterministic decryption al-
gorithm takes as inputs the public parameters PP, a secret key SK, and a
ciphertext CT. It outputs either the plaintext M , when the collection of at-
tributes satisfies the access structure of the ciphertext, or ⊥ when decryption
fails.
3See Sec. 4.2.4 for more information on the description of the attribute universe.
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Correctness: We require that a CP-ABE scheme is correct, i.e the
decryption algorithm correctly decrypts a ciphertext of an access structure A
with a secret key on Swhen S is an authorized set of A. Formally:
Definition 4.1. A CP-ABE scheme is correct when for all messages M , and
all attribute sets S and access structures A with S ∈ A (i.e. for S authorized):
Pr
Decrypt (PP, SK,CT) 6= M
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PP,MSK)
R← Setup (1λ)
SK
R← KeyGen (PP,MSK,S)
CT
R← Encrypt (PP,M,A)
 ≤ negl(λ)
where the probability is taken over all random coins of all algorithms.
As noted in Sec. 2.3, in case the ABE scheme is of the dual system
encryption type it also consists of the following two semi functional algorithms:
KeyGenSf (PP,MSK,S) R→ SK: The key generation algorithm takes
as inputs the public parameters PP, a normal master secret key MSK and a
set of attributes S ⊆ U . The algorithm generates a semi-functional secret key
corresponding to S.
EncryptSf (PP,M,A) R→ CT: The encryption algorithm takes as in-
puts the public parameters PP, a plaintext message M , and an access structure
A on U . It outputs the semi-functional ciphertext CT.
4.2.2 Key-Policy ABE
The only difference between a key-policy and a ciphertext-policy ABE
scheme is that the roles of the keys and the ciphertexts with respect to the
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policies and the attribute sets are reversed. In the KP-ABE case each key
is tied to a policy instead of an attribute set. A key-policy attribute-based
encryption scheme consists of the following four PPT algorithms:
Setup(1λ,U) R→ (PP,MSK): The Setup algorithm takes as inputs the
security parameter λ ∈ N encoded in unary and a description of the attribute
universe U 3. It outputs the public parameters PP and the master secret key
MSK.
KeyGen(PP,MSK,A) R→ SK: The key generation algorithm takes as
inputs the public parameters PP, the master secret key MSK and an access
structure A on U . The algorithm generates a secret key corresponding to A.
Encrypt(PP,M,S) R→ CT: The encryption algorithm takes as inputs
the public parameters PP, a plaintext message M , and a set of attributes
S ⊆ U . It outputs the ciphertext CT.
Decrypt(PP, SK,CT) → {M,⊥}: The deterministic decryption al-
gorithm takes as inputs the public parameters PP, a secret key SK, and a
ciphertext CT. It outputs either the plaintext M , when the collection of at-
tributes satisfies the access structure of the ciphertext, or ⊥ when decryption
fails.
Correctness: We require that a KP-ABE scheme is correct, i.e the
decryption algorithm correctly decrypts a ciphertext on S with a secret key of
an access structure A when S is an authorized set of A. Formally:
Definition 4.2. A KP-ABE scheme is correct when for all messages M , and
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all attribute sets S and access structures A with S ∈ A (i.e. for S authorized):
Pr
Decrypt(PP, SK,CT) 6= M
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PP,MSK)
R← Setup(1λ)
SK
R← KeyGen(PP,MSK,A)
CT
R← Encrypt(PP,M,S)
 ≤ neglλ
where the probability is taken over all random coins of all algorithms.
4.2.3 Multi-Authority ABE
A multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system
consists of the following five algorithms:
GlobalSetup(1λ,U ,UΘ) R→ GP: The global setup algorithm takes as
inputs the security parameter λ ∈ N encoded in unary, a description of the at-
tribute universe U , and a description on the authority universe UΘ. It outputs
the public global parameters for the system.
We assume that the description of a function T : U → UΘ is included
in the global parameters. This function maps each attribute to the unique
authority it belongs to.
AuthSetup(GP, θ)
R→ (PKθ, SKθ): The authority θ ∈ UΘ calls the au-
thority setup algorithm during its initialization with the global parameters GP
as input and receives its public / secret key pair (PKθ, SKθ). Each authority
is supposed to call this algorithm during its initialization, store the authority
secret key SKθ, and publish the public key PKθ.
KeyGen(GP,GID, SKθ, u) R→ KGID,u: The key generation algorithm
takes in the global identifier GID of a user, the secret key of the authority
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θ, an attribute u controlled by this authority, and the global parameters. It
outputs a key for the identity - attribute pair (GID, u).
Encrypt(GP,M,A, {PKθ}θ∈CΘ)
R→ CT: The encryption takes in a mes-
sage M , an access structure A, a set of public keys {PKθ}θ∈CΘ , and the global
parameters. The set CΘ is the set of the authorities relevant to the access
structure A(See Sec. 2.1.2 for a description of the relevant authorities). The
algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT.
Decrypt(GP, {KGID,u}u∈S ,CT)→ {M,⊥}: The deterministic decryp-
tion algorithm takes in a ciphertext CT, the set of keys of a single user GID
corresponding to different attributes u, and the global parameters. It outputs
either the message M , when the collection of attributes satisfies the access
structure of the ciphertext, or ⊥ when decryption fails.
Correctness: We require that a MA-CP-ABE scheme is correct, i.e.
the decryption algorithm correctly decrypts a ciphertext on A with a secret
key of the attribute set S, when S is an authorized set of A. All the public
keys on the relevant authorities of the access structure A and the secret keys
of the attribute set S should have been created by the AuthSetup algorithm.
For simplicity of the definition we include the entire universe of authorities.
Formally:
Definition 4.3. A MA-CP-ABE scheme is correct when for any user GID, for
all messages M , and all attribute sets S and access structures A with S ∈ A
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(i.e. for S authorized):
Pr

Decrypt(GP,
{KGID,u}u∈S ,CT) 6= M
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
GP
R← GlobalSetup(1λ){
(PKθ, SKθ)
R← AuthSetup(GP, θ)
}
θ∈UΘ{
KGID,u
R← KeyGen (GP,GID, SKT(u), u)}
u∈S
CT
R← Encrypt (GP,M,A, {PKθ}θ∈UΘ)
 ≤ negl(λ)
where the probability is taken over all random coins of all algorithms.
4.2.4 Small Universe, Large Universe, and Unbounded Construc-
tions
Orthogonal to the above definitions, we characterize the ABE schemes
with respect to the attribute universe size with the following properties:
Small Universe Constructions In these systems, the size of the attribute
universe U is polynomial in the security parameter λ. Typically for
construction of this type, the number of group elements of the public
parameters, secret keys, and/or ciphertexts depends polynomially on
|U|. As a result, the designer of these systems has to decide during setup
on a trade off between the expressiveness of the different policies (the
bigger the universe, the more expressive the policies) and the efficiency
of the implementation (the larger the universe, the less efficient scheme).
Large Universe Constructions In these systems, the size of the attribute
universe is exponential in the security parameter λ, while the size of the
public parameters, secret keys, and ciphertexts is polynomial λ. This
is obviously a desired feature, since in practice any possible attribute
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can be used in the policies of these systems. For example, the attribute
universe can be the set of character strings of up to 128 characters.
An extra property that can be applied to both of the above notions is
the following:
Unbounded Constructions In unbounded constructions the length of the
public parameters, keys and ciphertexts depends only on λ and is inde-
pendent of the size of the attribute universe |U|.
According to the above definitions, a large universe ABE scheme is
also unbounded, while a small universe ABE scheme can be either bounded
or unbounded. Actually, in several works [74] the term unbounded implied
a large universe construction. The only small universe and unbounded ABE
is the construction of Okamoto and Takashima [88], where all the encryption
components are of constant length, but the security proof requires the size of
the attribute universe to be polynomial in the security parameter. In this case,
the trade off is happening between expressiveness and proven security of the
implementation.
A common approach to construct large universe schemes from small
universe ones is to use a hash function that maps attributes from an exponen-
tial sized set to another exponential sized set. However, in this case the hash
function has to be modeled as a random oracle in the security proof, which
implies weaker security guarantees.
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With respect to the inputs to the Setup algorithm of different schemes,
the small universe constructions take as input (a description of) the entire
universe U , while for the large universe constructions the attribute universe
depends typically on the security parameter only. In these cases, the Setup
algorithm takes as input only 1λ. Finally, for the multi-authority setting, we
note that the universe of authorities is considered to be polynomially bounded
(although this is not necessary for our security proof in Sec. 6.3), since we
assume that at most a polynomial number of public authorities is going to be
deployed at any given time.
Our constructions of Chap. 6 are large-universe constructions secure
under various security notions, and more specifically the attribute universe is
Z∗p where p is a prime number with ‖p‖ = λ. Since practicality was one of
our main goals in Chap. 6 we required our constructions to be large universe
in order to achieve maximum expressiveness. On the other hand, the robust
construction of Chap. 5 is a small-universe (bounded) construction. That is,
the size of the public parameters depends linearly of the size of the attribute
universe, set during the Setup algorithm.
4.2.5 Dual System CP-ABE
A dual system CP-ABE system consists of the additional two algo-
rithms:
KeyGenSf (PP,MSK,S) R→ S˜K: The key generation algorithm takes
as inputs the public parameters PP, the master secret key MSK and a set
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of attributes S ⊆ U . The algorithm generates a semi-functional secret key
corresponding to S.
EncryptSf (PP,M,A) R→ C˜T: The encryption algorithm takes as in-
puts the public parameters PP, a plaintext message M , and an access structure
A on U . It outputs the semi-functional ciphertext C˜T.
4.3 Security Notions
In this section we present the various security notions under which our
constructions are secure. All security notions are defined via security games
between a challenger C and an attacker A. In all games the attacker outputs a
pair of messagesM0 andM1 and receives an encryption ofMb, where b
R← {0, 1}
is a random bit picked by the challenger. The goal of the attacker is to guess
which message was encrypted. Its guess/output is a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and its
success is measured by the advantage defined as
AdvA(λ) ..= |2 · Pr [b′ = b]− 1| = |Pr [b′ = 1|b = 1]− Pr [b′ = 1|b = 0]|
4.3.1 CP-ABE Security Notions
In this section we present the definition of adaptive (or full) security for
CP-ABE schemes. This is described by a game between a challenger and an
attacker and is parameterized by the security parameter λ ∈ N. The phases
of the adaptive security game are the following:
Setup: The challenger calls the Setup(1λ) algorithm and sends the
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public parameters PP to the attacker.
Query Phase 1: In this phase the attacker can adaptively ask for
secret keys for the sets of attributes S1,S2, . . . ,SQ1 . For each Si the challenger
calls KeyGen(MSK,Si)→ SKi and sends SKi to the attacker.
Challenge: The attacker declares an access structure A∗ and two
equal-length plaintexts M0 and M1. The challenger receives (A∗,M0,M1) and
flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}. After calling Encrypt(Mb,A∗)→ CT, he sends
CT to the attacker.
The restriction that has to be satisfied by the access structure A∗ is
that none of the queried sets in Phase 1 satisfies it, i.e. ∀i ∈ [Q1] : Si /∈ A∗.
Query Phase 2: This the same as query phase 1. The attacker
asks for the secret key for the sets SQ1+1,SQ1+2, . . . ,SQ, for which the same
restriction holds: ∀i ∈ [Q] : Si /∈ A∗.
Guess: The attacker outputs his guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
Definition 4.4. A CP-ABE scheme is adaptively secure if all PPT attackers
have at most a negligible advantage in λ in the adaptive security game.
A weaker notion of security for CP-ABE scheme is when the attacker
declares the challenge access structure at the beginning of the game. That is,
the selective security game is the same as the adaptive security game except
that the Setup phase is preceded by the following phase:
Initialization: In this phase the attacker declares the challenge ac-
cess structure A∗, which he will try to attack, and sends it to the challenger.
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As before all secret key queries should satisfy the same restriction:
∀i ∈ [Q] : Si /∈ A∗.
Definition 4.5. A CP-ABE scheme is selectively secure if all PPT attackers
have at most a negligible advantage in λ in the selective security game.
4.3.2 KP-ABE Security Notions
Similarly, the phases of the adaptive security game for KP-ABE schemes
are the following:
Setup: Here the challenger calls the Setup(1λ) algorithm and sends
the public parameters PP to the attacker.
Query Phase 1: In this phase the attacker can adaptively ask for
secret keys for the access structures A1,A2, . . . ,AQ1 . For each Ai the challenger
calls KeyGen(MSK,Ai)→ SKi and sends SKi to the attacker.
Challenge: The attacker declares an attribute set S∗ ⊆ U and two
equal-length plaintexts M0 and M1. The challenger receives (S∗,M0,M1) and
flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}. After calling Encrypt(Mb,S∗) → CT, he sends
CT to the attacker.
The restriction that has to be satisfied by the challenge set S∗ is that
none of the queried policies is satisfied by it, i.e. ∀i ∈ [Q1] : S∗ /∈ Ai.
Query Phase 2: This the same as query phase 1. The attacker asks
for the secret key for the access structures AQ1+1,AQ1+2, . . . ,AQ, for which the
same restriction holds: ∀i ∈ [Q] : S∗ /∈ Ai.
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Guess: The attacker outputs his guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
Definition 4.6. A KP-ABE scheme is adaptively secure if all PPT attackers
have at most a negligible advantage in λ in the adaptive security game, where
the advantage of an attacker is defined as Adv = Pr [b′ = b]− 1/2.
As before, we define the weaker notion of security via the selective
security game. This is the same as the adaptive security game except that the
Setup phase is preceded by the following phase:
Initialization: In this phase the attacker declares the challenge at-
tribute set S∗, which he will try to attack, and sends it to the challenger.
All secret key queries should satisfy the restriction: ∀i ∈ [Q] : S∗ /∈ A∗i .
Definition 4.7. A KP-ABE scheme is selectively secure if all PPT attackers
have at most a negligible advantage in λ in the selective security game.
4.3.3 Multi-Authority Static Security
In this section we will define the static (or non-adaptive) security game
between a challenger and an attacker. The difference between this security
game and the adaptive one is that all queries done by the attacker are sent
to the challenger immediately after seeing the public parameters. As usual,
we also allow the attacker to corrupt a certain set of authorities that he can
control. These authorities are chosen by the attacker after seeing the global
parameters and remain the same until the end of the game.
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The static security game is parameterized by the security parameter
λ and consists of the following phases:
Global Setup: The challenger calls GlobalSetup(1λ)→ GP and gives
the global parameters GP to the attacker.
Attacker’s Queries: Then the attacker responds with (CΘ, NΘ, Q,
(M0,M1), A) where:
• A set CΘ ⊆ UΘ of corrupt authorities and their respective public keys
{PKθ}θ∈CΘ , which he might have created in a malicious way4.
• A set NΘ ⊆ UΘ of the non-corrupt authorities for which the adversary
requests the public keys. Obviously, it should be disjoint from the set of
corrupt authorities.
• A sequence Q = {(GIDi,Si)}mi=1 of the secret key queries, where the
global identities GIDi are distinct and Si ⊆ U with T(Si) ∩ CΘ = ∅.
A pair (GIDi,Si) in this sequence denotes that the attacker requests the
secret keys for the user GIDi with attributes from the set Si. That is, for
every u ∈ Si the attacker gets a key KGIDi,u ← KeyGen(GIDi, SKT(u),
u, GP). According to the restriction T(Si) ∩ CΘ = ∅, none of these keys
come from a corrupt authority.
• Two messages M0,M1 of equal length, and a challenge access structure
A encoded in a suitable form. We require that for every i ∈ [m] the
4The only requirement is that they have the correct type.
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set Si ∪
⋃
θ∈CΘ T
−1(θ) is a unauthorized set of the access structure A,
where
⋃
θ∈CΘ T
−1(θ) is the set of all the attributes belonging to corrupt
authorities. This way, the attacker will not be able to trivially win the
game by decrypting the challenge ciphertext with a secret key given to
him augmented with the key components from the corrupt authorities.
Challenger’s Replies: The challenger flips a random coin b
R←
{0, 1} and replies with:
• The public keys PKθ ← AuthSetup(GP, θ) for all θ ∈ NΘ.
• The secret keys KGIDi,u ← KeyGen(GIDi, SKT(u), u,GP) for all i ∈ [m]
and for all u ∈ Si.
• The challenge ciphertext CT∗ ← Encrypt(Mb, A, {PKθ}, GP) where
{PKθ} is the set of all authority public keys (corrupt and non corrupt).
Guess: The attacker outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 4.8. A MA-CP-ABE scheme is statically secure if all PPT attack-
ers have at most a negligible advantage in λ in the static security game.
4.3.4 IBE Leakage-Resilient Adaptive Security
The security of our IBE system is based on a game, called MasterLeak.
It is a modified version of the usual IbeCpa security game. In that game,
the attacker can make a polynomial number of KeyGen queries for identities
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other than the challenge identity. Each of these queries returns a secret key of
the requested identity. The main idea of our security game is to allow these
queries and in addition allow leakage on the master key and secret keys of
the challenge identity. The only restriction we impose is that it can not get
leakage of more than `MSK bits per master key (remember we can have many
master keys) and `SK bits per secret key, where `MSK, `SK are parameters of
the game.
The game starts with a setup phase, where the challenger runs the
setup algorithm and gives the attacker the public parameters. It also gives
the attacker a handle (i.e. reference) to the master key. We now allow the
attacker to make three kinds of queries, called Create, Leak and Reveal.
With a Create query, the attacker asks the challenger to create a key and
store it. The attacker supplies a handle that refers to a master key to be used
in the key generation algorithm. Each such query returns a unique handle-
reference to the generated key, so that the attacker can refer to it later and
either apply a leakage function to it and/or ask for the entire key. The original
master key (the one created in the Setup algorithm) gets a handle of 0.
Using a handle, the attacker can make a leakage query Leak on any key
of its choice. Since all queries are adaptive (the attacker has the ability to leak
from each key a few bits at the time, instead of requiring the leakage to occur
all at once) and the total amount of leakage allowed is bounded, the challenger
has to keep track of all keys leaked via these queries and the number of leaked
bits from each key so far. Thus, it creates a set T that holds tuples of handles,
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identities, keys, and the number of leaked bits. Each Create query adds a
tuple to this set and each Leak query updates the number of bits leaked.
The Reveal queries allow the attacker to get access to an entire secret
key. They get as input a handle to a key and the challenger returns this secret
key to the attacker. The obvious restriction is that the attacker can not get a
master key, since it would trivially break the system. For the same reason, no
key for the challenge identity should be revealed and thus the challenger has
to have another set to keep track of the revealed identities. We will denote this
set by R. We also note that the Reveal queries model the attacker’s ability to
“change its mind” in the middle of the game on the challenge identity. Maybe
the attacker, after getting leakage from a secret key, decides that it is better
to get the entire key via a Reveal query. Thus we achieve the maximum level
of adaptiveness.
We now define our game formally. The security game is parameterized
by a security parameter λ and two leakage bounds `MSK = `MSK(λ), `SK =
`SK(λ). The master keys’, secret keys’ and identities’ spaces are denoted by
MK, SK, and I, respectively. We assume that the handles’ space is H = N.
The game MasterLeak consists of the following phases:
Setup: The challenger makes a call to Setup(1λ) and gets a master
key MSK and the public parameters PP. It gives PP to the attacker. Also,
it sets R = ∅ and T = {(0, ,MSK, 0)}. Remember that R ⊆ I and T ⊆
H × I × (MK ∪ SK) × N (handles - identities - keys - leaked bits). Thus
initially the set T holds a record of the original master key (no identity for it
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and no leakage so far). Also a handle counter H is set to 0.
Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can make the following queries
to the challenger. All of them can be interleaved in any possible way and the
input of a query can depend on the outputs of all previous queries (adaptive
security).
• Create(h,X): h is a handle to a tuple of T that must refer to a master
key and X can be either an identity ID or the empty string .
The challenger initially scans T to find the tuple with handle h. If the
identity part of the tuple is not , which means that the tuple holds a
secret key of some identity, or if the handle does not exist, it responds
with ⊥.
Otherwise, the tuple is of the form (h, ,MSK′, L). Then the chal-
lenger makes a call to KeyGen(MSK′, X) → K and adds the tuple
(H + 1, X,K, 0) to the set T . K is either a secret key for identity ID
or another master key. After that, it updates the handle counter to
H ← H + 1.
• Leak(h, f): In this query, the adversary requests leakage from a key
that has handle h ∈ N with a polynomial-time computable function f of
constant output size5 acting on the set of keys.
5We apply this restriction so that the adversary does not get any “extra” information
about the input; only the output bits of the function. This restriction is also present in
other works (e.g. in [28] they use circuits as leakage functions).
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The challenger scans T to find the tuple with the specified handle. It is
either of the form (h, ID, SK, L) or (h, ,MSK′, L) 6.
In the first case, it checks if L+‖f(SK)‖ ≤ `SK. If this is true, it responds
with f(SK) and updates the L in the tuple with L + ‖f(SK)‖. If the
checks fails, it returns ⊥ to the adversary.
If the tuple holds a master key MSK′, it checks if L + ‖f(MSK′)‖ ≤
`MSK. If this is true, it responds with f(MSK
′) and updates the L with
L+ ‖f(MSK′)‖. If the checks fails, it returns ⊥ to the adversary.
• Reveal(h): Now the adversary requests the entire key with handle h.
The challenger scans T to find the requested entry. If the handle refers
to a master key tuple, then the challenger returns ⊥. Otherwise, we
denote the tuple by (h, ID, SK, L). The challenger responds with SK
and adds the identity ID to the set R.
Challenge: The adversary submits a challenge identity ID∗ /∈ R
and two messages M0,M1 of equal size. The challenger flips a uniform coin
c
R← {0, 1} and encrypts Mc under ID∗ with a call to Encrypt(Mc, ID∗). It
sends the resulting ciphertext CT∗ to the adversary.
Phase 2: This is the same as Phase 1 with the restriction that
the only queries allowed are Create and Reveal queries that involve a (non-
master) secret key with identity different than ID∗. The reason for forbidding
6It can be the case that MSK′ is the original master key.
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Leak queries on a master key and on ID∗ is that the adversary can encode
the entire decryption algorithm of CT∗ as a function on a secret key, and thus
win the game trivially if we allow these queries. For the same reason, the
challenger can not give an entire secret key of ID∗ to the adversary and hence
no Reveal queries involving ID∗ are allowed too. Leak queries on keys of
identities other than ID∗ are useless, since the adversary can get the entire
secret keys.
Guess: The adversary outputs a bit c′ ∈ {0, 1}. We say it succeeds
if c′ = c.
The security definition we will use is the following:
Definition 4.9. An IBE encryption system Π is (`MSK, `SK)-master-leakage
secure if for all PPT adversaries A it is true that
AdvMasterLeakA,Π (λ, `MSK, `SK) ≤ negl(λ)
where AdvMasterLeakA,Π (λ, `MSK, `SK) is the advantage of A in game MasterLeak with
security parameter λ and leakage parameters `MSK = `MSK(λ), `SK = `SK(λ)
and is formally defined as
AdvMasterLeakA,Π (λ, `MSK, `SK) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [A succeeds]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is over all random bits used by the challenger and the
attacker.
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4.3.5 CP-ABE Leakage-Resilient Adaptive Security
In this section we will define the MasterLeakAbe which models the adap-
tive (or full) security notion for the leakage resilient CP-ABE schemes. The
main difference with the regular adaptive game for CP-ABE schemes is that
in this case the attacker can ask for leakage on secret keys of his choice, even
if these secret keys can decrypt the challenge ciphertext. He might even ask
for leakage on the master secret key. Of course the attacker is not allowed to
leak on the entire keys, because otherwise he would be able to trivially win the
game. Hence, it is parameterized by two leakage bounds, `MSK, `SK ∈ N, that
bound the number of leaked bits that the attacker is allowed to acquire from
each master secret key7 and each secret key, respectively. As in the regular
game, the attacker is also allowed to retrieve entire keys under the restriction
that they can not decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Since we are interested in adaptive security, we give to the attacker
the ability to postpone his decision on which keys are leaked, which ones
are revealed, and the challenge policy, as long as possible. For example, the
attacker might request leakage on some secret key and, depending on the result,
either get the entire key or stop leaking on it and use a challenge ciphertext
that can be decrypted by it. To achieve this functionality, the challenger upon
the creation of a key, assigns a handle to it (a unique integer) and provides to
7We might have many master secret keys because the scheme might support an update
algorithm that can output a fresh master secret key, consistent with the original public
parameters.
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the attacker reference to it via this handle. Using this handle, the attacker can
either make many leakage queries or ask for a complete reveal on the key. The
challenger holds a record of the total number of leaked bits from each specific
handle, so that the leakage does not exceed the leakage bounds. Also every
time the attacker gets an entire key, the challenger stores the attribute set of
this key in another record in order to be able to check the restriction that the
challenge access structure is not satisfied by any of these keys
Formally the MasterLeakAbe game consists of the following phases:
Setup: The challenger makes a call to Setup(1λ,U) and gets a master
key MSK and the public parameters PP. It gives PP to the attacker. Also,
it sets R = ∅ (the revealed keys’ list) and T = {(0,U ,MSK, 0)} (the handles’
list). Here, R ⊆ 2U and T ⊆ H × 2U × (MK ∪ SK) × N (handles - sets of
attributes - keys - leaked bits so far), whereMK and SK is the space of master
keys and secret keys, respectively. Thus initially the set T holds a record of
the master key (universal attribute set for it and no leakage so far). Also a
handle counter H is set to 0.
Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can make the following queries
to the challenger. All of them can be interleaved in any possible way and
therefore the input of a query can depend on the outputs of all previous queries
(adaptive security).
• Create(h,S): h is a handle to a tuple of T that has to refer to a master
key. The attribute set S can be any subset of the universe U , including
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U itself. If S = U , the attacker asks for the creation (via the update
algorithm) of another master key.
The challenger initially scans T to find the tuple with handle h. If the
attribute set field of the tuple is not U , which means that the tuple holds
a non-master key, or if the handle does not exist, it responds with ⊥.
Otherwise, the tuple is of the form (h,U ,MSK′, L). Then the chal-
lenger makes a call to Keygen(MSK′,S) → K and adds the tuple
(H + 1,S, K, 0) to the set T . After that, it updates the handle counter
to H ← H + 1.
• Leak(h, f): In this query, the adversary requests leakage from a key
that has handle h ∈ N with a polynomial-time computable function f
of constant output size acting on the set of keys. The challenger scans
T to find the tuple with the specified handle. It is either of the form
(h,S, SK, L) or (h,U ,MSK′, L).
In the first case, it checks first if L + ‖f(SK)‖ ≤ `SK. If this is true, it
responds with f(SK) and updates the L in the tuple with L+ ‖f(SK)‖.
If the check fails, it returns ⊥ to the adversary.
If the tuple holds a master key MSK′, it checks if L+‖f(MSK′)‖ ≤ `MSK.
If this is true, and responds with f(MSK′) and updates the L with
L+ ‖f(MSK′)‖. If the check fails, it returns ⊥ to the adversary.
• Reveal(h): Now the adversary requests the entire key with handle h.
The challenger scans T to find the requested entry. If the handle refers
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to a master key tuple, then the challenger returns ⊥. Otherwise, let’s
say the tuple is (h,S, SK, L). The challenger responds with SK and adds
the subset S to the set R.
Challenge: The adversary submits a challenge access structure A∗
with the restriction that no subset in R satisfies it. It also submits two mes-
sages M0,M1 of equal size. The challenger flips a uniform coin c
R← {0, 1} and
encrypts Mc under A∗ with a call to Encrypt(Mc,A∗). It sends the resulting
ciphertext CT∗ to the adversary.
Phase 2: This is the same as Phase 1, except with the restriction
that the only allowed queries are Create and Reveal queries for secret keys
with attribute sets that do not satisfy A∗.
Guess: The adversary outputs a bit c′ ∈ {0, 1}. We say it succeeds
if c′ = c.
Definition 4.10. A CP-ABE scheme is (`MSK, `SK)-master leakage secure if all
PPT attackers have at most a negligible advantage in λ in the MasterLeakAbe
game.
4.3.6 Three Properties for Leakage-Resilient Adaptive Security
To prove security of our leakage-resilient systems of Chapter 5, we will
first define three properties. These are defined similarly in both the IBE and
ABE cases. The only difference is that the keys correspond to identities in
the IBE case and attribute sets in the ABE case. Here, we will give the
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definitions of semi-functional ciphertext invariance, the one semi-functional
key invariance, and semi-functional security in the ABE setting.
The MasterLeakC game is exactly the same as the MasterLeakAbe game
except that in the Challenge phase, the challenger uses EncryptSF instead
of Encrypt to create a semi-functional ciphertext, and returns this to the
adversary.
In the MasterLeakCK game the challenger again uses EncryptSF for
the challenge phase. However, the set of tuples T has a different structure.
Each tuple holds for each key (master or secret) a normal and a semi-functional
version of it. In this game, all keys leaked or given to the attacker are semi-
functional. As we have noted above, the semi-functional key generation al-
gorithm takes as input a normal master key. Thus the challenger stores the
normal versions, as well the semi-functional ones so that it can use the normal
versions of master keys as input to KeyGen calls. More precisely, the challenger
additionally stores a semi-functional master key in tuple 0 by calling Key-
genSF(MSK, ) after calling Setup. Thereafter, for all Create(h,X) queries,
the challenger makes an additional call to KeygenSF(MSK′, X), where MSK′
is the normal version of the master key stored in tuple h. Leak and Reveal
queries act always on the semi-functional versions of each key.
The MasterLeakb game is similar to the MasterLeakCK game, with the
main difference being that the attacker can choose on which version of each key
to leak or reveal. In other words, on the first leakage or reveal query on a key
of the augmented set T , the attacker tells the challenger whether it wants the
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normal or the semi-functional version of the key. In order for the challenger
to keep track of the attacker’s choice on each key, we further augment each
tuple of T with a lock-value denoted by V ∈ N that can take one of the three
values:
• −1: That means that the attacker has not made a choice on this key yet
and the key is “unlocked”. This is the value the tuple gets, in a Create
query.
• 0: The attacker chose to use the normal version of the key on the first
leakage or reveal query on it. All subsequent Leak and Reveal queries
act on the normal version.
• 1: The attacker chose the semi-functional version and the challenger
works as above with the semi-functional version.
To summarize, each tuple is of the form (h,X,K, K˜, L, V ) i.e. handle -
attribute set - normal key - semi-functional key - leakage - lock. For example,
the original master key is stored at the beginning of the game in the tuple
(0, U,MSK,KeygenSF(MSK, U), 0,−1).
At some point, the attacker must decide on a challenge key which is
“unlocked”, V = −1, and tell this to the challenger. The challenger samples a
uniformly random bit b
R← {0, 1} and sets V = b. Therefore, the attacker has
access to either the normal (if b = 0) or the semi-functional (if b = 1) version
of this key via Leak and Reveal queries. We note that if the attacker did not
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make a choice for the original master key in tuple 0, it can choose this master
key as the challenge key.
The attacker is then allowed to resume queries addressed to either nor-
mal or semi-functional keys, with the usual restrictions (i.e. no leakage or
reveal queries on keys capable of decrypting the challenge ciphertext after the
attacker has seen the challenge ciphertext).
Semi-functional Ciphertext Invariance: We say that a dual system ABE
scheme ΠD has (`MSK, `SK)-semi-functional ciphertext invariance if for any
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage of A in the game
MasterLeakAbe is negligibly close to the advantage of A in the MasterLeakC
game. We denote this by:∣∣AdvMasterLeakAbeA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeakCA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
Semi-functional Key Invariance: We say that a dual system ABE scheme
ΠD has (`MSK, `SK)-semi-functional key invariance if for any probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm A, the advantage of A in the MasterLeakC game is neg-
ligibly close to the advantage of A in the MasterLeakCK game. We denote this
by: ∣∣AdvMasterLeakCA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeakCKA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
One Semi-functional Key Invariance: We say that a dual system ABE
scheme ΠD has (`MSK, `SK)-one semi-functional key invariance if, for any prob-
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abilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage of A in the MasterLeakb
game with b = 0 is negligibly close to the advantage of A in the MasterLeakb
game with b = 1. We denote this by:
∣∣AdvMasterLeak0A,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeak1A,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣ ≤ negl(λ)
Semi-functional Security: We say that a dual system ABE scheme ΠD has
(`MSK, `SK)-semi-functional security if for any probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A, the advantage of A in the MasterLeakCK game is negligible. We
denote this by:
AdvMasterLeakCKA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK) ≤ negl(λ).
The following theorems are proved below.
Theorem 4.11. If a dual system ABE scheme ΠD = ( Setup, Keygen, En-
crypt, Decrypt, KeygenSF, EncryptSF) has (`MSK, `SK) - semi - func-
tional ciphertext invariance, (`MSK, `SK) - semi - functional key invariance,
and (`MSK, `SK) - semi - functional security, then Π = ( Setup, Keygen,
Encrypt, Decrypt) is a (`MSK, `SK) - master - leakage secure ABE scheme.
Proof. The proof is straight-forward. We first observe that playing the
MasterLeak game with system Π is exactly the same as playing the MasterLeak
game with system ΠD. The methods called are exactly the same. Therefore
we have that:
AdvMasterLeakA,Π (λ, `MSK, `SK) = Adv
MasterLeak
A,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)
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By semi-functional ciphertext invariance, we have that:
∣∣AdvMasterLeakA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeakCA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
By semi-functional key invariance, we have that:
∣∣AdvMasterLeakCA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeakCKA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
Thus, by the triangle inequality (and the fact that the sum of two
negligible functions is also a negligible function), we may conclude that
∣∣AdvMasterLeakA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeakCKA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
By semi-functional security, we know that
AdvMasterLeakCKA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK) ≤ negl(λ).
Hence,
AdvMasterLeakA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK) ≤ negl(λ),
which implies that
AdvMasterLeakA,Π (λ, `MSK, `SK) ≤ negl(λ).

Theorem 4.12. If a dual system ABE scheme ΠD has (`MSK, `SK)-one semi-
functional key invariance, then it also has (`MSK, `SK)-semi-functional key in-
variance.
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Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there is a PPT adversary A that breaks
the semi-functional key invariance property of our system, but ΠD has one
semi-functional key invariance. This means by definition that the difference∣∣AdvMasterLeakCA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeakCKA,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣ (4.1)
is non-negligible. Then we will construct another PPT algorithm B that breaks
the one semi-functional key invariance of ΠD, which is a contradiction.
We denote by Q − 1 the maximum number of Create queries that A
makes. Thus, the total number of different secret keys is Q (since we also
count the original master key). Since A is assumed to be polynomial-time, Q
is a polynomial in λ.
For q ∈ [0, Q] we define the game SFq to be like the MasterLeakC game
(with EncryptSF for the challenge phase), semi-functional versions for the
first q different keys, and normal versions for the remaining keys. The order
is defined by the first leakage or reveal query made on each key. As always,
master keys input to Keygen calls are normal. The semi-functional versions
are passed to A via leakage or reveal queries.
Notice that SF0 is the MasterLeakC game and SFQ is the MasterLeakCK
game. Hence, since the difference in advantages of SF0 and SFQ is non-
negligible in λ by (4.1) and Q is a polynomial in λ, there exists a q∗ ∈ [0, Q−1]
such that the difference∣∣∣AdvSFq∗A,ΠD(λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvSFq∗+1A,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣∣
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is non-negligible. This means that the algorithm A has a non-negligible dif-
ference in the advantages when playing game SFq∗ and game SFq∗+1.
So, to create an algorithm B that breaks the one semi-functional key
invariance of ΠD, we use A in the MasterLeakb game. When A makes a key
request, B forwards this to the MasterLeakb challenger as follows. B requests
semi-functional keys for the first q∗ keys, chooses the (q∗+ 1)-th key to be the
challenge key, and requests normal keys for the remaining keys.
Notice that if the MasterLeakb challenger picked b = 0, then A plays
the SFq∗ game. Otherwise, it plays the SFq∗+1 game. This means that
AdvMasterLeakbB,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK) = Adv
SFq∗+b
A,ΠD (λ, `MSK, `SK) for b ∈ {0, 1}
Therefore, B breaks the one semi-functional key invariance of ΠD, which is a
contradiction. 
4.4 Continual Leakage for IBE and ABE
If an IBE or ABE scheme also comes equipped with an update algorithm
which takes in a secret key and outputs a new, re-randomized key from the
same distribution generated by a fresh call to KeyGen, then the above security
definitions yields resilience to continual leakage “for free”. Essentially, the
many master keys and many keys per identity that our definition allows to
leak can be interpreted as updated versions of keys. Hence, each time a key is
updated, the attacker is allowed to obtain new leakage on the new version of
the key.
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We now formally compare our security definition to the Continual Leak-
age Model (CLM) for leakage resilience. Recent results in this model have
appeared in [28] and [39]. This model allows for leakage on the randomness
generated during the calls of different methods, as well as leakage on the keys
of the system. It is essentially a combination of the types of leakage allowed
in the “Only Computation Leaks” model and the memory leakage model. We
will show that our definition of security implies a form of continual leakage if
the scheme in question has a specific re-randomization property (our schemes
in Sec. 5 have this property).
In the continual leakage model, there is only one master key and one
secret key per user at any moment in time. Continual leakage on many mas-
ter and secret keys is achieved with two new additional algorithms, called
UpdateMK and UpdateSK. These update master and secret keys, respectively,
and as a result a brand new leakage “session” on the updated key is allowed.
We will show that if an IBE or ABE scheme has an extra UpdateSK algorithm
and a specific re-randomization property, then our definition of security implies
security in the CLM. The UpdateMK algorithm is going to be implemented by
our KeyGen algorithm with the empty string as input in the case of IBE and
the entire attribute universe in the case of ABE. The additional algorithm for
both is:
UpdateSK(SK)→ SK′ This algorithm takes in a secret key, SK, and
outputs a re-randomized key, SK′, such that |SK′| = |SK|.
Definition 4.13. An IBE (resp. ABE) scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt,
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Decrypt, UpdateSK) is called an IBE (ABE) with re-randomization if the fol-
lowing property holds:
For all MSK,PP generated by a call to Setup, for all master keys
MSK′,MSK′′ generated by applying the KeyGen algorithm with the empty
string (the universe set) and a previously generated master key, for all identi-
ties ID (all attribute sets S), the distribution of a secret key SK′ generated by
the UpdateSK(KeyGen(MSK′, I)) method (by the UpdateSK(KeyGen(MSK′,S))
method) is indistinguishable from the distribution of a secret key SK generated
by KeyGen(MSK′′, I) (by KeyGen(MSK′′,S)).
The security definition of IBE schemes in the Continual Leakage Model
is defined via the following game, called ClmIbe. This is proposed (informally)
in [28]. The CLM definition for ABE schemes is similar.
The game consists of three query phases, where in the first the attacker
can make Extract queries on identities (similar to our Reveal queries) and
leakage queries on the master key. Also, it can ask for an update on the master
key. In the second phase, the attacker has decided on the challenge identity
and can make leakage or update queries on its secret key, in addition to the
previous queries. The third phase is like Phase 2 of the MasterLeak game; no
leakage queries are allowed.
The game is parameterized by the security parameter λ and five leakage
parameters
(ρG, ρUM , ρM , ρUS, ρS). These are meant to be leakage on the generation algo-
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rithm, on the update procedure of the master key, on the master key, on the
update procedure of a secret key, and on the secret keys, respectively. As in
the MasterLeak game, the challenger has to keep track of the total leakage on
each master key and on every secret key. Since we have only one master key
at a time, there is no need for the challenger to store master keys in T . It has
a master key leakage counter denoted LMSK. The phases of the game are:
Setup - CLM: The challenger chooses “secret randomness” r and
“public randomness” p and calls Setup(1λ; r, p)→ (PP,MSK). The adversary
specifies a polynomial-time computable function f of constant output size such
that ‖f(r, p)‖ ≤ ρG · ‖r‖ for all r, p. The challenger sends to the adversary the
tuple (PP, f(r, p), p). Also it sets the master leakage counter LMSK = ‖f(r, p)‖
and a handle counter H = 0. It initializes R = ∅.
Phase 1 - CLM: In this phase, the adversary can make one of the
following queries to the challenger. All of them can be interleaved in any
possible way and therefore the input of a query can depend on the outputs of
all previous queries (adaptive security).
• Keygen(ID): The challenger adds the identity ID to R, since it should
be considered “revealed” from now on and responds with the output of
a call to KeyGen(MSK, ID).
• MasterLeak(f): In this query, f is a polynomial-time computable func-
tion of constant output size such that LMSK +‖f(MSK)‖ ≤ ρM · ‖MSK‖.
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The adversary requests leakage from the master key here. The chal-
lenger responds with the value f(MSK) and updates LMSK to LMSK +
‖f(MSK)‖. If LMSK + ‖f(MSK)‖ > ρM · ‖MSK‖, it responds with the
dummy value ⊥.
• UpdateMK(f): Now the attacker requests an update (and leakage)
on the master key with a polynomial-time computable function f of
constant output size. It should be true that ‖f(MSK, r, p)‖ ≤ ρUM ·
(‖MSK‖ + ‖r‖) for all MSK, r, p where r, p are the secret and pub-
lic randomness, respectively, of the KeyGen method. The challenger
chooses randomness r, p and generates a new master key, M̂SK← KeyGen
(MSK, ; r, p). If LMSK + ‖f(MSK, r, p)‖ ≤ ρM · ‖MSK‖, it gives to
the attacker f(MSK, r, p). Finally, it sets LMSK = ‖f(MSK, r, p)‖ and
MSK← M̂SK, in that order.
Challenge Identity - CLM: In this phase, the attacker chooses the
challenge identity ID∗ /∈ R and the challenger creates a secret key for it:
SKID∗ ← KeyGen(MK, ID∗). Also it sets a leakage counter LSK = 0.
Phase 2 - CLM: In this phase, we allow the following queries. The
first three are same to the respective ones of Phase 1 -CLM.
• Keygen(ID): Obviously ID 6= ID∗ is required.
• MasterLeak(f)
• UpdateMK(f)
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• Leak(f): In this query, f is a polynomial-time computable function
of constant output size such that LSK + ‖f(SKID∗)‖ ≤ ρS · ‖SKID∗‖.
The adversary requests leakage from the secret key of ID∗ here. The
challenger responds with the value f(SKID∗) and updates LSK to LSK +
‖f(SKID∗)‖. If LSK + ‖f(SKID∗)‖ > ρS · ‖SKID∗‖, it responds with the
dummy value ⊥.
• UpdateSK(f): Now the attacker requests an update, and leakage, on
the secret key of ID∗ with a polynomial-time computable function f
of constant output size. It should be true that ‖f(SKID∗ , r, p)‖ ≤
ρUS · (‖SK‖ + ‖r‖) for all SK, r, p where r, p are the secret and pub-
lic randomness, respectively, of the Keygen method. The challenger
chooses randomness r, p and generates a new secret key, ŜKID∗ ← KeyGen
(MSK, ID∗; r, p). If LSK + ‖f(SKID∗ , r, p)‖ ≤ ρS · ‖SKID∗‖, it gives to
the attacker f(SKID∗ , r, p). Finally, it sets LSK = ‖f(SKID∗ , r, p)‖ and
SKID∗ ← ŜKID∗ , in that order.
Challenge: The adversary submits two messages M0,M1 of equal
size. The challenger flips a uniform coin c
R← {0, 1} and encrypts Mc under
ID∗ with a call to Encrypt(M, ID). It sends the resulting ciphertext CT∗ to
the adversary.
Phase 3 - CLM: Now only Keygen(ID) queries with ID 6= ID∗
are allowed.
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Guess: The adversary outputs a bit c′ ∈ {0, 1}. We say it succeeds
if c′ = c.
We say that a scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, UpdateSK)
is (ρG, ρUM , ρM , ρUS, ρS)-secure in the CLM if any PPT adversary has at most
a negligible advantage in winning the ClmIbe game.
We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.14. If an IBE system Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt,
UpdateSK) with re-randomization is (`MSK, `SK)-master-leakage secure, then
it is also (
0, 0,
`MSK
‖MSK‖ , 0,
`SK
‖SK‖
)
- secure
in the Continual Leakage Model above.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we assume that we have a PPT attacker A
that breaks our system in the continual leakage model with parameters
(
0, 0,
`MSK
‖MSK‖ , 0,
`SK
‖SK‖
)
. Notice that this attacker gets no leakage from the generation
and update algorithms. We will construct a PPT algorithm B that uses A
and breaks the (`MSK, `SK)-master-leakage security of our system. B will play
the role of A’s challenger in the ClmIbe game.
Essentially, the main strategy of the new algorithm is to merge phases
1, Challenge Identity, 2 of the ClmIbe game into Phase 1 of the MasterLeak
game. It will use a handle hMSK to denote the “current” master key and a
handle hID∗ to denote the current secret key of the challenge identity. Also,
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we state here that B chooses all randomness used to be private. Initially, it
sets hMSK = 0. B works as follows:
Setup: B executes the setup phase of MasterLeak game with its chal-
lenger and sends only the public parameters to A. Since no leakage is allowed
on the generation algorithm and our system does not use public randomness,
this is exactly what A expects.
Phase 1: For every KeyGen(ID) query made by A, B makes a Cre-
ate(hMSK, ID)→ h′ query first and a Reveal(h′)→ SK′ query afterwards. It
gives to A the secret key SK′. It is obvious that this is exactly the output of
KeyGen(MSK, ID), where MSK is the current master key.
For every MasterLeak(f) query made byA, Bmakes a Leak(hMSK, f)
query. Since LMSK + ‖f(MSK)‖ ≤ ρM · ‖MSK‖ =⇒ LMSK + ‖f(MSK)‖ ≤
`MSK, the challenger of the MasterLeak game has to provide B with the re-
quested leakage f(MSK). Notice that the update it makes to the L of the
tuple is the same as update A’s challenger should make on LMSK - thus legit-
imate in the view of A.
For every UpdateMK(f) query made by A, B has only to update the
master key. That is because ρUM = 0 and thus f outputs nothing. To simulate
an update, it makes a Create(hMSK, )→ h′ query. It sets hMSK ← h′, which
changes the current master key to the new one. The method called is exactly
the same, i.e. KeyGen(MSK, ); hence A sees no difference.
At some point, A reaches the challenge phase. After sending the chal-
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lenge identity ID∗, B makes a Create(hMSK, ID∗)→ hID∗ query. The handle
hID∗ will point to the current secret key of the challenge identity. For the ad-
ditional queries of Phase 2 - CLM, B works as follows:
For every Leak(f) query, B makes a Leak(hID∗ , f) query. Since LSK +
‖f(SKID∗)‖ ≤ ρS · ‖SKID∗‖ =⇒ LSK + ‖f(SKID∗)‖ ≤ `SK, the challenger of
the MasterLeak game has to provide B with the requested leakage f(SKID∗).
Notice that the update it makes to the L of the tuple is the same as update
A ’s challenger should make on LSK - thus legitimate in the view of A .
For every UpdateSK(f) query, B has only to update the secret key
of ID∗. That is because ρUS = 0 and thus f outputs nothing. Instead of
updating, it makes a Create(hMSK, ID∗) → h′ query. It sets hID∗ ← h′,
which changes the current secret key to the new one. However, now the method
called is not what A expected. It expected the UpdateSK method, but B
implicitly called the KeyGen method. Since the output distributions of the two
methods are indistinguishable by the property of re-randomization, A cannot
have a non-negligible change in its advantage. Thus, the advantage of B will
still be non-negligible.
Challenge: Here, B simply forwards to its challenger the two mes-
sages and the challenge identity provided by A . According to the MasterLeak
game, the challenger encrypt the message under the challenge identity and re-
turns the ciphertext to B . It responds to A with this ciphertext. It is obvious
that this is a correct simulation for A .
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Phase 2: In this phase A can make only KeyGen queries for ID 6=
ID∗. For each such query, B makes a Create(hMSK, I) → h′ query first and
a Reveal(h′)→ SK′ query afterwards. It gives to A the secret key SK′. It is
obvious that this is exactly the output of KeyGen (MSK, I), where MSK is the
current master key.
Guess: B outputs A ’s guess bit.
The advantage of B in the MasterLeak game is exactly the same as
the advantage of A in ClmIbe. Thus, it breaks the (`MSK, `SK)-master-leakage
security. 
4.4.1 Leakage from Updates
We note here that using the same “guess and check” method of [28], we
can tolerate a small amount leakage on the generation and update procedures
in the Continual Leakage Model. More specifically, we can tolerate leakage
which is logarithmic in the security parameter λ by guessing a value for the
leakage and observing whether the attacker’s advantage noticeably decreases.
If not, we can use this value for the leakage during the key generation or
update in question, and continue the simulation. By limiting the leakage size
to logarithmic, we can efficiently check all possible leakage values and hence
we will be able to find one that works in polynomial time. The details of this
argument are given in [28].
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CHAPTER 5
Part I: Leakage-Resilient IBE and CP-ABE
Systems
Our IBE and ABE schemes [71] are suitable transformations of the Lewko-
Waters HIBE constructions [72], designed to sustain master and secret key
leakage from an arbitrary number of keys. To hide nominal semi-functionality
in the attacker’s view, we add vectors of dimension n to the front of the
ciphertexts and secret keys of the LW system. Notice in the construction
below that the last two elements of our secret keys and ciphertexts are very
similar to the elements in the LW system. Nominal semi-functionality now
corresponds to the vector of exponents of the semi-functional components of
the key being orthogonal to the vector of exponents of the semi-functional
components of the ciphertext. We can use the algebraic lemma of [28] to
assert that this orthogonality is hidden from attackers with suitably bounded
leakage. We note here that according to the lemma and our security game, the
leakage is not applied to both vectors at once, since then the dot product would
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be trivial to leak. Finally, to allow leakage on the master key, we designed the
master key to be similar in form to regular secret keys.
Like the original LW scheme, our systems use a bilinear group whose
order is the product of three distinct primes. The role of the first prime or-
der subgroup is to “carry” the necessary information of the plaintext message
and the secret information of each user or the master authority. The second
subgroup is used only in the proof to provide semi-functionality. The third
subgroup is used to additionally randomize secret keys. Each of these compo-
nents is orthogonal to the other two under the pairing operation.
5.1 Leakage-Resilient IBE
Our IBE system from [71] is the first IBE scheme resistant to continual
leakage attacks on both the users’ secret keys and master secret key. It serves
as a stepping stone towards the more complicated CP-ABE construction of Sec.
5.2. It can also be extended to a continual-leakage-resilient HIBE construction
using the same techniques.
5.1.1 Construction
Our dual system IBE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1λ) The setup algorithm generates a bilinear group G of com-
posite order N = p1p2p3, where p1, p2, p3 are three different λ1,λ2,λ3-bit prime
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numbers respectively1. Therefore, for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have that 2λi−1 ≤
pi < 2
λi . The subgroup of order pi in G is denoted by Gi. We assume that the
identities of users in our system are elements of ZN .
We let n be a positive integer greater than or equal to 2. The value of
n can be varied - higher values of n will lead to a better fraction of leakage
being tolerated (see Sec. 5.3), while lower values of n will yield a system with
fewer group elements in the keys and ciphertexts.
The algorithm picks 3 random generators (g1, u1, h1) ∈ G1 × G1 × G1
and one generator g3 ∈ G3. It also picks n + 1 random exponents (α, x1,
x2, . . ., xn)
R← Zn+1N . It picks (r, y1, y2, . . ., yn) R← Zn+1N , a random vector
~ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn+2)
R← Zn+2N , and a random element ρn+3 R← ZN . It outputs the
following public parameters and master key:
PP = (N, g1, g3, u1, h1, e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , g
x2
1 , . . . , g
xn
1 )
MSK =
(
~K∗, K∗
)
=
((
gy11 , . . . , g
yn
1 , g
α
1 h
−r
1
n∏
i=1
g−xiyi1 , g
r
1
)
∗ g~ρ3 , ur1gρn+33
)
KeyGen(MSK,PP, X) We first consider when X = , the empty string.
Then this algorithm re-randomizes the master key by picking another (r′, y′1,
y′2, . . ., y
′
n)
R← Zn+1N , a random vector ~ρ′ =
(
ρ′1, . . . , ρ
′
n+2
) R← Zn+2N , and a
random element ρ′n+3
R← ZN . If MSK =
(
~K∗, K∗
)
, it outputs the new (same-
1The three λ’s depend on the security parameter and are chosen appropriately to get a
better leakage fraction (see Sec. 5.3.
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sized) master key:
MSK′ =
(
~K ′, K ′
)
=
(
K∗ ∗
(
g
y′1
1 , . . . , g
y′n
1 , h
−r′
1
n∏
i=1
g
−xiy′i
1 , g
r′
1
)
∗ g~ρ′3 , K∗ur
′
1 g
ρ′n+3
3
)
If X = ID ∈ ZN , an identity, the algorithm picks n + 1 random
exponents (r′, z1, z2, . . . , zn)
R← Zn+1N . Also it picks ~ρ′ R← Zn+2N and outputs
the secret key:
SK = ~K1 = ~K∗ ∗
(
gz11 , g
z2
1 , . . . , g
zn
1 , (K
∗)−I(uID1 h1)
−r′
n∏
i=1
g−xizi1 , g
r′
1
)
∗ g~ρ′3
The terms g
−xiy′i
1 and g
−xizi
1 above are calculated by using the g
xi terms
of PP.
It is very important to notice that with knowledge of α alone, one can
create properly distributed secret keys, because the random terms r, y1, . . ., yn,
ρn+3, ~ρ of the master key are all masked by the random terms r
′, z1, . . . , zn, ~ρ′
generated by the algorithm. However, instead of storing α, the master author-
ity now stores n+ 3 elements of G.
Encrypt(M, ID) The encryption algorithm picks s R← ZN and outputs
the ciphertext:
CT =
(
C0, ~C1
)
=
=
(
M · (e(g1, g1)α)s,
(
(gx11 )
s, . . . , (gxn1 )
s, gs1, (u
ID
1 h1)
s
)) ∈ GT ×Gn+2
Decrypt(CT, SK) To calculate the blinding factor e(g1, g1)
αs, one com-
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putes en+2( ~K1, ~C1). If the encryption and decryption are correct, we get:
en+2( ~K1, ~C1) = e(g1, g1)
αse(g1, u
ID
1 h1)
rse(g1, u
ID
1 h1)
r′s
· e(h1, g1)−rse(uID1 , g1)−rse(uID1 h1, g1)−r
′s
·
n∏
i=1
e(g1, g1)
−xiyis
n∏
i=1
e(g1, g1)
−xizis
·
n∏
i=1
e(g1, g1)
xiyis
n∏
i=1
e(g1, g1)
xizis
= e(g1, g1)
αs
(Note that the G3 parts of the key do not contribute anything because they
are orthogonal to the ciphertext under e.)
Hence, the message is computed as:
M =
C0
en+2( ~K1, ~C1)
5.1.2 Semi-Functionality
All the ciphertexts, master keys, and secret keys generated by the above
algorithms are normal, where by normal we mean that they have no G2 parts.
On the other hand, a semi-functional key or ciphertext has G2 parts. We let
g2 denote a generator of G2. The remaining algorithms of our dual system
IBE are the following:
KeyGenSf(MSK, X) → K˜ This algorithm calls first the normal key
generation algorithm Keygen(MSK, X) to get a normal key MSK = ( ~K∗,
K∗) or SK = ~K1, depending on X.
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In the former case, it picks ~θ
R← Zn+2N and θ R← ZN and outputs
M˜SK =
(
~K∗ ∗ g~θ2, K∗gθ2
)
In the latter case, it picks ~γ
R← Zn+2N and outputs
S˜K = ~K1 ∗ g~γ2
EncryptSf(M, ID)→ C˜T This algorithm calls first the normal encryp-
tion algorithm Encrypt(M , ID) to get the ciphertext CT = (C0, ~C1). Then it
picks ~δ
R← Zn+2N and outputs
C˜T =
(
C0, ~C1 ∗ g~δ2
)
.
Notice that the above algorithms need a generator g2 of the subgroup
G2. We call the three terms
(
~θ, θ
)
, ~γ, ~δ the semi-functional parameters of
the master key, secret key, and ciphertext, respectively. Notice that a se-
cret key that has been constructed using a semi-functional master key is
considered semi-functional ; not normal. For example, if someone uses the
master key M˜SK, with parameters
(
~θ, θ
)
, to construct a secret key for iden-
tity ID with KeyGen, then this will be semi-functional with parameters ~γ =
~θ + (0, . . . , 0,−IDθ, 0). Normal secret keys do not have a G2 part.
The semi-functional keys are partitioned in nominal semi - functional
keys and in truly semi - functional keys, with respect to a specific semi -
functional ciphertext. In short, a nominal secret key can correctly decrypt the
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ciphertext (by using Decrypt), while a nominal master key can generate a semi-
functional secret key that correctly decrypts the ciphertext. A semi-functional
secret key of identity IDk with parameters ~γ is nominal with respect to a
ciphertext for identity IDc with parameters ~δ if and only if
~γ · ~δ = 0 mod p2 and IDk = IDc
It is easy to see that only then the decryption is correct, because we get
an extra term e(g2, g2)
~γ·~δ by the pairing. A semi-functional master key with
parameters ~θ, θ is nominal with respect to a ciphertext for identity ID with
parameters ~δ if and only if
~δ ·
(
~θ + (0, . . . , 0,−IDθ, 0)
)
= 0 mod p2.
5.1.3 Continual Leakage
For completeness, we give here the update algorithm for the secret keys.
It is clear that it satisfies the re-randomization property.
UpdateSK(SK) → SK′ The update algorithm picks n + 1 random ex-
ponents (r′, z1, z2, . . . , zn)
R← Zn+1N and ~ρ′ R← Zn+2N . For SK = ~K1, it outputs
the new secret key:
SK′ = ~K ′1 = ~K1 ∗
(
gz11 , g
z2
1 , . . . , g
zn
1 , (u
ID
1 h1)
−r′
n∏
i=1
g−xizi1 , g
r′
1
)
∗ g~ρ′3 .
5.1.4 Security
We prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 5.1. Under the assumptions Comp1, Comp2, Comp3 and for (`MSK
= (n − 1 − 2c) log(p2), `SK = (n − 1 − 2c) log(p2)), where c > 0 is a fixed
positive constant, our dual system IBE scheme is (`MSK, `SK)-master-leakage
secure.
In order to prove that our system is (`MSK, `SK)-master-leakage secure,
we have to prove that it has semi-functional ciphertext invariance, one semi-
functional key invariance, and semi-functional security. Then according to
Theorems 4.11 and 4.12, it is (`MSK, `SK)-master-leakage secure. We will base
each of properties on one of our three complexity assumptions of subsection
3.2.2.
Our values of `MSK and `SK are based on the following lemma, and will
only become relevant in our proof of one semi-functional key invariance.
Semi-functional Ciphertext Invariance
Theorem 5.2. If the assumption Comp1 holds, our system has (`MSK, `SK)-
semi-functional ciphertext invariance.
Proof. We will build a PPT simulator B that breaks the assumption Comp1
with the help of a PPT attacker A that breaks the semi-functional ciphertext
invariance of our system.
The simulator B initially receives input from the assumption’s chal-
lenger, i.e. D1 = (N , G, GT , e, g1, g3) and a challenge term T , which is equal
either to gz1 or g
z
1g
ν
2 . Then it plays the MasterLeak or the MasterLeakC game
with A in the following way:
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Setup phase: B picks (α, x1, x2, . . . , xn, a, b)
R← Zn+3N . It computes
u1 = g
a
1 , h1 = g
b
1, e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , g
x2
1 , . . ., and g
xn
1 . It gives the public parame-
ters
PP = (N, g1, g3, u1, h1, e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , g
x2
1 , . . . , g
xn
1 )
to A where N, g1 and g3 are given by the challenger.
B also picks (r, y1, y2, . . . , yn)
R← Zn+1N , a random vector ~ρ = (ρ1, . . .,
ρn+2)
R← Zn+2N , and a random element ρn+3 R← ZN . It stores in tuple 0 the
normal master key:
MSK =
(
~K∗, K∗
)
=
((
gy11 , . . . , g
yn
1 , g
α
1 h
−r
1
n∏
i=1
g−xiyi1 , g
r
1
)
∗ g~ρ3 , ur1gρn+33
)
.
Phase 1: The simulator B can answer all of A’s queries, since it
knows the master key of tuple 0. It works according to the definition of the
game, by making the appropriate calls.
Challenge Phase: The adversary A gives B two messages M0 and
M1 and the challenge identity ID∗. The simulator B chooses c R← {0, 1} and
outputs the ciphertext:
CT =
(
C0, ~C1
)
=
(
Mc · e (T, gα1 ) ,
(
T x1 , T x2 , . . . , T xn , T, T aID
∗+b)) ,
where T is the challenge term from the assumption.
Phase 2: B works in the same way as Phase 1.
If T = gz1g
ν
2 , then the ciphertext is semi-functional, since
C0 = Mc · e (gz1gν2 , gα1 ) = M · e(g1, g1)αz
T aI
∗+b = (uI
∗
1 h1)
zg
ν(aID∗+b)
2
T = gz1g
ν
2
T xi = (gxi1 )
zgνxi2 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
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This implicitly sets s = z and ~δ = (νx1, νx2, . . . , νxn, ν, ν(aID∗ + b)). Ob-
viously, s is properly distributed since z
R← ZN according to the assumption.
The vector ~δ is properly distributed in the attacker’s view because the mul-
tiplying factors (aI∗ + b), x1, x2, . . . , xn are only seen modulo p1 in the public
parameters and not modulo p2. Thus, in A’s view, they are random mod-
ulo p2 by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This means that B has properly
simulated the MasterLeakC game.
If T = gz1, it is easy to see that the ciphertext is normal since it has no
G2 part, and B has properly simulated the MasterLeak game.
Hence, if A has a non-negligible difference in the advantages of these
two games, B can use it and break the assumption Comp1 with non-negligible
advantage. 
One Semi-functional Key Invariance
Theorem 5.3. If the assumption Comp2 holds, our system has (`MSK, `SK)-one
semi - functional key invariance.
Proof.
In order to prove this theorem we need the following two lemmas:
Lemma 5.4. If the assumption Comp2 holds, then for any PPT adversary A,
A’s advantage in the MasterLeakb game, where b = 0 or b = 1, changes only
by a negligible amount if we restrict it to making queries only on the challenge
identity and on identities that are not equal to the challenge identity modulo
p2 .
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Proof. If there exists an adversary whose advantage changes by a non-negligible
amount under this restriction, we can find a non-trivial factor of N with non-
negligible probability. This non-trivial factor can then be used to break the
assumption Comp2 (same proof as [72]).
The simulator plays the MasterLeakb game, where b = 0 or b = 1, using
the terms from the assumption Comp2 to create the semi-functional keys and
ciphertext. It works in a way similar to the simulator in the reduction shown
after the proof of the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.5. We suppose that the leakage is at most (`MSK = (n − 1 −
2c) log(p2), `SK = (n − 1 − 2c) log(p2)), where c > 0 is any fixed positive con-
stant. Then, for any PPT adversary A, A’s advantage in the MasterLeak1
game changes only by a negligible amount when the truly semi-functional chal-
lenge key is replaced by a nominal semi-functional challenge key whenever A
declares the challenge key to be either a master key or a key for the same
identity as the challenge ciphertext.
Proof. We suppose there exists a PPT algorithm A whose advantage changes
by a non-negligible amount  when the MasterLeak1 game changes as described
above. Using A, we will create a PPT algorithm B which will distinguish
between the distributions (~δ, f(~τ)) and (~δ, f(~τ ′)) from Corollary B.1.1 with
non-negligible advantage (where m = n + 1 and p = p2). This will yield a
contradiction, since these distributions have a negligible statistical distance.
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B simulates the game MasterLeak1 with A as follows. It starts by
running the Setup algorithm for itself, and giving A the public parameters.
Since B knows the original master key and generators of all the subgroups, it
can make normal as well as semi-functional keys. Hence, it can respond to A’s
non-challenge Phase 1 queries by simply creating the queried keys.
With non-negligible probability, Amust chose a challenge key in Phase
1 which is either a master key or matches the identity of the challenge cipher-
text. (If it only did this with negligible probability, then the difference in
advantages whenever it declared the challenge key to be either a master key
or a key for the same identity as the challenge ciphertext would be negligible.)
B will not create this challenge key, but instead will encode the leakage
A asks for on this key in Phase 1 as a single polynomial time computable
function f with domain Zn+1p2 and with an image of size 2
`SK . It can do this by
fixing the values of all other keys and fixing all other variables involved in the
challenge key (more details on this below). B then receives a sample (~δ, f(~Γ)),
where ~Γ is either distributed as ~τ or as ~τ ′, in the notation of the corollary.
B will use f(~Γ) to answer all of A’s leakage queries on the challenge key by
implicitly defining the challenge key as follows.
If the challenge key is not a master key, B chooses two more random
values r1, r2 ∈ Zp2 . If the challenge key is a master key, it chooses r1, r2, θ ∈
Zp2 . We let g2 denote a generator of G2. B implicitly sets the G2 components
of the key to be g
~Γ′
2 , where ~Γ
′ is defined to be
(
~Γ, 0
)
+ (0, . . . , 0, r1, r2) in
the case of a key which is not a master key, and is defined to be
(
~Γ, 0, 0
)
+
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(0, . . . , 0, r1, r2, 0) + (0, . . . , 0, θ) in the case of a master key. (Recall that ~Γ
is of length n + 1.) B defines the non-G2 components of the key to fit their
appropriate distribution.
At some point, A declares the identity for the challenge ciphertext. If
the challenge key was not a master key and the challenge ciphertext identity
does not match the challenge key’s identity, then B aborts the simulation
and guesses whether ~Γ is orthogonal to ~δ randomly. However, the simulation
continues with non-negligible probability.
B chooses a random element t2 ∈ Zp2 subject to one of two constraints:
if the challenge key is a master key, it chooses t2 so that δn+1(r1−IDθ)+t2r2 ≡
0 mod p2, where ID is the challenge ciphertext identity. If the challenge key
is for the identity ID, it chooses t2 so that δn+1r1 + t2r2 ≡ 0 mod p2. It
then constructs the challenge ciphertext, using
(
~δ, 0
)
+ (0, . . . , 0, 0, t2) as the
challenge vector (recall that ~δ is of length n + 1). Now, if ~Γ is orthogonal to
~δ, then the challenge key is nominally semi-functional (and well-distributed
as such). If ~Γ is not orthogonal to ~δ, then the challenge key is truly semi-
functional (and also well-distributed).
It is clear that B can easily handle Phase 2 queries, since the chal-
lenge key cannot be queried on here when it is a master key or has the same
identity as the challenge ciphertext. Hence, B can use the output of A to
gain a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the distributions (~δ, f(~τ))
and (~δ, f(~τ ′)). This violates Corollary B.1.1, since these distributions have a
negligible statistical distance for f with this output size. 
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To prove Theorem 5.3, we will build a PPT simulator B that breaks the
assumption Comp2 with the help of a PPT attacker A that breaks one semi-
functional key invariance of our system. B will simulate the game MasterLeakb.
Initially the simulator B receives input from the assumption’s challenger, i.e.
D2 = (N,G,GT , e, g1, g3, gz1gν2 , g
µ
2 g
ρ
3) and a challenge term T , which is equal
either to gw1 g
σ
3 or g
w
1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 . Algorithm B works as follows:
Setup phase: B picks (α, x1, x2, . . . , xn, a, b)
R← Zn+3N . It computes
u1 = g
a
1 , h1 = g
b
1, e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , g
x2
1 , . . ., and g
xn
1 . It gives the public parame-
ters
PP = (N, g1, g3, u1, h1, e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , g
x2
1 , . . . , g
xn
1 )
to A where N, g1 and g3 are given by the challenger. No keys are stored in
tuple 0.
Phase 1: We recall that in game MasterLeakb, the challenger has to
store in each tuple both a normal and a semi-functional version of each key.
However, since for the challenge key our goal is to allow leakage on an unknown
version depending on the challenge, we postpone the creation of all keys until
the point where the attacker A decides that they should be normal, semi-
functional, or challenge. Therefore, each Create query returns a handle and
stores an unlocked tuple, but with the two key fields empty. Since the attacker
only gets the handle from each such query, it cannot tell the difference.
Also, our simulator will not store both versions of each key in the tuple,
in contrast to the game rules. It will store only the version that the attacker
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chose to get leakage from (or reveal). But then one could ask how the simulator
is going to handle the Create(h,X) queries, when the h refers to a tuple with
a semi-functional master key. The answer is that for our system, knowledge of
α alone allows the creation of any type of key. Since the simulator knows α, it
always bypasses the normal Keygen algorithm and creates totally legitimate
keys.
Thus, in this phase, as well as in Phase 2, the simulator B has to
successfully store the appropriate key on six different types of first leakage or
reveal queries:
• A requested a normal master key: In this case B creates a normal mas-
ter key by picking (r, y1, y2, . . . , yn)
R← Zn+1N , a random vector ~ρ =
(ρ1, . . . , ρn+2)
R← Zn+2N , and a random element ρn+3 R← ZN . It stores
the following key in the tuple along with lock-value V = 0:
MSK =
(
~K∗, K∗
)
=
((
gy11 , . . . , g
yn
1 , g
α
1 h
−r
1
n∏
i=1
g−xiyi1 , g
r
1
)
∗ g~ρ3 , ur1gρn+33
)
Obviously, this is properly distributed, since it the same method used in
the Setup algorithm and this is also the same distribution that occurs
when a normal master key is created by a call to the KeyGen algorithm
with the empty string and a previously created master key as input.
• A requested a semi-functional master key: As in the previous case, B
chooses (r, y1, y2, . . ., yn)
R← Zn+1N , ~ρ = (ρ1, . . ., ρn+2) R← Zn+2N , and
ρn+3
R← ZN . Also it picks ~θ′ R← ZnN and θ′ R← ZN and generates the
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following key:
M˜SK =
(
~K∗, K∗
)
=
((
gy11 , . . . , g
yn
1 , g
α
1 h
−r
1
n∏
i=1
g−xiyi1 , g
r
1
)
∗ (gµ2 gρ3)~θ′ ∗ g~ρ3 , ur1(gµ2 gρ3)θ
′
g
ρn+3
3
)
where gµ2 g
ρ
3 is given by the assumption’s challenger. It is easy to see
that the G1,G3 parts are properly distributed. For the G2 part, the
semi-functional parameters are ~θ = µ~θ′ and θ = µθ′. Thus, this part is
properly distributed as well.
• A requested a normal secret key: In this case, B picks (r′, z1, z2, . . .,
zn)
R← Zn+1N , and a random vector ~ρ′ R← Zn+2N . It creates the following
key:
SK = ~K1 =
(
gz11 , g
z2
1 , . . . , g
zn
1 , g
α
1 (u
ID
1 h1)
−r′
n∏
i=1
g−xizi1 , g
r′
1
)
∗ g~ρ′3
• A requested a semi-functional secret key: Now B picks (r′, z1, z2, . . .,
zn)
R← Zn+1N , a random vector ~ρ′ R← Zn+2N , and a random vector ~γ′ R←
Zn+2N . It generates the following key:
S˜K = ~K1 =
(
gz11 , . . . , g
zn
1 , g
α
1 (u
ID
1 h1)
−r′
n∏
i=1
g−xizi1 , g
r′
1
)
∗ (gµ2 gρ3)~γ′ ∗ g
~ρ′
3
As before, it is easy to see that the G1,G3 parts are properly distributed
and, for the G2 part, the semi-functional parameters are ~γ = µ~γ′. Thus,
this part is properly distributed as well.
• A requested to be challenged on a master key: Remember that now B
is supposed to flip a coin and store either a normal or a semi-functional
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master key. Instead of doing this, it will use the assumption’s challenge
term T to generate the master key. To do so, it picks (y′1, y
′
2, . . . , y
′
n)
R←
ZnN , ~ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn+2)
R← Zn+2N , and ρn+3 R← ZN and generates:
MSK =
(
~K∗, K∗
)
=
((
T y
′
1 , . . . , T y
′
n , gα1 T
−b
n∏
i=1
T−xiy
′
i , T
)
∗ g~ρ3 , T agρn+33
)
As before, it is easy to see that the G3 part is properly distributed. We
will now argue that the G1 and G2 parts are also well-distributed.
If T = gw1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 , then for the G1 part, this sets (remember that u = ga1
and h = gb1):
r = w and yi = sy
′
i ∀i ∈ [1, n].
Thus, all parameters are properly distributed. For the G2 part, the
semi-functional parameters are:
~θ = κ
(
y′1, . . . , y
′
n,−b−
∑
xiy
′
i, 1
)
and θ = κa
. Since all terms y′1, . . . , y
′
n, a, b are only seen modulo p1 in the public
parameters, they appear random modulo p2 here. Therefore, in this case,
B has formed a properly distributed semi-functional master key.
It is easy to see that if T = gw1 g
σ
3 , the G2 part above is omitted and B
has formed a properly distributed normal master key.
• A requested to be challenged on a secret key: Now B picks (z′1, z′2, . . .,
z′n)
R← ZnN , and a random vector ~ρ′ R← Zn+2N . It stores the following key:
SK = ~K1 =
(
T z
′
1 , T z
′
2 , . . . , T z
′
n , gα1 T
−(aID+b)
n∏
i=1
T−xiz
′
i , T
)
∗ g~ρ′3 ,
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where ID is the identity of this key given by the adversary A.
If T = gw1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 , then this key is semi-functional with
r′ = w and zi = sz′i ∀i ∈ [1, n]
~γ = κ
(
z′1, . . . , z
′
n,−(aI + b)−
∑
xiz
′
i, 1
)
For the same reasons as before, all vectors seem random in A’s view2.
That concludes Phase 1. We mention here that B works the same way
in Phase 2.
Challenge Phase: In this phase, B has to create a semi-functional
ciphertext with EncryptSf. It gets two messages M0 and M1 and the challenge
identity ID∗ from A and chooses c R← {0, 1}. Then it generates the following
ciphertext:
C˜T =
(
C0, ~C1
)
=
=
(
Mc · e ((gz1gν2 ), gα1 ) ,
(
(gz1g
ν
2 )
x1 , . . . , (gz1g
ν
2 )
xn , (gz1g
ν
2 ), (g
z
1g
ν
2 )
aID∗+b))
where gz1g
ν
2 is given by the assumption’s challenger.
It is easy to see that the ciphertext’s parameters are
s = z and ~δ = ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1, aID∗ + b) .
2We recall that the last two cases exclude each other. We cannot have both a master
key and a secret key picked by A as the challenge key. Thus, for example the term κ is only
seen once modulo p2.
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Although, the s is obviously properly distributed, the semi-functional
parameters δ are not (if the challenge key is capable of decrypting the cipher-
text). We can argue that the terms x1, . . . , xn seem random modulo p2 to the
adversary (and ν) as before, but we can not do the same for aID∗ + b. This
happens, because it might be the case that a, b have been seen modulo p2 (if
the challenge key is the master key) or aID∗ + b is seen (if the identity of the
challenge key ID is equal to ID∗ modulo p2 or the identity of the challenge
key is the challenge identity). However, lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 assert that the
change in any adversary’s advantage is negligible.
Lemma 5.4 states that if the simulator B aborts and guesses a random
value for the assumption in case it detects that ID = ID∗ mod p2 and ID 6=
ID∗ (it can do that with N), the loss in advantage is only a negligible amount.
Otherwise, the ciphertext is well-distributed when ID 6= ID∗, because the
aID + b in the secret key is uncorrelated to the aID∗ + b of the ciphertext.
On the other hand, notice that if A picks a master key as the chal-
lenge key, this will be nominally semi-functional with respect to the challenge
ciphertext (i.e. the following holds modp2):
~δ ·
(
~θ + (0, . . . , 0,−ID∗θ, 0)
)
= ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1, aID∗ + b) · κ
(
y′1, . . . , y
′
n,−aID∗ − b−
∑
xiy
′
i, 1
)
= 0
The same happens when the challenge key is a secret key for identity
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ID∗:
~δ · ~γ = ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1, aID∗ + b) · κ
(
z′1, . . . , z
′
n,−(aID∗ + b)−
∑
xiz
′
i, 1
)
= 0 mod p2
Therefore, since ~δ modulo p2 has all terms random but one, it is dis-
tributed the same modulo p2 as if it were chosen uniformly at random from
the orthogonal complement of the key’s semi-functional parameters modulo
p2. Remember that the above is true, only if T = g
w
1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 and B simulates
the MasterLeak1 game. Then, according to Lemma 5.5, no PPT adversary
can distinguish this from a truly random vector. Thus, the ciphertext seems
properly distributed to the attacker.
In summary, if T = gw1 g
σ
3 , algorithm B simulates a game in which A’s
advantage is only negligibly different from its advantage in the MasterLeak0
game, and if T = gw1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 , B simulates a game in which A’s advantage is only
negligibly different from its advantage in the MasterLeak1 game. Hence, B
can use the output of A to break the assumption Comp2 with non-negligible
advantage. 
Semi-functional Security
Theorem 5.6. If the assumption Comp3 holds, our system has (`MSK, `SK)-
semi-functional security.
Proof. We will build a PPT simulator B that breaks the assumption Comp3
with the help of a PPT attacker A that breaks the semi-functional security of
our system.
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The input from the assumption’s challenger to B is D3 = (N , G, GT ,
e, g1, g2, g3, g
α
1 g
ν
2 , g
z
1g
µ
2 ) and a challenge term T which is either e(g1, g1)
αz or
a random term of GT . Algorithm B works as follows:
Setup phase: B picks (x1, x2, . . . , xn, a, b)
R← Zn+2N . It computes
u1 = g
a
1 , h1 = g
b
1, and g
x1
1 , g
x2
1 , . . ., g
xn
1 . The term e(g1, g1)
α is computed
as e(gα1 g
ν
2 , g1). (Notice that now α is unknown to B.) It gives the public
parameters PP = (N , g1, g3, u1, h1, e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , g
x2
1 , . . ., g
xn
1 ) to A.
Phase 1: Although our simulator does not know α, it can still create
properly distributed semi-functional keys, which are the only ones needed for
this game. Now it bypasses the KeyGenSf algorithm using the challenge term
gα1 g
ν
2 .
For Create queries on a master key (as well as the key of tuple 0),
the simulator picks (r, y1, y2, . . . , yn, ρn+3, θ
′) R← Zn+3N and two random vectors
~ρ, ~θ′ R← ZnN and constructs:
MK =
(
~K∗, K∗u
)
=
((
gy11 , . . . , g
yn
1 , (g
α
1 g
ν
2 )h
−r
1
n∏
i=1
g−xiyi1 , g
r
1
)
∗ g~θ′2 ∗ g~ρ3 , ur1gθ
′
2 g
ρ
3
)
Remember that gα1 g
ν
2 is given by the assumption’s challenger. The above is a
properly distributed semi-functional master key, with semi-functional param-
eters ~θ = (0, . . . , 0, ν, 0) + ~θ′ and θ = θ′.
For all secret keys requested by the adversary on identity ID, the
simulator creates and stores the following semi-functional keys:
SK = ~K1 =
(
gz11 , . . . , g
zn
1 , (g
α
1 g
ν
2 )(u
ID
1 h1)
−r′
n∏
i=1
g−zixi1 , g
r′
1
)
∗ g ~γ′2 ∗ g
~ρ′
3 ,
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where the vectors ~ρ′, ~γ′ R← ZnN and (r′, z1, . . . , zn) R← Zn+1N are picked in-
dependently for each generated key. It is easy to see that the above is a
properly distributed semi-functional key with semi-functional parameters ~γ =
(0, . . . , 0, ν, 0) + ~γ′.
Challenge Phase: The adversary A gives B two messages M0 and
M1 and the challenge identity ID∗. The simulator B chooses c R← {0, 1} and
outputs the following ciphertext:
CT =
(
C0, ~C1
)
=
=
(
Mc · T,
(
(gz1g
µ
2 )
x1 , . . . , (gz1g
µ
2 )
xn , (gz1g
µ
2 ), (g
z
1g
µ
2 )
aID∗+b)) ,
where gz1g
µ
2 is given by the assumption’s challenger and T is the challenge term.
Phase 2: B works in the same way as Phase 1.
If T = e(g1, g1)
αz, then we get a semi-functional ciphertext of Mc with
parameters:
s = z and ~δ = (µx1, . . . , µxn, µ, µ(aID∗ + b))
As before, ~δ is properly distributed since all terms x1, . . . , xn, aID∗+b are ran-
dom modulo p2. Therefore, B has properly distributed game MasterLeakCK.
On the other hand, if T
R← GT , the term C0 is entirely random and we
get a semi-functional ciphertext of a random message. Therefore, the value
of c is information-theoretically hidden and the probability of success of any
algorithm A in this game is exactly 1/2, since c
R← {0, 1}. Thus, B can use the
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output of A to break the assumption Comp3 with non-negligible advantage.

This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
5.2 Leakage-Resilient CP-ABE
5.2.1 Construction
The algorithms of our CP-ABE system are the following:
Setup(1λ,U) → (PP,MSK): The setup algorithm calls the bilinear
group generation algorithm for composite order groups G(1λ) → (N , p1, p2,
p3, g, G, GT , e).
It picks two random exponents α, a
R← ZN . We note that U denotes the
universe of attributes. Therefore |U| is polynomial in the security parameter
λ and the scheme is a small universe construction. For each attribute i ∈ U , it
chooses random si
R← ZN . It also picks n random exponents x1, x2, . . . , xn R←
ZN to get the required vectors. For the master key, it picks t∗, y1, . . . , yn ∈ ZN
and ~ρ
R← Zn+1N , ρn+2 R← ZN ,∀i ∈ U ρ′i R← ZN for the G3 part.
It outputs the following public parameters and master key:
PP =
(
N, g1, g3, g
a
1 , e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , . . . , g
xn
1 , {Ti = gsi1 }i∈U
)
MSK =
(
U , ~K∗1 , L∗, {K∗i }i∈U
)
=
=
(
U ,
(
gy11 , . . . , g
yn
1 , g
α
1 g
at∗
1
n∏
i=1
g−xiyi1
)
∗ g~ρ3 , gt
∗
1 g
ρn+2
3 ,
{
T t
∗
i g
ρ′i
3
}
i∈U
)
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Notice that ~K∗1 has n+ 1 elements.
KeyGen(MSK,S,PP) → SK: S denotes a set of attributes, S ⊆ U .
The key generation algorithm chooses random values t, z1, . . . , zn ∈ ZN and
random exponents ~ρ
R← Zn+1N , ρn+2 R← ZN ,∀i ∈ S ρ′i R← ZN for the G3 part.
The secret key it generates is the following:
SK =
(
S, ~K1, L, {Ki}i∈S
)
=
=
(
S, ~K∗1 ∗
(
gz11 , . . . , g
zn
1 , g
at
1
n∏
i=1
g−xizi1
)
∗ g~ρ3 , L∗gt1gρn+23 ,
{
K∗i T
t
i g
ρ′i
3
}
i∈S
)
The update or re-randomization of a secret key is done using the secret
key in question instead of the master secret key and the same attribute set S.
In case we want to re-randomize a master key, we use S = U .
Encrypt(M, (A, δ)) → CT: A is an n1 × n2 LSSS matrix and δ is a
mapping from each row Ax of A to an attribute δ(x) ∈ U . The algorithm
picks a random vector ~v = (s, v2, . . . , vn2)
R← Zn2N . For each row Ax, it picks a
random exponent rx
R← ZN . The ciphertext generated is the following:
CT =
(
(A, δ), C0, ~C1, {Cx, Dx}x∈[n1]
)
=
=
(
(A, δ),M · (e(g1, g1)α)s, ((gx11 )s, . . . , (gxn1 )s, gs1) ,{
g
a〈Ax,~v〉
1 T
−rx
ρ(x) , g
rx
1
}
x∈[n1]
)
Decrypt(CT, SK)→M : First the decryption algorithm computes con-
stants ωx ∈ ZN for every row of A (note that A is given in the ciphertext)
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such that
∑
δ(x)∈S ωxAx = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn2N . To calculate the blinding factor,
it computes:
en+1( ~C1, ~K1)∏
δ(x)∈S
(
e(Cx, L)e(Dx, Kδ(x))
)ωx =
=
e(g1, g1)
αse(g1, g1)
sat ·∏ni=1 e(g1, g1)−sxizi ·∏ni=1 e(g1, g1)sxizi∏
δ(x)∈S (e(g1, g1)
at〈Ax,~v〉e(g1, g1)−rxsρ(x)te(g1, g1)rxsρ(x)t)
ωx =
=
e(g1, g1)
αse(g1, g1)
sat
e(g1, g1)
at〈∑δ(x)∈S ωxAx,~v〉 =
= e(g1, g1)
αs
In the above calculation, the values t, zi are meant denote the exponents
of the secret key.
5.2.2 Semi-Functionality
In this section, we present the algorithms for creating semi-functional
ciphertexts and secret keys for our CP-ABEsystem. In contrast to our previous
systems, we now have two different types of semi-functional keys, called Type
1 and Type 2. Hence we have two different KeyGenSf algorithms. Another
difference is that for every attribute i ∈ U , random values qi R← ZN are chosen
before the execution of any algorithm and are shared by the semi-functional
ciphertexts and keys - they work similar to public parameters for the semi-
functional algorithms. The algorithms are the following:
KeyGenSf1(MSK,S) → K˜ To create a semi-functional key of type 1,
this algorithm first calls KeyGen(MSK,S) and gets the key K = (S, ~K1,L,
{Ki}i∈S) (Notice that this can be a master key, if S = U). Then it picks
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~γ
R← Zn+1N and θ R← ZN and outputs
K˜ =
(
S, ~K1 ∗ g~γ2 , Lgθ2,
{
Kig
θqi
2
}
i∈S
)
KeyGenSf2(MSK,S)→ K˜ A semi-functional key of type 2 is generated
the same way but without the terms gθ2 and g
θqi
2 (i.e. we now set θ = 0). It
outputs
K˜ =
(
S, ~K1 ∗ g~γ2 , L, {Ki}i∈S
)
EncryptSf(M, (A, δ)) → C˜T This algorithm first calls the normal en-
cryption algorithm Encrypt(M , (A, δ)) to get the ciphertext CT = ((A, δ), C0,
~C1, {Cx, Dx}x∈[n1]). Then it picks ~δ
R← Zn+1N , a random vector ~u R← Zn2N (recall
n2 is the number of columns of A), and for every row Ax of A, it chooses
δ′x
R← ZN . It outputs
C˜T =
(
(A, δ), C0, ~C1 ∗ g~δ2,
{
Cxg
Ax·~u+δ′xqρ(x)
2 , Dxg
−δ′x
2
}
x∈[n1]
)
Notice the use of qρ(x), which are the same q’s used by the KeyGenSf1
algorithm.
If we use the Decrypt algorithm to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext
with a semi-functional key, we get the extra term
e(g2, g2)
〈~γ,~δ〉−θu1 ,
where u1 denotes the first coordinate of vector ~u picked during EncryptSf.
Hence we call a semi-functional key (of type 1 or type 2) nominally semi-
functional with respect to a semi-functional ciphertext if
〈
~γ, ~δ
〉
−θu1 = 0 mod
p2.
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5.2.3 Security Proof
Our ABE construction has two types of semi-functional key genera-
tion algorithms instead of one. We define here that the semi-functional key
generation algorithm used by game MasterLeakb generates keys of type 2. Es-
sentially the main idea is to convert all keys to semi-functional keys of type
2. Type 1 keys serve as a “stepping stone” between the games MasterLeak0
and MasterLeak1. Remember that if these two games are indistinguishable,
our scheme has one semi-functional key invariance. However, our assumptions
do not allow us to go in one step from one game to the other. To achieve
that, we add an intermediate game, called MasterLeak1/2, which is defined the
exact same way as MasterLeakb, but with the difference that the challenger
always uses a semi-functional key of type 1 for the challenge key. All other
semi-functional keys are of type 2.
We now give the proofs of semi-functional ciphertext invariance, one
semi-functional key invariance (split in two parts), and semi-functional security
for our system.
Theorem 5.7. If the assumption Comp1 holds, our system has (`MSK, `SK)-
semi-functional ciphertext invariance.3
Proof. We assume we have a PPT attacker A which breaks semi-functional
ciphertext invariance of our system. We will create a PPT algorithm B which
breaks the assumption Comp1 with non-negligible advantage. The simulator
3For this theorem to be true the leakage bounds `MSK, `SK can take any values in N∪{0}.
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B plays the MasterLeakAbe or the MasterLeakC game with the attacker A in
the following way:
Setup phase: B picks α, a
R← ZN and for each attribute i ∈ U , it
chooses random si
R← ZN . It also picks n random exponents x1, x2, . . . , xn R←
ZN . It gives the public parameters
PP = (N, g1, g3, g
a
1 , e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , . . . , g
xn
1 , ∀i ∈ U Ti = gsi1 )
to A, where N , g1, and g3 are given by the challenger.
Phase 1: Knowing α, the simulator can generate a normal master
key as in the Setup algorithm and execute all secret key queries (create, leaked,
keygen) with this master key.
Challenge Phase: The adversary A gives B two messages M0 and
M1 and an access structure, encoded as an n1 × n2 LSSS matrix: (A∗, δ∗).
The simulator B chooses random values v′2, . . . , v
′
n2
R← ZN and for each row
A∗x of A
∗ one value rx
R← ZN . Using the v′ values, it creates the vector ~v′ =(
1, v′2, . . . , v
′
n2
)
. It flips a random coin c
R← {0, 1} and outputs the ciphertext:
CT =
(
(A∗, δ∗), C0, ~C1, ∀x Cx, ∀x Dx
)
=
=
(
(A∗, δ∗),M · (e(T, gα1 ))s, (T x1 , . . . , T xn , T ) ,
∀x T aA∗x·~v′T−r′xsδ∗(x) ,∀x T r′x
)
,
where T is the challenge term from the assumption.
Phase 2: B works in the same way as Phase 1.
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If T = gz1g
ν
2 , then the ciphertext is semi-functional, since
C0 = Mc · e (gz1gν2 , gα1 ) = M · e(g1, g1)αz
T xi = (gxi1 )
zgνxi2 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
T = gz1g
ν
2
T aA
∗
x·~v′T−r
′
xsδ∗(x) = g
aA∗x·z~v′
1 g
−zr′xsδ∗(x)
1 · gA
∗
x·aν ~v′−νr′xsδ∗(x)
2 for every row x of A
∗
T r
′
x = g
zr′x
1 · gνr
′
x
2 for every row x of A
∗
For the G1 part, this implicitly sets s = z, ~v = z~v′ and rx = zr′x. Thus
all the G1 parts are properly distributed (remember that the first coordinate
of ~v should be z).
For the G2 parts, this sets ~δ = ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1), ~u = aν~v′, δ′x =
−νr′x, and qρ∗(x) = sρ∗(x). All the terms have been re-used only in the G1
part; hence they look random and uncorrelated modulo p2 in the adver-
sary’s view. In other words, uniform randomness of the semi-functional pa-
rameters follows from uniform randomness modulo p2 of the following terms:
x1, x2, . . . , xn, ν, a, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
n2
, r′x, sδ∗(x). So this is a properly distributed semi-
functional ciphertext, and B has properly simulated the MasterLeakC game.
If on the other hand, if T = gz1, it is easy to see that the cipher-
text is normal since it has no G2 parts and B has properly simulated the
MasterLeakAbe game. 
Theorem 5.8. If the assumption Comp2 holds, the difference between the ad-
vantages of any PPT attacker when playing the MasterLeak0 and MasterLeak1/2
games with leakage (`MSK, `SK) on our ABE system with the unique attribute
restriction is negligible in λ.
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Proof. We suppose we have a PPT attacker A whose advantage changes non-
negligibly between these two games. We will create a PPT algorithm B which
breaks the assumption Comp2 with non-negligible advantage. The simulator
B will play either the MasterLeak0 or the MasterLeak1/2 game with the attacker
A. Recall that in the former game, all keys are either semi-functional of type 2
or normal (according to the attacker’s choice) and the challenge key is normal.
The latter game is the same, except the challenge key is semi-functional of
type 1.
Setup phase: B picks α, a
R← ZN and for each attribute i ∈ U , it
chooses random si
R← ZN . It also picks n random exponents x1, x2, . . . , xn R←
ZN . It gives the public parameters
PP = (N, g1, g3, g
a
1 , e(g1, g1)
α, gx11 , . . . , g
xn
1 , ∀i ∈ U Ti = gsi1 )
to A, where N , g1, and g3 are given by the challenger.
Phase 1: Knowing α, the simulator can generate a normal master
key as in the Setup algorithm and answer all secret key queries for normal keys
(remember that A queries for either a semi-functional or a normal key).
For semi-functional keys (of type 2), the simulator picks t, z1, . . . , zn ∈
ZN and random exponents ~ρ
R← Zn+1N , ρn+2 R← ZN ,∀i ∈ S ρ′i R← ZN for the
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G3 part. It uses the following secret key:
SK =
(
S, ~K1, L,∀i ∈ S Ki
)
=
=
(
S,
(
gz11 , . . . , g
zn
1 , g
α
1 g
at
1
n∏
i=1
g−xizi1
)
∗ (gµ2 gρ3)~ρ, gt1gρn+23 ,∀i ∈ S T ti gρ
′
i
3
)
,
where S is the set of attributes given by A and gµ2 gρ3 comes from the challenger.
It is easy to see that this is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type
2.
For the challenge key, the simulator has to either give a normal key
or a semi-functional key of type 1. To do this, it will use the assumption’s
challenge term T . It picks z′1, . . . , z
′
n ∈ ZN and random exponents ~ρ R← Zn+1N ,
ρn+2
R← ZN ,∀i ∈ S ρ′i R← ZN for the G3 part. It uses the secret key:
SK =
(
S, ~K1, L,∀i ∈ S Ki
)
=
=
(
S,
(
T z
′
1 , . . . , T z
′
n , gα1 T
a
n∏
i=1
T−xiz
′
i
)
∗ g~ρ3 , T gρn+23 ,∀i ∈ S T sigρ
′
i
3
)
It is easy to see that the G3 parts are properly distributed. For the G1 parts,
this always sets t = w and zi = sz
′
i for all i ∈ [1, n] (remember that T = gw1 gσ3
or gw1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 ). Thus this part is always well-distributed.
If T = gw1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 , the key has G2 parts as well and we can see that it is a
semi-functional key of type 1 with parameters:
~γ = κ
(
z′1, . . . , z
′
n, a−
∑
xiz
′
i
)
, θ = κ and qi = si.
Since the terms z′1, . . . , z
′
n, κ, si are random modulo p2, the key is properly
distributed.
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Challenge Phase: The adversary A gives B two messages M0 and
M1 and an access structure, encoded as an n1×n2 LSSS matrix: (A∗, δ∗). The
simulator B chooses random values v′2, . . . , v
′
n2
R← ZN and for each row A∗x of
A∗ and one value r′x
R← ZN . Using the v′ values, it creates the vector ~v′ =(
1, v′2, . . . , v
′
n2
)
. It flips a random coin c
R← {0, 1} and outputs the ciphertext:
CT =
(
(A∗, δ∗), C0, ~C1,∀x Cx,∀x Dx
)
=
= ((A∗, δ∗),M · (e((gz1gν2 ), gα1 )), ((gz1gν2 )x1 , . . . , (gz1gν2 )xn , (gz1gν2 )) ,
∀x (gz1gν2 )aA
∗
x·~v′(gz1g
ν
2 )
−r′xsδ∗(x) ,∀x (gz1gν2 )r
′
x
)
,
where gz1g
ν
2 is given from the assumption.
The ciphertext is semi-functional since
C0 = Mc · e (gz1gν2 , gα1 ) = M · e(g1, g1)αz
(gz1g
ν
2 )
xi = (gxi1 )
zgνxi2 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
(gz1g
ν
2 ) = g
z
1g
ν
2
(gz1g
ν
2 )
aA∗x·~v′(gz1g
ν
2 )
−r′xsδ∗(x) = gaA
∗
x·z~v′
1 T
−zr′x
δ∗(x) · g
A∗x·aν ~v′−νr′xsδ∗(x)
2
for every row x of A∗
(gz1g
ν
2 )
r′x = g
zr′x
1 · gνr
′
x
2 for every row x of A
∗
For the G1 parts, this implicitly sets s = z, ~v = z~v′, and rx = zr′x. Thus
all are properly distributed (remember that the first coordinate of ~v should be
z).
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For the G2 parts, this sets ~δ = ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1), ~u = aν~v′, δ′x = −νr′x
and qρ∗(x) = sρ∗(x).
First, notice that qδ∗(x) = sδ∗(x) as in the challenge key if it happens to
be of type 1. This is what we want since the qi values used by KeyGenSf1 and
EncryptSf should be the same. We recall here that type 2 keys do not have qi
terms.
The remaining semi-functional parameters of both the challenge key (if
it is semi-functional of type 1) and the ciphertext are shown below:
Secret key
~γ = κ (z′1, . . . , z
′
n, a−
∑
xiz
′
i) θ = κ
Ciphertext
~δ = ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1) ~u = aν
(
1, v′2, . . . , v
′
n2
)
δx = −νr′x
We note that the first term of vector ~u is always equal to aν. Both a
and ν are “seen” by the adversary modulo p2: in the last coordinate of ~γ and
~δ, respectively (for the last of ~γ, we note that κ and all xi, z
′
i’s are seen in other
terms).
The first and easier case is when the attributes of the key satisfy the
challenge access structure. Then this is nominal with respect to the ciphertext
because:
~γ · ~δ − θu1 = κ
(
z′1, . . . , z
′
n, a−
∑
xiz
′
i
)
· ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1)− κaν = 0 mod p2
According to the rules of the game, this key can not be revealed to the
adversary, but only leakage is allowed on it.We can show that no PPT attacker
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can have more than negligible advantage in distinguishing these two keys. The
required lemma is the following:
Lemma 5.9. We suppose the leakage is at most (`MSK = (n−1−2c) log(p2), `SK
= (n− 1− 2c) log(p2)), where c > 0 is a fixed positive constant. Then, for any
PPT adversary A, A’s advantage in the MasterLeak1 game changes only by a
negligible amount when the truly semi-functional challenge key is replaced by a
nominal semi-functional challenge key whenever A declares the challenge key
to have attributes which satisfy the challenge ciphertext’s access structure.
Proof. Throughout this proof we treat the master keys as a special form of
secret keys, i.e. the ones that have as attributes the entire universe U , which
satisfies all monotone access structures.
We suppose there exists a PPT algorithm A whose advantage changes
by a non-negligible amount  when the MasterLeak1 game changes as described
above. Using A, we will create a PPT algorithm B which will distinguish
between the distributions (~δ, f(~τ)) and (~δ, f(~τ ′)) from Corollary B.1.1 with
non-negligible advantage (where m = n + 1 and p = p2). This will yield a
contradiction, since these distributions have a negligible statistical distance.
B simulates the game MasterLeak1 with A as follows. It starts by
running the Setupalgorithm for itself, and giving A the public parameters.
Since B knows the original master key and generators of all the subgroups, it
can make normal as well as semi-functional keys. Hence, it can respond to A’s
non-challenge Phase 1 queries by simply creating the queried keys.
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With non-negligible probability, Amust chose a challenge key in Phase
1 with attributes that satisfy the challenge ciphertext’s access structure. (If
it only did this with negligible probability, then the difference in advantages
whenever the attributes satisfy the access structure would be negligible.)
B will not create this challenge key, but instead will encode the leakage
A asks for on this key in Phase 1 as a single polynomial time computable
function f with domain Zn+1p2 and with an image of size 2
`SK (or 2`MSK). It
can do this by fixing the values of all other keys and fixing all other variables
involved in the challenge key (more details on this below). B then receives a
sample (~δ, f(~Γ)), where ~Γ is either distributed as ~τ or as ~τ ′, in the notation
of the corollary. B will use f(~Γ) to answer all of A ’s leakage queries on the
challenge key by implicitly defining the challenge key as follows.
B chooses r1, r2 ∈ Zp2 . We let g2 denote a generator of G2. B implicitly
sets the G2 components of the key to be g~γ2 and gθ2, where ~γ, θ are defined to
be
~γ = ~Γ +
( n︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, r1
)
and θ = r2
Recall that ~Γ is of length n+ 1; thus r1 is added to the last component
of ~Γ. B defines the non-G2 components of the key to fit their appropriate
distribution.
At some point, A declares the access structure for the challenge ci-
phertext. If the challenge key had attributes that did not satisfy this access
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structure, then B aborts the simulation and guesses whether ~Γ is orthogonal to
~δ randomly. However, the simulation continues with non-negligible probability.
B chooses a random element t2 ∈ Zp2 subject to the constraint δn+1r1−
t2r2 = 0 mod p2. It then constructs the challenge ciphertext, using ~δ and
u1 = t2 as the challenge vector (recall that ~δ is of length n+ 1). The remain-
ing parameters (semi-functional or not) are chosen according to EncryptSF
algorithm. Now, if ~Γ is orthogonal to ~δ, then the challenge key is nominally
semi-functional (and well-distributed as such). If ~Γ is not orthogonal to ~δ,
then the challenge key is truly semi-functional (and also well-distributed).
It is clear that B can easily handle Phase 2 queries, since the chal-
lenge key cannot be queried on here when its attributes satisfy the challenge
ciphertext’s access structure. Hence, B can use the output of A to gain a non-
negligible advantage in distinguishing the distributions (~δ, f(~τ)) and (~δ, f(~τ ′)).
This violates Corollary B.1.1, since these distributions have a negligible sta-
tistical distance for f with this output size. 
However, if the attributes of the key do not satisfy the challenge access
structure, the attacker can ask for the entire key to be revealed. In this
scheme, we use the unique attribute restriction to argue that the value of
u1 = aν is information-theoretically hidden modulo p2.
Since the attributes of the key do not satisfy the challenge access struc-
ture, the rowspace R ⊆ Zn2N formed by the rows of A∗, whose attributes are
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in S, does not include the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0). Otherwise, one could find ωx’s
such that
∑
δ∗(x)∈S ωxA
∗
x = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and decrypt. This means that there
is a vector ~w that is in the orthogonal complement of R, but not orthogonal
to (1, 0, . . . , 0). We can create a basis B of Zn2N that includes ~w. Then we can
write ~u = f ~w + ~u′ where f ∈ ZN and ~u′ is generated by all the vectors of B
except ~w. But then we have that
u1 = ~u · (1, 0, . . . , 0) = f ~w · (1, 0, . . . , 0) + ~u′ · (1, 0, . . . , 0) .
Since ~u′ reveals no information about f and ~w is not orthogonal to (1, 0, . . . , 0),
the value of f is needed to determine the value of u1.
The only places where ~u (and hence f) appears modulo p2 are in the
exponents of the form (see EncryptSf algorithm)
A∗x · ~u+ δ′xqδ∗(x) for every row x
However, not all of these are affected by the value of f . More specifically, we
know that the rows for which the attribute δ∗(x) is in S (i.e. one of the key’s
attributes), hide the value of f since ~w is orthogonal to R.
For the remaining rows, we know that with certainty minus a negligible
probability, all multiplicative factors δ′x are not equal to 0 mod p2 and thus the
value of f is “masked” by the term δ′xqδ∗(x). Here is where we use the restriction
that each attribute in the access structure appears only once: Each of these
qδ∗(x) factors masks f entirely if it appears only once, since they are random
modulo p2. But this is true because they appear only in the access structure
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for which the unique attribute restriction holds and the only key that could
have these terms is the challenge key (type 1). Therefore, the value of u1 seems
random to the adversary, as well. (This is proven the same way in [68].)
Phase 2: B works in the same way as in Phase 1.
The conclusion is that the attacker A plays either the MasterLeak0 or
the MasterLeak1/2 game, depending on the assumption. Thus, if it has a non-
negligible difference in the advantages, B can break the assumption Comp2
with non-negligible advantage. 
Theorem 5.10. If the assumption Comp2 holds, the difference between the ad-
vantages of any PPT attacker when playing the MasterLeak1/2 and MasterLeak1
games with leakage (`MSK, `SK) on our ABE system is negligible in λ.
4
Proof. We assume we have a PPT attacker A with a non-negligible difference
in advantage between these two games. We will build a PPT algorithm B
which breaks assumption 3.2.2 with non-negligible advantage. The simulator
in this reduction works in the same way as in the previous one, with only one
difference: it picks ~h
R← Zn+1N and generates the challenge key as:
SK =
(
S, ~K1, L,∀i ∈ S Ki
)
=
=
(
S,
(
T z
′
1 , . . . , T z
′
n , gα1 T
a
n∏
i=1
T−xiz
′
i
)
∗ (gµ2 gρ3)~h ∗ g~ρ3 , T gρn+23 ,
∀i ∈ S T sigρ′i3
)
4For this theorem to be true the leakage bounds `MSK, `SK can take any values in N∪{0}.
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The only difference from the previous simulator is the term (gµ2 g
ρ
3)
~h,
where gµ2 g
ρ
3 is given by the assumption.
If T = gw1 g
κ
2g
σ
3 , the semi-functional parameters of the challenge key and
the ciphertext are:
~γ = κ (z′1, . . . , z
′
n, a−
∑
xiz
′
i) + µ
~h θ = κ
~δ = ν (x1, . . . , xn, 1) ~u = aν~v′
As before, qi = si for both the key and the ciphertext as they should
be. Also the new term re-randomizes the G2 part of ~K1 so the key is no longer
nominally semi-functional with respect to the ciphertext, i.e. ~γ · ~δ − θu1 = 0
no longer holds. It is obvious that the extra vector µ~h makes all parameters
random and uncorellated modulo p2. So in this case, the challenge key is a
well-distributed semi-functional key of type 1 and A plays game MasterLeak1/2
(all requested semi-functional keys of type 2, type 1 challenge key and the
remaining keys normal).
If T = gw1 g
σ
3 , the key is semi-functional of type 2 with parameters
~γ = µ~h. Thus A plays game MasterLeak1 (all requested semi-functional keys
and challenge key of type 2 and the remaining keys normal). 
By the two previous theorems we get immediately one-semi-functional
invariance:
Theorem 5.11. If the assumption Comp2 holds, our system has (`MSK, `SK)-
one semi-functional key invariance.
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Proof. By theorems 5.8 and 5.10, we have that for any PPT adversary A∣∣∣AdvMasterLeak0A,ΠABE (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeak1/2A,ΠABE (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ)∣∣∣AdvMasterLeak1/2A,ΠABE (λ, `MSK, `SK)− AdvMasterLeak1A,ΠABE (λ, `MSK, `SK)∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
By the triangle inequality and the fact that the sum of two negligible functions
is negligible, we get one semi-functional key invariance. 
Theorem 5.12. If the assumption Comp3 holds, our system has (`MSK, `SK)-
semi-functional security.5
Proof. We assume we have a PPT attacker A which breaks semi-functional
security with non-negligible advantage. We will construct a PPT algorithm B
which breaks the assumption Comp3 with non-negligible advantage. As always,
B that plays either the MasterLeakCK game or a final game with A , where
the advantage of any attacker is 0 in the final game because the ciphertext is
an encryption of a random message, independent of the bit c.
Setup phase: B picks a
R← ZN and for each attribute i ∈ U , it
chooses random si
R← ZN . It will use α from the assumption’s term gα1 gν2 .
It also picks n random exponents x1, x2, . . . , xn
R← ZN . It gives the public
parameters
PP = (N, g1, g3, g
a
1 , e(g1, g1)
α = e(gα1 g
ν
2 , g1), g
x1
1 , . . . , g
xn
1 , ∀i ∈ U Ti = gsi1 )
5For this theorem to be true the leakage bounds `MSK, `SK can take any values in N∪{0}.
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to A, where N , g1, and g3 are given by the challenger.
Phase 1: All keys generated by B should be semi-functional keys of
type 2. For each one, the simulator picks t, z1, . . . , zn ∈ ZN , a random vector
~h
R← Zn+1N for the G2 part and ~ρ R← Zn+1N , ρn+2 R← ZN , ∀i ∈ S ρ′i R← ZN for the
G3 part. It creates the following secret key:
SK =
(
S, ~K1, L,∀i ∈ S Ki
)
=
=
(
S,
(
gz11 , . . . , g
zn
1 , (g
α
1 g
ν
2 )g
at
1
n∏
i=1
g−xizi1
)
∗ g~h2 ∗ g~ρ3 , gt1gρn+23 ,
∀i ∈ S T ti gρ
′
i
3
)
,
where S is the set of attributes given by A and gα1 gν2 comes from the
challenger. It is easy to see that this is a properly distributed semi-functional
key of type 2 with semi-functional parameters ~γ = ~h+ (0, . . . , 0, ν).
Challenge Phase: The adversary A gives B two messages M0 and
M1 and an access structure, encoded as a n1 × n2 LSSS matrix: (A∗, δ∗). The
simulator B chooses random values v′2, . . . , v
′
n2
R← ZN and for each row A∗x
of A∗, one value r′x
R← ZN . Using the v′ values, it creates the vector ~v′ =(
1, v′2, . . . , v
′
n2
)
. It flips a random coin c
R← {0, 1} and outputs the ciphertext:
CT =
(
(A∗, δ∗), C0, ~C1,∀x Cx,∀x Dx
)
=
= ((A∗, δ∗),M · e(T, gα1 ), ((gz1gµ2 )x1 , . . . , (gz1gµ2 )xn , (gz1gµ2 )) ,
∀x (gz1gµ2 )aA
∗
x·~v′(gz1g
µ
2 )
−r′xsδ∗(x) , ∀x (gz1gµ2 )r
′
x
)
,
where gz1g
µ
2 is given from the assumption and T is the challenge term.
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The ciphertext is semi-functional since
(gz1g
µ
2 )
xi = (gxi1 )
zgµxi2 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
(gz1g
µ
2 )
aA∗x·~v′(gz1g
µ
2 )
−r′xsδ∗(x) = gaA
∗
x·z~v′
1 T
−zr′x
δ∗(x) · g
A∗x·aµ~v′−µr′xsδ∗(x)
2
for every row x of A∗
(gz1g
µ
2 )
r′x = g
zr′x
1 · gµr
′
x
2 for every row x of A
∗
For the G1 parts, this implicitly sets s = z, ~v = z~v′, and rx = zr′x.
Thus all G1 parts are properly distributed (remember that the first coordinate
of ~v should be z).
For the G2 parts, this sets ~δ = µ (x1, . . . , xn, 1), ~u = aµ~v′, δ′x = −µr′x
and qδ∗(x) = sδ∗(x). These are properly distributed modulo p2 because the terms
x1, . . ., xn, µ, a, v
′
2, . . ., v
′
n2
, r′x, sδ∗(x) are only seen modulo p1 elsewhere.
Phase 2: Here B works in the same way as in Phase 1.
If T = e(g1, g1)
αz, the above is a properly distributed semi-functional
encryption of Mc. Otherwise, it is an encryption of a random message. Thus,
the advantage of any adversary in this case is 0. 
By theorems 5.7, 5.11, 5.12 we get that:
Theorem 5.13. Under the assumptions Comp1, Comp2, Comp3 and for (`MSK
= (n− 1− 2c) log(p2), `SK = (n− 1− 2c) log(p2)), where c > 0 is a fixed posi-
tive constant, our dual system encryption ABE scheme is (`MSK, `SK)-master-
leakage secure.
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5.3 Leakage Fraction
Our systems allow the same absolute amount of leakage for both the
master and the secret keys. That is, `MSK = `SK = (n − 1 − 2c) log p2 bits,
where n is an arbitrary integer greater than or equal to 2 and c is a fixed
positive constant. Notice that the leakage depends only on the size of the
G2 subgroup, and not on the size of p1 or p3. Thus by varying the relative
sizes of the G1, G2, and G3 subgroups, we can achieve variable key sizes and
allow different fractions of the key size to be leaked. We use the term “leakage
fraction” to mean the number of bits allowed to be leaked from a key divided
by the number of bits required to represent that key.
Recall that p1, p2, p3 are primes of λ1, λ2, λ3 bits, respectively, and N =
p1p2p3 is the order of our group G. We assume that each group element is
represented by approximately λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = Θ(logN) bits. Then, by fixing
λ1 = c1λ, λ2 = λ, and λ3 = c3λ, where λ is the security parameter and
c1, c3 are arbitrary positive constants, we get that the leakage fractions of our
systems are the following:
The leakage fraction can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by modifying
n, c1 and c3 (if we assume a fixed universe size for ABE). Higher values of n give
a better leakage fraction, but larger public parameters, keys, and ciphertexts.
Smaller values of c1, c3 give a better leakage fraction, but also give fewer bits
of security in the G1 and G3 subspaces as a function of λ. We must choose λ
so that c1λ and c3λ are sufficiently large.
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Scheme Master Key Secret Key
IBE n−1−2c
n+3
· 1
1+c1+c3
n−1−2c
n+2
· 1
1+c1+c3
ABE n−1−2c
n+2+|U| · 11+c1+c3 n−1−2cn+2+|S| · 11+c1+c3
Table 5.1: c, c1, c3 are arbitrary positive constants and n is an integer greater
than 2. For the ABE scheme, |U| is the total number of attributes in the
system, i.e. the size of the universe, and |S| is the number of attributes of
the key in question. Notice that in the ABE scheme we ignored the size of
the representations of U and S. They are included in the keys, but they are
considered public; thus not included in the leakage fraction.
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CHAPTER 6
Part II: Three Practical Constructions
In this chapter we present three prime order group constructions with ad-
vanced features. Namely we present two large universe ABE constructions
[98], both proved selectively secure in the standard model under suitable prime
order q-type assumptions, and a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme [97], which
is statically secure in the random oracle model under a third q-type assump-
tion. All of the schemes were designed with three major goals: practicality,
augmented functionality, and sufficiently strong security guarantees.
6.1 A Large-Universe KP-ABE System
In this section we present our large universe KP-ABE scheme from
[98]. We mention here that it can be converted to an HIBE scheme using non
repeating identities, “AND” policies and delegation capabilities (c.f. [74]). In
this setting the public parameters consist of the five terms (g, u, h, w, e(g, g)α),
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which intuitively are utilized in two separate “layers” to achieve secure large
universe KP-ABE. In the “attribute layer”, the u, h terms provide a Boneh-
Boyen-style [21] hash function (uAh), while in the “secret sharing layer” the g
term holds the shares of the secret key α during key generations. The w term
is used to “bind” this layer to the u, h “attribute layer”.
6.1.1 Construction
Our scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
Setup(1λ)→ (PP,MSK): The setup algorithm calls the group gener-
ator algorithm G(1λ) and gets the descriptions of the groups and the bilinear
mapping D = (p,G,GT , e), where p is the prime order of the groups G and
GT . The attribute universe is U = Zp.
Then the algorithm picks the random terms g, u, h, w
R← G and α R← Zp.
It outputs
PP = (D, g, u, h, w, e(g, g)α) MSK = (α)
KeyGen(MSK, (A, δ))→ SK: Initially the algorithm picks ~y = (α, y2,
. . . , yn)
> where y2, . . . , yn
R← Zp. In the terminology of section 2.1, the master
secret key α is the secret to be shared among the shares. The vector of the
shares is
~λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λ`)
> = A~y
It then picks ` random exponents t1, t2, . . . , t`
R← Zp and for every τ ∈ [`]
144
it computes
Kτ,0 = g
λτwtτ Kτ,1 =
(
uδ(τ)h
)−tτ
Kτ,2 = g
tτ
The secret key is SK = ((A, δ), {Kτ,0, Kτ,1, Kτ,2}τ∈[`]).
Encrypt(m,S = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak} ⊆ Zp) → CT: Initially, the algo-
rithm picks k + 1 random exponents s, r1, r2, . . ., rk
R← Zp. It computes
C = m · e(g, g)αs, C0 = gs, and for every τ ∈ [k] it computes
Cτ,1 = g
rτ Cτ,2 = (u
Aτh)rτw−s
The ciphertext is CT = (S, C, C0, {Cτ,1, Cτ,2}τ∈[k]).
Decrypt {SK,CT} → m: The algorithm finds the set of rows in M that
provide a share to attributes in S, i.e. I = {i : δ(i) ∈ S}. Then it calculate
constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that
∑
i∈I ωiAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0), where Ai is the
i-th row of the matrix A. According to the discussion in section 2.1, these
constants exist if the set S is an authorized set of the policy.
Then it calculates
B =
∏
i∈I
{e(C0, Ki,0)e(Cτ,1, Ki,1)e(Cτ,2, Ki,2)}ωi
where τ is the index of the attribute δ(i) in S (it depends on i). The algorithm
outputs m = C/B.
145
Correctness: If the attribute set S of the ciphertext is authorized, we have
that
∑
i∈I ωiλi = α. Therefore:
B =
∏
i∈I
e(g, g)sωiλie(g, w)stiωie(g, uδ(i)h)−rτ tiωie(g, uδ(i)h)rτ tiωie(g, w)−stiωi
= e(g, g)s
∑
i∈I ωiλi = e(g, g)αs
6.1.2 Security Proof
We will prove the following theorem regarding the selective security of
our KP-ABE scheme:
Theorem 6.1. If the q-DPBDH1 assumption holds, then all PPT adversaries
with a challenge attribute set of size k, where k ≤ q, have a negligible advantage
in selectively breaking our scheme.
Proof. To prove the theorem we will assume that there exists a PPT attacker
A with a challenge attribute set that satisfies the restriction, which has a non
negligible advantage AdvA in selectively breaking our scheme. Using this at-
tacker we will build a PPT simulatorB that attacks the q-DPBDH1 assumption
with a non negligible advantage.
Initialization: Initially, B receives the given terms from the assump-
tion and an attribute set S∗ = {A∗1, A∗2, . . . , A∗k} ⊆ U .
Setup: Now, the simulator B has to provide A the public parameters
of the system. In order to do that it implicitly sets the master secret key of the
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scheme to be α = xy, where x, y are set in the assumption. Notice that this
way α is properly distributed. Then B picks the random exponents u˜, h˜
R← Zp
and gives to A the following terms:
g = g w = gx
u = gu˜ ·∏i∈[k] gy/b2i h = gh˜ ·∏i∈[k] gxz/bi ·∏i∈[k] (gy/b2i)−A∗i
e(g, g)α = e(gx, gy)
Since x is information-theoretically hidden from A, because it is multiplied
by y in α, the term w is properly uniformly random in G. The terms u, h
are properly distributed due to u˜, h˜ respectively. Notice that all terms can be
calculated by the simulator using suitable terms from the assumption and the
challenge set S∗ given by A.
Query phases 1 and 2: The simulator has to produce secret keys
for policies requested by A, for which the set S∗ is not authorized. In both
phases the treatment is the same. We describe here the way B works in order
to create a key for a policy (A, δ).
Since S∗ is non authorized for (A, δ), there exists a vector ~w = (w1, w2,
. . ., wn)
> ∈ Zpn such that w1 = 1 and 〈Aτ , ~w〉 = 0 for all τ ∈ [`] such that
δ(τ) ∈ S∗ (c.f. section 2.1). The simulator calculates ~w using linear algebra.
The vector ~y that will be shared is implicitly
~y = xy ~w + (0, y˜2, y˜3, . . . , y˜n)
>
where y˜2, y˜3, . . . , y˜n
R← Zp. This vector is properly distributed because its first
component is xy = α and the remaining components are uniformly random in
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Zp. Therefore for each row τ ∈ [`] the share is
λτ = 〈Aτ , ~y〉 = xy〈Aτ , ~w〉+ 〈Aτ , (0, y˜2, y˜3, . . . , y˜n)>〉 = xy〈Aτ , ~w〉+ λ˜τ
As we mentioned above for each row τ for which δ(τ) ∈ S∗ it is true
that 〈Aτ , ~w〉 = 0. Therefore in this case λτ = λ˜τ = 〈Aτ , (0, y˜2, y˜3, . . . , y˜n)>〉;
hence its value is known to the simulator. In that case it picks tτ
R← Zp and
outputs the terms Kτ,0, Kτ,1, Kτ,2 as in the KeyGen algorithm.
On the other hand, for each row τ for which δ(τ) /∈ S∗ it picks t˜τ R← Zp
and sets implicitly
tτ = −y〈Aτ , ~w〉+
∑
i∈[k]
xzbi〈Aτ , ~w〉
δ(τ)− A∗i
+ t˜τ
Since δ(τ) /∈ S∗ the above fractions are defined and tτ is properly
distributed due to t˜τ . The intuition behind this choice is that the y exponent
“raises” the power of w to the secret α = xy. However, this also results
to xyz/bi exponents from h. Thus, the cancellation is provided by the xzbi
exponents on the y/b2i part. Now the simulator can compute the following
terms using the assumption:
Kτ,0 = g
λτwtτ
= gxy〈Aτ , ~w〉+λ˜τ · g−xy〈Aτ , ~w〉+
∑
i∈[k]
x2zbi〈Aτ ,~w〉
δ(τ)−A∗
i · wt˜τ
= gλ˜τ ·
∏
i∈[n]
(
gx
2zbi
)〈Aτ , ~w〉/(δ(τ)−A∗i ) · wt˜τ
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Kτ,1 = (u
δ(τ)h)−tτ =
=
gδ(τ)u˜+h˜ ·∏
i∈[k]
gxz/bi ·
∏
i∈[k]
gy(δ(τ)−A
∗
i )/b2i
y〈Aτ , ~w〉−
∑
i∈[k]
xzbi〈Aτ ,~w〉
δ(τ)−A∗
i
· (uδ(τ)h)−t˜τ
= gy〈Aτ , ~w〉(δ(τ)u˜+h˜)
∏
i∈[k]
g−xzbi(δ(τ)u˜+h˜)〈Aτ , ~w〉/(δ(τ)−A
∗
i )
·
∏
i∈[k]
gxyz〈Aτ , ~w〉/bi
∏
(i,j)∈[k,k]
g−(xz)
2bj〈Aτ , ~w〉/bi(δ(τ)−A∗j )
·
∏
i∈[k]
gy
2〈Aτ , ~w〉(δ(τ)−A∗i )/b2i
∏
(i,j)∈[k,k]
g−xyz〈Aτ , ~w〉bj(δ(τ)−A
∗
i )/b2i (δ(τ)−A∗j )
· (uδ(τ)h)−t˜τ
= (gy)〈Aτ , ~w〉(δ(τ)u˜+h˜)
∏
i∈[k]
(
gxzbi
)−(δ(τ)u˜+h˜)〈Aτ , ~w〉/(δ(τ)−A∗i )
·
∏
(i,j)∈[k,k]
(
g(xz)
2bj/bi
)−〈Aτ , ~w〉/(δ(τ)−A∗j ) ∏
i∈[k]
(
gy
2/b2i
)〈Aτ , ~w〉(δ(τ)−A∗i )
·
∏
(i,j)∈[k,k]
i 6=j
(
gxyzbj/b
2
i
)−〈Aτ , ~w〉(δ(τ)−A∗i )/(δ(τ)−A∗j ) · (uδ(τ)h)−t˜τ
Kτ,2 = g
tτ
= (gy)−〈Aτ , ~w〉 ·
∏
i∈[k]
(
gxzbi
)〈Aτ , ~w〉/(δ(τ)−A∗i ) · gt˜τ
Therefore B can reply to A’s query with the entire secret key SK =
((A, δ), {Kτ,0, Kτ,1, Kτ,2}τ∈[`]).
Challenge: The attacker will output a pair of messages (M0,M1)
of the same length. In this phase the simulator flips a random coin b
R←
{0, 1} and sets implicitly s = z from the q-DPBDH1 assumption. Also, it sets
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rτ = bτ for every level τ ∈ [k]. These parameters are properly distributed since
z, b1, . . . , bq are information-theoretically hidden from the attacker’s view. Now
the simulator can compute the following terms using the assumption:
C = Mb · T C0 = gs = gz
Cτ,1 = g
rτ = gbτ
Cτ,2 = (u
A∗τh)rτ · w−s
= gbτ (u˜A
∗
τ+h˜) ·
∏
i∈[k]
gxzbτ/bi
∏
i∈[k]
gybτ(A
∗
k−A∗i )/b2i · g−xz
=
(
gbτ
)u˜A∗τ+h˜ ·∏
i∈[k]
i 6=τ
gxzbτ/bi
∏
i∈[k]
i 6=τ
(
gybτ/b
2
i
)A∗τ−A∗i
As one can see, the choice of rτ = bτ “raises” one of the xz/bi compo-
nents to xz and achieves the cancellation with w−s. The simulator hands over
the ciphertext CT =
(
S∗, C, C0, {Cτ,1, Cτ,2}τ∈[k]
)
to the attacker A.
Guess: After the query phase 2, where the simulator creates the secret
keys as described above, the attacker outputs a guess b′ for the challenge bit.
If b′ = b the simulator outputs 0, i.e. it claims that the challenge term is
T = e(g, g)xyz. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
If T = e(g, g)xyz then A played the proper security game, because
C = Mb · T = Mb · e(g, g)αs. On the other hand, if T is a random term of GT
then all information about the message Mb is lost in the challenge ciphertext.
Therefore the advantage of A is exactly 0. As a result if A breaks the proper
security game with a non negligible advantage, then B has a non negligible
advantage in breaking the q-DPBDH1 assumption. 
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6.2 A Large-Universe CP-ABE System
In this section we present our large universe CP-ABE construction from
[98]. The public parameters consist of the six group elements (g, u, h, w,
v, e(g, g)α), which intuitively are utilized in two separate “layers” to achieve
secure large universe CP-ABE. In the “attribute layer”, the u, h terms provide
a Boneh-Boyen-style [21] hash function (uAh), while in the “secret sharing
layer” the w term holds the secret randomness r during key generation and
the shares of the secret randomness s during encryption. The v term is used to
“bind” the two layers together. The g and e(g, g)α terms are used to introduce
the master secret key functionality and allow correct decryption.
We see here that the “layered” construction is the same as the KP-ABE
construction. However, we notice an extra term in binding the two main layers.
This is because the master secret key α is no longer split in shares during key
generation and is appearing as an exponent of the group generator g. Due to
the extra binding term we need the extra functionality in the more complex
assumption q-DPBDH2 provided by the powers of a.
6.2.1 Construction
Our scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup(1λ)→ (PP,MSK): The setup algorithm calls the group gener-
ator algorithm G(1λ) and gets the descriptions of the groups and the bilinear
mapping D = (p,G,GT , e), where p is the prime order of the groups G and
GT . The attribute universe is U = Zp.
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Then the algorithm picks the random terms g, u, h, w, v
R← G and α R←
Zp. It outputs
PP = (D, g, u, h, w, v, e(g, g)α) MSK = (α)
KeyGen(MSK,S = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak} ⊆ Zp) → SK: Initially, the key
generation algorithm picks k+1 random exponents r, r1, r2, . . . , rk
R← Zp. Then
it computes K0 = g
αwr, K1 = g
r, and for every τ ∈ [k]
Kτ,2 = g
rτ and Kτ,3 = (u
Aτh)rτv−r
The secret key output is SK = (S, K0, K1, {Kτ,2, Kτ,3}τ∈[k]).
Encrypt(M ∈ GT , (A, δ)) → CT: The encryption algorithm takes the
plaintext message M and picks ~y = (s, y2, . . ., yn)
> R← Zn×1p . In the terminol-
ogy of section 2.1, s is the random secret to be shared among the shares. The
vector of the shares is
~λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λ`)
> = M~y
It then picks ` random exponents t1, t2, . . . , t`
R← Zp and calculates
C = M · e(g, g)αs, C0 = gs, and for every τ ∈ [`]
Cτ,1 = w
λτvtτ , Cτ,2 = (u
δ(τ)h)−tτ and Cτ,3 = gtτ
The ciphertext output is CT = ((A, δ), C, C0, {Cτ,1, Cτ,2, Cτ,3}τ∈[`]).
Decrypt {SK,CT} → m: Firstly, the decryption algorithm calculates
the set of rows in A providing a share to attributes in S, i.e. I = {i : δ(i) ∈ S}.
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Then it computes the constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that
∑
i∈I ωiAi = (1, 0, . . .,
0), where Ai is the i-th row of the matrix A. According to the discussion in
section 2.1, these constants exist if the set S is an authorized set of the policy.
Then it calculates
B =
e(C0, K0)∏
i∈I {e(Ci,1, K1)e(Ci,2, Kτ,2)e(Ci,3, Kτ,3)}ωi
where τ is the index of the attribute δ(i) in S (it depends on i). The algorithm
outputs M = C/B.
Correctness: If the attribute set S of the secret key is authorized, we have
that
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. Therefore:
B =
e(g, g)αse(g, w)rs∏
i∈I e(g, w)
rωiλie(g, v)rtiωie(g, uδ(i)h)−rτ tiωie(g, uδ(i)h)rτ tiωie(g, v)−rtiωi
=
e(g, g)αse(g, w)rs
e(g, w)r
∑
i∈I ωiλi
= e(g, g)αs
6.2.2 Security Proof
We will prove the following theorem regarding the selective security of
our CP-ABE scheme:
Theorem 6.2. If the q-DPBDH2 assumption holds then all PPT adversaries
with a challenge matrix of size `×n, where `, n ≤ q, have a negligible advantage
in selectively breaking our scheme.
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Proof. To prove the theorem we will assume that there exists a PPT attacker A
with a challenge matrix that satisfies the restriction, which has a non negligible
advantage AdvA in selectively breaking our scheme. Using this attacker we will
build a PPT simulator B that attacks the q-DPBDH2 assumption with a non
negligible advantage.
Initialization: B receives the given terms from the assumption and a
challenge policy (A∗, δ∗) from A. We have that A∗ is an ` × n matrix, where
`, n ≤ q, and δ∗ : [`]→ Zp.
Setup: The simulator B has to provide A the public parameters of
the system. In order to do that it implicitly sets the master secret key of
the scheme to be α = aq+1 + α˜, where a, q are set in the assumption and
α˜
R← Zp is a known to B random exponent. Notice that this way α is correctly
distributed and a is information-theoretically hidden from A. Then B picks
the random exponents v˜, u˜, h˜
R← Zp and using the assumption gives to A the
following public parameters:
g = g w = ga
v = gv˜ ·∏(j,k)∈[`,n] (gak/bj)A∗j,k u = gu˜ ·∏(j,k)∈[`,n] (gak/b2j)A∗j,k
h = gh˜ ·∏(j,k)∈[`,n] (gak/b2j)−δ∗(j)A∗j,k e(g, g)α = e(ga, aaq) · e(g, g)α˜
Since a is information-theoretically hidden from A, the term w is properly
uniformly random in G. The terms v, u, h are properly distributed due to
v˜, u˜, h˜ respectively. Notice that all terms can be calculated by the simulator
using suitable terms from the assumption and the challenge policy given by
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A.
As one can see, the “attribute layer”, which consists of the terms u, h,
is made up of terms whose exponents have b2i in the denominator, the “binder
term” v has bi, and the “secret sharing layer” w has only one power of a. This
scaling of the powers of bi will allow our simulator to properly simulate all
terms.
Query phases 1 and 2: Now the simulator has to produce secret
keys for non authorized sets of attributes requested by A. In both phases the
treatment is the same. We describe here the way B works in order to create a
key for an attribute set S = {A1, A2, . . . , A|S|} received by A.
Since S is non authorized for (A∗, δ∗), there exists a vector ~w = (w1,
w2, . . ., wn)
> ∈ Zpn such that w1 = −1 and 〈A∗i , ~w〉 = 0 for all i ∈ I =
{i|i ∈ [`] ∧ δ∗(i) ∈ S} (c.f. section 2.1). The simulator calculates ~w using
linear algebra. Then it picks r˜
R← Zp and implicitly sets
r = r˜ + w1a
q + w2a
q−1 + . . .+ wnaq+1−n = r˜ +
∑
i∈[n]
wia
q+1−i
This is properly distributed due to r˜. Then using the suitable terms
from the assumption it calculates:
K0 = g
αwr = ga
q+1
gα˜gar˜
∏
i∈[n]
gwia
q+2−i
= gα˜ (ga)r˜
n∏
i=2
(
ga
q+2−i
)wi
K1 = g
r = gr˜
∏
i∈[n]
(
ga
q+1−i
)wi
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Additionally, for all τ ∈ [|S|] it has to compute the terms Kτ,2 = grτ
and Kτ,3 = (u
Aτh)rτv−r. The common part v−r for these terms is the following:
v−r = v−r˜
gv˜ ∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
ga
kA∗j,k/bj
−
∑
i∈[n] wia
q+1−i
= v−r˜
∏
i∈[n]
(
ga
q+1−i
)−v˜wi · ∏
(i,j,k)∈[n,`,n]
g−wiA
∗
j,ka
q+1+k−i/bj
= v−r˜
∏
i∈[n]
(
ga
q+1−i
)−v˜wi · ∏
(i,j,k)∈[n,`,n]
i 6=k
(
ga
q+1+k−i/bj
)−wiA∗j,k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
·
∏
(i,j)∈[n,`]
g−wiA
∗
j,ia
q+1/bj
= Φ ·
∏
j∈[`]
g−〈~w,A
∗
j 〉aq+1/bj
= Φ ·
∏
j∈[`]
δ∗(j)/∈S
g−〈~w,A
∗
j 〉aq+1/bj
The Φ part can be calculated by the simulator using the assumption,
while the second part has to be canceled by the (uAτh)rτ part. So for every
attribute Aτ ∈ S the simulator sets implicitly
rτ = r˜τ + r ·
∑
i′∈[`]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
bi′
Aτ − δ∗(i′)
= r˜τ + r˜ ·
∑
i′∈[`]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
bi′
Aτ − δ∗(i′) +
∑
(i,i′)∈[n,`]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
wibi′a
q+1−i
Aτ − δ∗(i′)
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Where r˜τ
R← Zp and therefore rτ is properly distributed. The use of
the bi’s in the numerators of the fractions is explained by the “layer” intuition
presented before. Namely, these bi will cancel with the b
2
i denominators in the
“attribute layer” and provide a cancellation for the unknown part of v−r.
Also, notice that rτ is well-defined only for attributes in the specific
unauthorized set S or unrelated attributes (outside the policy), since the sum
is over the i′ such that δ∗(i′) /∈ S. Therefore, for all Aτ ∈ S or Aτ /∈ δ∗([`]), the
denominators Aτ − δ∗(i′) are non zero. If the simulator tries to include more
attributes of the policy in the key (and possibly make a key for an authorized
set), he would have to divide by zero (c.f. Figure 6.1).
Zp
δ∗([`]) S
Figure 6.1: The simulator can not create the components for attributes in the
gray area.
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Therefore the first part of Kτ,3 = (u
Aτh)rτv−r is:
(uAτh)rτ =
gu˜Aτ+h˜ ∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
g(Aτ−δ
∗(j))A∗j,ka
k/b2j
r˜·
∑
i′∈[`],δ∗(i′)/∈S
bi′
Aτ−δ∗(i′)
·
gu˜Aτ+h˜ ∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
g(Aτ−δ
∗(j))A∗j,ka
k/b2j

∑
(i,i′)∈[n,`],δ∗(i′)/∈S
wibi′a
q+1−i
Aτ−δ∗(i′)
· (uAτh)r˜τ
= (Kτ,2/g
r˜τ )u˜Aτ+h˜ ·
∏
(i′,j,k)∈[`,`,n]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
gr˜(Aτ−δ
∗(j))A∗j,kbi′a
k/(Aτ−δ∗(i′))b2j
·
∏
(i,i′,j,k)∈[n,`,`,n]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
g(Aτ−δ
∗(j))wiA∗j,kbi′a
q+1+k−i/(Aτ−δ∗(i′))b2j · (uAτh)r˜τ
= Ψ ·
∏
(i,j)∈[n,`]
δ∗(j)/∈S
g(Aτ−δ
∗(j))wiA∗j,ibja
q+1+i−i/(Aτ−δ∗(j))b2j
= Ψ ·
∏
j∈[`]
δ∗(j)/∈S
g〈~w,A
∗
j 〉aq+1/bj
Where Ψ = (uAτh)r˜τ · (Kτ,2/gr˜τ )u˜Aτ+h˜
·
∏
(i′,j,k)∈[`,`,n]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
(
gbi′a
k/b2j
)r˜(Aτ−δ∗(j))A∗j,k/(Aτ−δ∗(i′))
·
∏
(i,i′,j,k)∈[n,`,`,n]
δ∗(i′)/∈S,(j 6=i′∨i 6=k)
(
gbi′a
q+1+k−i/b2j
)(Aτ−δ∗(j))wiA∗j,k/(Aτ−δ∗(i′))
and Kτ,2 = g
rτ = gr˜τ ·
∏
i′∈[`]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
(
gbi′
)r˜/(Aτ−δ∗(i′)) · ∏
(i,i′)∈[n,`]
δ∗(i′)/∈S
(
gbi′a
q+1−i
)wi/(Aτ−δ∗(i′))
The Ψ and Kτ,2 terms can be calculated using the suitable terms of our
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assumption1. The second part of (uAτh)rτ cancels exactly with the problematic
part of v−r. Therefore the simulator can calculate Kτ,2 and Kτ,3 for all Aτ ∈
S and hand over the secret key SK = (S, K0, K1, {Kτ,2, Kτ,3}τ∈[|S|]) to the
attacker A.
Challenge: The attacker will output a pair of messages (M0,M1) of
the same length. In this phase the simulator flips a random coin b
R← {0, 1}
and constructs
C = Mb · T · e(g, gs)α˜ and C0 = gs
where T is the challenge term and gs the corresponding term of the
assumption.
The simulator sets implicitly ~y = (s, sa+ y˜2, sa
2 + y˜3, . . ., sa
n−1 + y˜n)>,
where y˜2, y˜3, . . ., y˜n
R← Zp. We see that the secret s and the vector ~y are
properly distributed, since s was information theoretically hidden from A and
the y˜i’s are picked uniformly at random. As a result, since ~λ = A
∗~y we have
that
λτ =
∑
i∈[n]
A∗τ,isa
i−1 +
n∑
i=2
A∗τ,iy˜i =
∑
i∈[n]
A∗τ,isa
i−1 + λ˜τ
for each row τ ∈ [`]. Notice that the terms λ˜τ =
∑n
i=2A
∗
τ,iy˜i are known
to the simulator. For each row the simulator B sets implicitly tτ = −sbτ . This
1Notice that for the products of Ψ we can have j = i′, but in that case the power of a is
different than q + 1. So the simulator can use the ga
i/bj terms.
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is properly distributed as well, because the bi’s are information theoretically
hidden from the attacker. Using the above, B calculates:
Cτ,1 = w
λτvtτ = wλ˜τ ·
∏
i∈[n]
gA
∗
τ,isa
i · (gsbτ )−v˜ · ∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
g−A
∗
j,ka
ksbτ/bj =
= wλ˜τ · (gsbτ )−v˜ ·∏
i∈[n]
gA
∗
τ,isa
i ·
∏
k∈[n]
g−A
∗
τ,ka
ksbτ/bτ ·
∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
j 6=τ
g−A
∗
j,ka
ksbτ/bj =
= wλ˜τ · (gsbτ )−v˜ · ∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
j 6=τ
(
gsa
kbτ/bj
)−A∗j,k
Cτ,2 =
(
uδ
∗(τ)h
)tτ
=
(
gsbτ
)−(u˜δ∗(τ)+h˜) ·
 ∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
g(δ
∗(τ)−δ∗(j))A∗j,kak/b2j
−sbτ
=
(
gsbτ
)−(u˜δ∗(τ)+h˜) · ∏
(j,k)∈[`,n]
j 6=τ
(
gsa
kbτ/b2j
)−(δ∗(τ)−δ∗(j))A∗j,k
Cτ,3 = g
tτ =
(
gsbτ
)−1
Notice that by using tτ = −sbτ we “raised” the exponents of the
“binder” term v so that they cancel with the unknown powers of wλτ . There-
fore, the simulator hands over the ciphertext CT = ((A∗, δ∗), C, C0, {Cτ,1,
Cτ,2, Cτ,3}τ∈[`]) to the attacker A.
Guess: After the query phase 2, where the simulator creates the secret
keys as described above, the attacker outputs a guess b′ for the challenge bit.
If b′ = b the simulator outputs 0, i.e. it claims that the challenge term is
T = e(g, g)sa
q+1
. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
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If T = e(g, g)sa
q+1
then A played the proper security game, because
C = Mb · T · e(g, gs)α˜ = Mb · e(g, g)αs. On the other hand, if T is a random
term of GT then all information about the message Mb is lost in the challenge
ciphertext. Therefore the advantage of A is exactly 0. As a result if A breaks
the proper security game with a non negligible advantage, then B has a non
negligible advantage in breaking the q-DPBDH2 assumption. 
6.3 A Large-Universe Multi-Authority CP-ABE Sys-
tem
Our scheme in [97] constitutes an augmented version of the Lewko-
Waters [73] CP-ABEconstruction and shares several of the existing techniques.
Namely in order to allow for multiple authorities and prevent collusion between
users’ keys it utilizes a hash function H that maps global identities to group
elements. This hash function is modeled as a Random Oracle in the security
proof. We combined this technique with the technique from [112] that used
a hash function F that hashes attributes to group elements; also modeled
as a Random Oracle. This way we achieved a large universe construction
and at the same time we overcome the restriction that each attribute is used
only once. This is because the policies are not any more controlled by the
authorities, but by the underlying attributes. And the Random Oracle usage
naturally overcomes the “one-time” restriction. Finally in order to “bound”
the different ciphertext terms together we use two secret sharing vectors: one
that shares the secret z of the blinding factor and one that shares 0. In order
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to decrypt someone has to use them both; therefore collusion on decryption
from different users is prevented.
6.3.1 Construction
Our proposed scheme consists of the following five algorithms:
GlobalSetup(1λ)→ GP: The global setup algorithm takes as input the
security parameter λ and chooses a bilinear group of prime order p ∈ Θ(2λ). It
also choses a function H mapping global identities GID to elements of G and
another function F mapping strings, interpreted as attributes, to elements of
G. Both of these functions will be modeled as random oracles in the security
proof.
We denote by UΘ the set of authorities and U the set of attributes.
We assume that each attribute belongs to only one authority and it is easy to
find the corresponding authority. UΘ is of polynomial size, while U may be of
exponential size in the security parameter.
The algorithm outputs the global parameters GP = {p,G, H, F}.
AuthSetup(GP)→ {PK, SK}: The authority setup algorithm chooses
two random exponents α, y ∈ Zp and publishes PK = {e(g, g)α, gy} as its
public key. It keeps SK = {α, y} as its secret key.
KeyGen(GID, θ, u, SK,GP) → {Kθ,u,GID,K′θ,u,GID}: The key genera-
tion algorithm takes as input the user’s global identifier GID, the identifier θ
of the authority, the attribute u to create a key for as well as the authority’s
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secret key and the global parameters.
The algorithm first chooses a fresh random t
R← Zp and it computes:
Kθ,u,GID = gαθH(GID)yθF (u)t, K′θ,u,GID = gt
Encrypt(M, (A, ρ, δ),GP, {PK}) → CT: The encryption algorithm
takes in a message M , an ` × n access matrix A with ρ mapping its rows
to authorities and δ mapping rows to attributes for each authority. The al-
gorithm also takes in global parameters, and the public keys of the relevant
authorities. We use the notation (e(g, g)αθ , gyθ) to refer to the public key of
authority θ.
The algorithm first chooses a random z ∈ Zp and a random vector
~v ∈ Znp with z as its first entry. We let λx denote the share
〈
~Ax, ~v
〉
, where ~Ax
is row x of A. It also chooses a random vector ~w ∈ Znp with 0 as its first entry.
We let ωx denote the share
〈
~Ax, ~w
〉
.
For each row x of A, it chooses a random tx ∈ Zp. The ciphertext is
computed as:
C0 = Me(g, g)
s
{C1,x = e(g, g)λxe(g, g)αρ(x)tx , C2,x = g−tx ,
C3,x = g
yρ(x)txgωx , C4,x = F (δ(x))
tx}x∈[`]
Decrypt(CT, {Kθ,u,GID},GP) → M : We assume the ciphertext is en-
crypted under an access matrix (A, ρ, δ). To decrypt, the decryptor first com-
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putes H(GID). If the decryptor has the secret keys {Kρ(x),δ(x),GID} for a subset
of rows ~Ax of A such that (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span of these rows, then the
decryptor proceeds as follows:
For each such x, the decryptor computes:
C1,x · e(Kρ(x),δ(x),GID, C2,x) · e(H(GID), C3,x) · e(K′ρ(x),δ(x),GID, C4,x)
= e(g, g)λxe(H(GID), g)ωx
The decryptor then chooses constants cx ∈ Zp such that
∑
x cx
~Ax =
(1, 0, . . . , 0) and computes:
∏
x
(
e(g, g)λxe(H(GID), g)ωx)cx = e(g, g)z
We recall that λx =
〈
~Ax, ~v
〉
and ωx =
〈
~Ax, ~w
〉
, where 〈(1, 0, . . . , 0), ~v〉 = s
and 〈~w, (1, 0, . . . , 0)〉 = 0. The message can then be obtained as:
M = C0/e(g, g)
z
Remark 6.3. Notice that for the users’ secret keys and the ciphertexts a re-
randomizing technique is applicable using only the public parameters. Namely,
if someone has a key (Kθ,u,GID, K′θ,u,GID), he can acquire a new key for (GID,
θ, u) by picking t′ R← Zp and constructing (Kθ,u,GIDF (u)t′ , K′θ,u,GIDgt′). For the
ciphertext the re-randomization can be done by picking new random vectors
~v′, ~w′ with the first element 0 and new t′x
R← Zp. Then the re-randomized terms
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for row x are
(C1,xe(g, g)
〈 ~Ax,~v′〉e(g, g)αρ(x)t′x , C2,xg−t′x , C3,xgyρ(x)t′xg〈 ~Ax, ~w′〉, C4,xF (δ(x))tx)
We will use these re-randomizing techniques in our security reduction to pro-
vide properly distributed components.
6.3.2 Security Proof
In our security proof we combined several techniques, which we think
might be of independent interest in the study of CP-ABE systems. The first
technique allows the simulator of our reduction to isolate an unauthorized set of
rows and essentially ignore it for the remaining of the security reduction. It can
ignore the contributions of these rows even in the construction of the challenge
ciphertext. In our case the simulator does that for the corrupt authorities,
which are controlled by the adversary. The claim that makes this technique
possible is shown below and the proof is in appendix B. The claim allows the
simulator to “zero-out” a subset of columns for the unauthorized set.
Claim 6.4. Let A ∈ Z`×np be the secret sharing matrix of a linear secret sharing
scheme for an access policy A and let C ⊆ [`] be a non-authorized set of rows.
Let c ∈ N be the dimension of the subspace spanned by the rows of C.
Then the distribution of the shares {λx}x∈[`] sharing the secret z ∈
Zp generated with the matrix A is the same as the distribution of the shares
{λ′x}x∈[`] sharing the secret z ∈ Zp generated with some matrix A′, where
A′x,j = 0 for x ∈ C and j ∈ [n− c] (see figure 6.2).
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Moreover A′ is computable from A in polynomial time.
Another technique utilized in the security proof is the “splitting” of the
unknown parameters to two different vectors. Namely the secret sharing vector
~v will hold the secret saq+1 on only the first position and the zero sharing vector
~w will hold the unknown terms saq, saq−1, . . . , sa2 on all positions but the first.
During the generation of the secret keys these terms are “recombined” to give
a full series of q terms that are canceled by the attribute term.
Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 6.5. If the q-DPBDHE assumption holds, then all PPT adversaries
with a challenge matrix of size at most q × q have a negligible advantage in
statically breaking our scheme in the Random Oracle Model.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we assume that there exists a PPT
adversary Adv that breaks the scheme with more than negligible advantage
and we show how to construct a PPT algorithm B that simulates the static
security game with Adv and breaks the q-DPBDHE assumption. Our simulator
works as follows:
Global Parameters: Initially, it gets (D,T ) from its q-DPBDHE
challenger and sends the public parameters GP = (G, p, g) to Adv. The two
random oracles H,F will be programmed by the simulator.
Static security: According to the static security game, the attacker
Adv outputs a set of corrupt authorities CΘ ⊆ UΘ. It also outputs the sequence
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A =

A1,1 A1,2 . . . A1,n
A2,1 A2,2 . . . A2,n
A3,1 A3,2 . . . A3,n
...
...
. . .
...
A`,1 A`,2 . . . A`,n
 A′ =

0 . . . 0 A′1,n−c+1 . . . A
′
1,n
A′2,1 . . . A
′
2,n−c A
′
2,n−c+1 . . . A
′
2,n
0 . . . 0 A′3,n−c+1 . . . A
′
3,n
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
A′`,1 . . . A
′
1,n−c A
′
1,n−c+1 . . . A
′
`,n

Figure 6.2: Transformation of the policy matrix A to be used by the simulator.
Rows that belong to corrupted authorities are highlighted.
Q = {(GIDi, Si)}mi=1 of the secret key queries, where Si ⊆ (UΘ \ CΘ)×U , and
sends two messages (M0,M1) ∈ G2T with a challenge policy (A, ρ, δ), where
A ∈ Z`×np , ρ : [`]→ UΘ, and δ : [`]→ U .
Since we are in the Random Oracle Model, the attacker also outputs
a sequence LID of global identities for the H oracle queries and a sequence
L ⊆ U of attributes for the F oracle queries. W.l.o.g. we assume that all global
ID’s and all attributes present in Q are queried on their respective oracle.
In order to proceed, the simulator substitutes the secret sharing matrix
A with the matrix A′ from 6.4. After B calculates the matrix A′ (shown
in figure 6.2) where C = CΘ it proceeds to compute all the inputs to Adv.
According to the above claim, if B uses A′ instead of A in the simulation the
view of Adv in this game is information-theoretically the same as if it used the
given matrix A. In the remaining of the proof, we use n′ = n− c.
Authority Public Keys: The simulator has to provide the public
keys of all non-corrupted authorities. To do that it considers two cases:
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If the authority in question, θ, is not in the challenge policy, i.e. θ /∈
ρ[`] ∪ CΘ, the simulator B picks αθ, yθ R← Zp itself and outputs the public key
(e(g, g)αθ , gyθ)
For each authority θ ∈ ρ[`] \ CΘ, let X = {x|ρ(x) = θ} ⊆ [`]. This is
the set of rows in the challenge policy that belong to authority θ. Then the
simulator B picks α˜θ, y˜θ
R← Zp and sets implicitly
αθ = α˜θ +
∑
x∈X
bxa
q+1A′x,1 and yθ = y˜θ +
∑
x∈X
n′∑
j=2
bxa
q+2−jA′x,j
It outputs the public key
(e(g, g)αθ , gyθ) =
(
e(g, g)α˜θ
∏
x∈X
e(gbxa, ga
q
)A
′
x,1 , gy˜θ
∏
x∈X
n′∏
j=2
(
gbxa
q+2−j
)A′x,j)
Since n′ = n − c ≤ q and ` ≤ q, the simulator can compute all these
terms using suitable terms of the assumption. Also due to α˜θy˜θ these terms
are properly distributed.
H-Oracle Queries: If the queried global identity GID is in LID but
not in {GIDi}i∈[m], then the simulator outputs a random element of G for
H(GID). These elements are not going to be used anywhere else.
If the queried global identity is equal to GIDi for some i and there is
no row x such that (ρ(x), δ(x)) ∈ Si (i.e. if this user is not entitled to any
shares), then the simulator picks h˜i
R← Zp and outputs
H(GIDi) = gh˜i · ga · ga2 · · · · · gan
′−1
= gh˜i
n′∏
k=2
ga
k−1
168
Otherwise, we should consider the case where for some rows X ′ ⊆ [`] it
is true that (ρ(x), δ(x)) ∈ Si. According to our restriction we know that the
set of these rows together with the set of the rows that belong to corrupted
authorities is non-authorized. This means that there exists a vector ~di ∈ Znp
such that the first element is di,1 = 1 and the inner product of it with any of
the aforementioned rows is equal to zero.
Additionally, according to the construction of A′ we know that the set of
the corrupted rows spans the entire subspace of dimension c. That means the
vector ~di is orthogonal to any of the vectors (
n′︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,
c︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Znp .
These are the vectors with exactly one “1” in one of the last c positions. This
implies that di,j = 0 for n − c + 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Hence
〈
~A′x, ~di
〉
= 0 even if we
restrict the row ~A′x and the vector ~di to the first n
′ = n− c positions. We will
denote this inner product by
〈
~A′x, ~di
〉
.
In this case the simulator picks h˜i
R← Zp and outputs
H(GIDi) = gh˜i · (ga)di,2 · (ga2)di,3 · · · · · (gan
′−1
)di,n′ = gh˜i
n′∏
k=2
(
ga
k−1
)di,k
F -Oracle Queries: Let θ be the authority of the queried attribute
u. Then if θ /∈ ρ[`] or θ ∈ CΘ, the simulator outputs a random element of G
for F (u) and stores the value so that he might reuse it in a secret key query.
If θ ∈ ρ[`], let X = {x|ρ(x) = θ} ⊆ [`]. Then if u /∈ δ[`] (i.e. the
attribute is not used at the challenge policy), the simulator picks f˜u
R← Zp and
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outputs
F (u) = gf˜ug
∑
x∈X
∑
j∈[n′] bxa
q+1−jA′x,j = f˜u
∏
x∈X
∏
j∈[n′]
(
gbxa
q+1−j
)A′x,j
Otherwise, i.e. u ∈ δ[`], letX ′′ = X\{x|δ(x) = u}. Therefore, X ′′ is the
set of rows that belong to authority θ but do not have u as the corresponding
attribute. Then the simulator picks f˜u
R← Zp and outputs
F (u) = gf˜ug
∑
x∈X′′
∑
j∈[n′] bxa
q+1−jA′x,j = gf˜u
∏
x∈X′′
∏
j∈[n′]
(
gbxa
q+1−j
)A′x,j
Secret Keys: Consider the query (GIDi, Si) where Si ⊆ UΘ × U .
First, consider the case where there is no row x such that (ρ(x), δ(x)) ∈
Si. Then according to the above H(GIDi) = gh˜ig
∑n
k=2 a
k−1
. We have to con-
sider two cases for each element (θ, u) of Si:
• θ /∈ ρ[`]: Here the simulator knows αθ and yθ. Therefore it picks t R← Zp
and outputs
Kθ,u,GIDi = g
αθH(GIDi)yθF (u)t and K ′θ,u,GIDi = gt
• θ ∈ ρ[`]: Here we know that there is no row (θ, u) in the policy. Therefore
we have that u /∈ δ[`] (remember that each attribute belongs to exactly
one authority); hence F (u) = gf˜ug
∑
x∈X
∑
j∈[n′] bxa
q+1−jA′x,j . In this case
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the simulator sets implicitly t = −∑k∈[n′] ak and computes the key
Kθ,u,GIDi = g
αθH(GIDi)yθF (u)t
= g
∑
x∈X bxa
q+1A′x,1g
∑
x∈X
∑n′
j=2
∑n′
k=2 bxa
q+1+k−jA′x,j
· g−
∑
x∈X
∑
j∈[n′]
∑
k∈[n′] bxa
q+1+k−jA′x,j
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
= g−
∑
x∈X
∑n′
j=2 bxa
q+2−jA′x,jg−
∑
x∈X
∑n′
k=2 bxa
q+kAx,1
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
= gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
·
∏
x∈X
n′∏
j=2
(
gbxa
q+2−j
)−A′x,j ·∏
x∈X
n′∏
k=2
(
gbxa
q+k
)−A′x,1
K ′θ,u,GIDi = g
t =
∏
k∈[n′]
(gak)−1
Finally it re-randomizes this key on t using the public parameters and
outputs the re-randomized key.
If there is a row x such that (ρ(x), δ(x)) ∈ Si, then H(GIDi) =
gh˜ig
∑n
k=2 a
k−1di,k . We consider the following cases for each element (θ, u) of
Si:
• θ /∈ ρ[`]: Here the simulator knows αθ and yθ. Therefore it picks t R← Zp
and outputs
Kθ,u,GIDi = g
αθH(GIDi)yθF (u)t and K ′θ,u,GIDi = gt
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• θ ∈ ρ[`] and u /∈ δ[`]: As before F (u) = gf˜ug
∑
x∈X
∑
j∈[n′] bxa
q+1−jA′x,j . The
simulator sets implicitly t = −∑k∈[n′] akdi,k and outputs
Kθ,u,GIDi = g
αθH(GIDi)yθF (u)t
= g
∑
x∈X bxa
q+1A′x,1g
∑
x∈X
∑n′
j=2
∑n′
k=2 bxa
q+1+k−jA′x,jdi,k
· g−
∑
x∈X
∑
j∈[n′]
∑
k∈[n′] bxa
q+1+k−jA′x,jdi,k
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
= g−
∑
x∈X
∑n′
j=2 bxa
q+2−jA′x,jdi,1g−
∑
x∈X
∑n′
k=2 bxa
q+kA′x,1di,k
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
=
∏
x∈X
n′∏
j=2
(
gbxa
q+2−j
)−A′x,j ·∏
x∈X
n′∏
k=2
(
gbxa
q+k
)−A′x,1di,k
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
K ′θ,u,GIDi = g
t =
∏
k∈[n′]
(gak)−di,k
As before it re-randomizes this key on t using the public parameters and
outputs the re-randomized key.
• θ ∈ ρ[`] and u ∈ δ[`]: In this case we have
F (u) = gf˜ug
∑
x∈X′′
∑
j∈[n′] bxa
q+1−jA′x,j (with X ′′)
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The simulator sets implicitly t = −∑k∈[n′] akdi,k and outputs
Kθ,u,GIDi = g
αθH(GIDi)yθF (u)t
= g
∑
x∈X bxa
q+1A′x,1g
∑
x∈X
∑n′
j=2
∑n′
k=2 bxa
q+1+k−jA′x,jdi,k
· g−
∑
x∈X′′
∑
j∈[n′]
∑
k∈[n′] bxa
q+1+k−jA′x,jdi,k
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
= g
∑
x∈X\X′′ bxa
q+1〈 ~A′x,~di〉g
∑
x∈X\X′′
∑n′,n′
j=2,k=2
j 6=k
bxaq+1+k−jA′x,jdi,k
· g−
∑
x∈X
∑n′
j=2 bxa
q+2−jA′x,jdi,1g−
∑
x∈X
∑n′
k=2 bxa
q+kA′x,1di,k
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
=
∏
x∈X\X′′
n′,n′∏
j=2,k=2
j 6=k
(
gbxa
q+1+k−j
)A′x,jdi,k ·∏
x∈X
n′∏
j=2
(
gbxa
q+2−j
)−A′x,j
·
∏
x∈X
n′∏
k=2
(
gbxa
q+k
)−A′x,1di,k
· gα˜θH(GIDi)y˜θ (gyθ)h˜i
(
gt
)f˜u
K ′θ,u,GIDi = g
t =
∏
k∈[n′]
(gak)−di,k
As before it re-randomizes this key on t using the public parameters
and outputs the re-randomized key. Notice that X \ X ′′ contains rows
that map to (θ, u) in the challenge policy. Therefore, according to our
discussion in the creation of the secret keys
〈
~Ax, ~di
〉
= 0.
Challenge Ciphertext: The first part of the ciphertext is calculated
as C0 = Mb ·T , where b R← {0, 1} is a random coin and T is the challenge term.
Thus the simulator B implicitly set z = saq+1.
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The simulator also sets implicitly
~v =
(
saq+1, 0, . . . , 0
) ∈ Znp and ~w =
 n
′︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, saq, . . . , saq−n
′+2, 0, . . . , 0
 ∈ Znp
Therefore for a row x∗ ∈ [`] that belongs to a corrupted authority we
have that λx∗ = 0 and ωx∗ = 0, due to the fact that these rows have all “0”s
in the first n′ columns. Thus for these rows the simulator picks tx∗
R← Zp and
using the public key {e(g, g)αθ , gyθ} of the corrupted authority it computes:
C1,x∗ = e(g, g)
λx∗e(g, g)αρ(x∗)tx∗ = (e(g, g)αρ(x∗))tx∗
C2,x∗ = g
−tx∗
C3,x∗ = g
yρ(x∗)tx∗gωx∗ = (gyρ(x∗))tx∗
C4,x∗ = F (δ(x
∗))tx∗
On the other hand for a row x∗ that does not belong to corrupted
authorities, we have that λx∗ = sa
q+1 ·A′x∗,1 and ωx∗ =
∑n′
j=2 sa
q+2−jA′x∗,j. For
each one of these rows B sets implicitly tx∗ = −s/bx∗ and computes:
C1,x∗ = e(g, g)
λx∗e(g, g)αρ(x∗)tx∗ = e(g, g)sa
q+1A′
x∗,1e(g, g)−
∑
x∈X sbxa
q+1A′
x∗,1/bx∗
=
∏
x∈X\{x∗}
e(g, gsbxa
q+1/bx∗ )−A
′
x∗,1
C2,x∗ = g
−tx∗ = gs/bx∗
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C3,x∗ = g
yρ(x∗)tx∗gωx∗ = g−
∑
x∈X
∑n′
j=2 sbxa
q+2−jA′
x∗,j/bx∗g
∑n′
j=2 sa
q+2−jA′
x∗,j
=
∏
x∈X\{x∗}
n′∏
j=2
(
gsbxa
q+2−j/bx∗
)−A′
x∗,j
C4,x∗ = F (δ(x
∗))tx∗ = g−
∑
x∈X′′
∑
j∈[n′] sbxa
q+1−jA′
x∗,j/bx∗
=
∏
x∈X′′
∏
j∈[n′]
(
gsbxa
q+1−j/bx∗
)−A′
x∗,j
Notice that x∗ /∈ X ′′. Therefore the simulator can compute C4,x∗ .
Finally the simulator re-randomizes the ciphertext on the vectors ~v and ~w and
on the exponents t using the public parameters.
Guess: If the attacker Adv correctly guessed the bit b, then the
simulator B outputs that the challenge term was e(g, g)sa
q+1
. That is because
in this case it simulated the static security game perfectly. If the attacker
did not guess the bit correctly, the simulator answer that T was a random
group element. In this case the simulator produced an encryption of a random
message. Therefore, if Adv is successful with more than negligible advantage,
so is B. 
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CHAPTER 7
Implementations and Benchmarks
7.1 Charm Framework
We implemented our scheme in Charm [2]; a framework developed to
facilitate the rapid prototyping of cryptographic schemes and protocols. It
is based on the Python language which allows the programmer to write code
similar to the theoretical descriptions. However, the routines that implement
the dominant group operations use the PBC library [76] (written natively in C)
and the time overhead imposed by the use of Python is usually less than 1%.
Charm also provides routines for applying and using LSSS schemes needed for
Attribute-Based systems. For more information on Charm we refer the reader
to [2, 32].
We tested several ABE constructions on all elliptic curve bilinear groups
provided by Charm, i.e. three super-singular symmetric EC groups and two
“MNT” [79] asymmetric EC groups. In Table 7.1 we present the approximate
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security level each group provides with respect to the discrete log problem.
Although this does not necessarily translates to the security level of our as-
sumption (or the various assumptions of the other ABE schemes), it provides
an intuitive comparison between the security levels of the different instanti-
ations. For more information on the security of discrete log and of q-type
assumptions we refer the reader to [48, 67, 83, 91].
Curve Security Level (Bits)
SS512 80
SS1024 112
MNT159 70
MNT201 90
MNT224 100
Table 7.1: Approximate security levels in bits of the ECC groups supported
by the Charm framework. “SS” are super singular curves (symmetric bilinear
groups), while “MNT” are the Miyaji, Nakabayashi, Takano curves (asymmet-
ric bilinear groups). The number after the type of the curve denotes the size
of the base field in bits.
7.2 Implementation Details
All Charm routines use formally asymmetric groups (although the un-
derlining groups might be symmetric) and therefore we translated our schemes
to the asymmetric setting. Namely, we have three groups G1,G2 and GT and
the pairing e is a function from G1 × G2 to GT . We note here that we tried
to implement our algorithms so that more operations are executed in the G1
group than in the G2 and that encryption consists mainly of operations in G1,
compared to key generation. The reason is that the time taken to execute
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them in the G1 group is considerably smaller than G2 in specific asymmetric
groups such as the “MNT” groups.
The source code of our implementations can be found in [106]. All
our benchmarks were executed on a dual core Intel R© Xeon R© CPU W3503
@2.40GHz with 2.0GB RAM running Ubuntu R10.04 and Python3.2.3.
7.3 Benchmarks KP-ABE and CP-ABE
We compare our single-authority large universe constructions of Chap.
6 with the three known unbounded constructions on prime order groups. In
Table 7.2 we present time benchmarks in different elliptic curve groups for
some sample policies (≈ size 4 attributes). Asymptotic results on the group
exponentiations are shown in Sec. 7.4.
Regarding the comparison between our schemes and prior works, we
notice the big gap between the timings of our constructions and prior ones.
This is due to the fact that dual vector spaces of high dimension (≈ 10 - 14)
are utilized, which increase the number of group operations by big factors. We
remind the reader that the OT schemes are fully secure, while the RW and
LW selectively secure.
Regarding the practicality, in general, of both our schemes we notice
that the KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt times of our algorithms are relatively
small. They are all under 100ms, with the exception of the super singular 1024-
bit curve. Even for this curve the times for each algorithm are under the 700
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msec mark. Although one would expect that as the policies and the attributes
sets grow bigger these times will increase, the additional overhead will grow
only linearly. Thus we believe that the two constructions constitute the most
practical implementations of large universe ABE, secure in the standard model.
7.4 Group Operations (Asymptotic) for KP-ABE and
CP-ABE
In Table 7.3, we demonstrate the asymptotic growth of the algorithms
of the schemes implemented. For the KP-ABE setting the number of group
operations during the key generation, encryption, and decryption calls depends
linearly on the number of rows in the policy, on the size of the attribute set
and the number of rows that are used during decryption, respectively. In the
CP-ABE setting the key generation time grows linearly with the size of the
attribute set and the encryption time with the number of rows in the policy.
Some constant factors might not correspond exactly to the factors that can be
derived from schemes in Sec. 6.2 and App. 6.1, because certain optimizations
have been applied so that common parts are only computed once (see the
source code in [106] for more details).
7.5 Benchmarks MA-CP-ABE
Regarding the comparisons of our MA-CP-ABE scheme to existing
schemes, there are three other schemes that provided expressive policies in
the multi-authority setting: the CP-ABE scheme of Lewko-Waters [73], the
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Curve Type Scheme Setup KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt
“SS512”
KP-ABE
RW [6.1] 19.1 49.1 30.7 14.7
LW [70] 447.2 642.3 483.4 44.7
OT [87] 673.7 924.4 933.5 65.6
CP-ABE
RW [6.2] 25.0 32.9 52.0 16.6
OT [87] 678.0 922.9 938.5 66.0
“SS1024”
KP-ABE
RW [6.1] 71.5 626.3 396.8 325.3
LW [70] 5553.3 9283.8 6978.3 1098.8
OT [87] 7904.3 13389.3 13582.0 1735.7
CP-ABE
RW [6.2] 110.8 431.0 669.3 374.4
OT [87] 7898.9 13393.2 13598.7 1740.4
“MNT159”
KP-ABE
RW [6.1] 21.1 48.1 44.3 36.4
LW [70] 692.2 1666.3 168.9 125.2
OT [87] 930.7 2435.1 320.6 178.4
CP-ABE
RW [6.2] 23.5 43.8 53.5 41.5
OT [87] 929.9 2396.2 326.7 183.5
“MNT201”
KP-ABE
RW [6.1] 28.4 59.2 60.2 49.7
LW [70] 929.8 2301.1 237.8 173.6
OT [87] 1237.1 3338.3 453.3 251.5
CP-ABE
RW [6.2] 31.3 58.7 71.9 57.4
OT [87] 1235.1 3328.7 463.3 251.8
“MNT224”
KP-ABE
RW [6.1] 34.2 73.4 74.2 60.9
LW [70] 1150.9 2896.0 302.1 215.6
OT [87] 1514.9 4156.3 572.4 309.8
CP-ABE
RW [6.2] 37.9 73.2 88.2 74.4
OT [87] 1511.7 4140.0 584.5 310.7
Table 7.2: Typical running times in milliseconds of each scheme. KeyGen
and Encrypt are called with attribute sets and policies of size 4, while Decrypt
with common attribute sets of size 2. “MNT” are the Miyaji, Nakabayashi,
Takano curves (asymmetric pairing groups), while “SS” are super singular
curves (symmetric pairing groups). The number after the type of the curve
denotes the size of the base field in bits.
180
Type Scheme Algorithm G1 G2 GT Pairings
KP-ABE
RW [6.1]
Setup 0 0 1 1
KeyGen 4k k 0 0
Encrypt 2m+ 1 m+ 1 1 0
Decrypt 0 0 n 3n
LW [70]
Setup 60 80 2 1
KeyGen 0 60k 0 0
Encrypt 40m+ 20 0 2 0
Decrypt 0 0 10n 10n
OT [87]
Setup 100 99 1 1
KeyGen 0 84k + 10 0 0
Encrypt 84m+ 15 0 1 0
Decrypt 0 0 n 14n+ 5
CP-ABE
RW [6.2]
Setup 1 0 1 1
KeyGen 2m+ 2 m+ 1 0 0
Encrypt 4k k + 1 1 0
Decrypt 0 0 n 3n+ 1
OT [87]
Setup 100 99 1 1
KeyGen 0 84m+ 10 0 0
Encrypt 84k + 15 0 1 0
Decrypt 0 0 n 14n+ 5
Table 7.3: Asymptotic growth of the exponentiations in the three groups and
the pairings. These are the dominant operations in each call. Notice the large
constant factors in the schemes utilizing the dual vector spaces. These are due
to the large dimensions of vectors. The k,m, n parameters denote the number
of rows of the policy, the size of the attribute set, and the rows utilized during
decryption, respectively.
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prime order version of it [69], and the multi-authority signature scheme of
Okamoto - Takashima [89]. However, we decided to defer implementation and
benchmarking of them for several reasons. The first scheme utilizes composite
order groups, which are several orders of magnitude slower than the prime
order groups that provide the same security level. We expect our scheme to
be significantly faster. More information on the comparison between prime
and composite groups can be found in Sec. 3.3.4. In addition, Charm does not
support composite order groups. The other two schemes utilize dual pairing
vector spaces of high dimension and all their components (public parameters,
secret keys) consist of a large number of group elements which degrades their
efficiency. Secondly an one-use restriction per policy is imposed on each at-
tribute on the first two systems. So even these schemes provide less flexibility
than our construction. Finally, it is questionable the validity of the comparison
between a prime order group and a composite order group, when the underly-
ing elliptic curve is different and/or different optimizations have been applied
to them.
Instead of this, we validate the claim that our system provides sim-
ilar efficiency to existing single-authority ABE constructions, by providing
implementation results of two single-authority ABE schemes. These are the
Bethencourt-Sahai-Waters CP-ABE scheme [11] and the recent Waters CP-
ABE [112]. Both of them were implemented by the Charm authors as typical
examples. The former scheme is secure in the generic group model, while the
implementation of the latter uses the random oracle version of it.
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In this section we present the timing results of our multi-authority
CP-ABE scheme. Since there are no other multi-authority large universe
CP-ABE schemes on prime order groups, we compare it versus two know and
established single-authority CP-ABE constructions and claim that our scheme
achieves similar timings. Timing results in milliseconds are shown in Table
7.4. We see that our scheme achieves similar operation times to the two estab-
lished single-authority schemes. In general, we attempted to keep execution
times for encryption and decryption relatively low, while the times for setup
and key generation can be significantly higher, since they are called only once.
183
O
u
r
C
P
-A
B
E
[S
ec
.
6.
3]
(M
u
lt
i-
au
th
or
it
y,
ra
n
d
om
or
ac
le
m
o
d
el
,
st
at
ic
al
ly
se
cu
re
)
C
u
rv
e
G
S
A
S
K
G
(4
)
K
G
(8
)
K
G
(1
2)
E
C
(4
)
E
C
(8
)
E
C
(1
2)
D
E
(4
)
D
E
(8
)
D
E
(1
2)
S
S
51
2
8.
4
4.
1
91
.5
18
2.
9
27
4.
6
75
.0
15
0.
4
22
6.
4
34
.5
59
.2
82
.3
S
S
10
24
58
.0
43
.8
63
1.
4
12
63
.5
18
94
.5
66
6.
9
13
31
.2
19
97
.2
64
1.
4
12
75
.4
19
07
.4
M
N
T
15
9
14
.4
3.
7
29
5.
9
50
2.
7
79
9.
7
15
5.
9
29
9.
4
45
0.
1
99
.3
15
9.
8
23
7.
5
M
N
T
20
1
19
.5
4.
6
37
0.
5
78
7.
0
12
05
.8
19
1.
6
40
1.
2
59
2.
1
13
3.
8
23
7.
9
32
1.
5
M
N
T
22
4
24
.1
5.
5
48
9.
5
83
8.
4
13
35
.2
24
4.
1
47
3.
0
69
5.
9
15
7.
0
27
3.
2
39
0.
3
B
S
W
C
P
-A
B
E
[1
1]
(S
in
gl
e-
au
th
or
it
y,
ge
n
er
ic
gr
ou
p
m
o
d
el
,
ad
ap
ti
ve
ly
se
cu
re
)
C
u
rv
e
G
S
A
S
K
G
(4
)
K
G
(8
)
K
G
(1
2)
E
C
(4
)
E
C
(8
)
E
C
(1
2)
D
E
(4
)
D
E
(8
)
D
E
(1
2)
S
S
51
2
20
.1
N
/A
52
.9
10
0.
1
14
6.
9
51
.0
98
.5
14
7.
6
22
.5
40
.3
55
.3
S
S
10
24
21
3.
3
N
/A
39
4.
0
71
0.
3
10
26
.5
36
0.
1
68
1.
6
99
7.
1
48
2.
2
90
9.
0
13
33
.9
M
N
T
15
9
31
.2
N
/A
15
2.
8
26
5.
2
39
9.
4
10
7.
5
26
8.
2
37
6.
9
56
.4
10
4.
7
14
9.
1
M
N
T
20
1
42
.2
N
/A
22
1.
5
33
5.
1
55
7.
8
16
9.
8
33
1.
7
56
4.
5
76
.3
14
2.
5
20
5.
5
M
N
T
22
4
52
.3
N
/A
19
2.
8
44
7.
5
56
6.
1
20
9.
1
32
9.
3
59
5.
2
94
.7
17
5.
0
25
3.
6
W
at
er
s
C
P
-A
B
E
[1
12
]
(S
in
gl
e-
au
th
or
it
y,
ra
n
d
om
or
ac
le
m
o
d
el
,
ad
ap
ti
ve
ly
se
cu
re
)
C
u
rv
e
G
S
A
S
K
G
(4
)
K
G
(8
)
K
G
(1
2)
E
C
(4
)
E
C
(8
)
E
C
(1
2)
D
E
(4
)
D
E
(8
)
D
E
(1
2)
S
S
51
2
20
.4
N
/A
39
.6
73
.9
10
8.
0
64
.2
12
4.
8
18
6.
4
32
.5
60
.1
85
.3
S
S
10
24
21
6.
3
N
/A
23
7.
7
39
7.
5
55
8.
6
51
6.
4
99
2.
9
14
64
.4
62
7.
0
12
00
.5
17
70
.1
M
N
T
15
9
32
.7
N
/A
18
.3
21
.8
25
.7
43
.4
84
.5
12
5.
2
56
.3
10
4.
5
14
8.
8
M
N
T
20
1
44
.6
N
/A
25
.4
31
.7
37
.2
58
.8
11
8.
3
17
0.
7
77
.0
14
3.
4
20
6.
9
M
N
T
22
4
55
.1
N
/A
31
.4
38
.4
45
.2
71
.3
13
7.
3
20
5.
7
95
.2
17
7.
9
25
8.
4
T
ab
le
7.
4:
A
ve
ra
ge
ru
n
n
in
g
ti
m
es
in
m
il
li
se
co
n
d
s
of
ou
r
sc
h
em
e
an
d
tw
o
si
n
gl
e
au
th
or
it
y
sc
h
em
es
.
T
h
e
al
go
ri
th
m
s
ar
e
d
en
ot
ed
as
G
S
:
G
lo
b
al
se
tu
p
,
A
S
:
A
u
th
or
it
y
se
tu
p
,
K
G
:
K
ey
ge
n
er
at
io
n
fo
r
a
u
se
r,
E
C
:
E
n
cr
y
p
t,
D
E
:
D
ec
ry
p
t.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
re
fe
r
to
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
at
tr
ib
u
te
s
in
ke
y
ge
n
er
at
io
n
,
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
ro
w
s
of
th
e
p
ol
ic
y
in
en
cr
y
p
ti
on
,
an
d
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
ro
w
s
u
ti
li
ze
d
d
u
ri
n
g
d
ec
ry
p
ti
on
.
W
e
ca
n
se
e
th
e
li
n
ea
r
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
es
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
an
d
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
ti
m
es
.
184
CHAPTER 8
Other Work and Future Directions
8.1 Other Work
Leakage-Resilient IBE In a joint work with Chow, Dodis, and Wa-
ters [36] we provide new constructions of leakage-resilient IBE in the standard
model. We apply a hash proof technique in the existing IBE schemes of Boneh-
Boyen, Waters, and Lewko-Waters. As a result, we achieve leakage-resilience
under the respective static assumptions of the original systems in the standard
model. The first two systems are secure under the simple Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption (DBDH). The first system is selectively secure and
serves as a stepping stone to construct the fully secure system. This second
system is the first leakage-resilient fully secure system under DBDH in the
Standard model. Finally the third system achieves full security with shorter
public parameters but is based on three non-standard static assumptions (sim-
ilar to the composite order group assumptions of Sec. 3.2.2). The efficiency of
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our transformed systems is almost the same as the original ones.
Our main technique is different than the technique presented in Chap.
5. The original systems used random secret keys with only one degree of
freedom, which was explorable to the secret key holder. This means that
the owner of the secret key could re-randomize his key arbitrarily without
knowing the secret parameters of the IBE system (the master secret key). In
this sense the information each key holds is deterministic. The new technique
we applied was to add another randomness to the secret keys, called “tag”,
coupled with some master secret key terms. As a result, the secret-key holder
can not anymore re-randomize his key (in this degree of freedom). The added
randomness allows the simulators of our security proofs to provide the attacker
leaked information from a properly distributed secret key with a tag of our
choice.
Obviously the ability of the simulator to create these secret keys allows
him to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. One would ask then why is the at-
tacker’s response useful to the simulator. The answer is that we use a standard
primitive in leakage-resilient constructions [5, 80] to “mask” the relationship
between the leakage of the secret key and the ciphertext. This primitive, called
extractor [82], makes it hard for any attacker to break the system given only a
bounded amount of leakage from the secret key when the simulator “injects”
the tag of the challenge identity to specific parts of the ciphertext.
Property-Preserving Encryption Processing on encrypted data is
a subject of rich investigation. Several new and exotic encryption schemes,
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supporting a diverse set of features, have been developed for this purpose. In
a joint work with Omkant Pandey [92] we consider encryption schemes that
are suitable for applications such as data clustering on encrypted data. In
such applications, the processing algorithm needs to learn certain properties
about the encrypted data to make decisions. Often these decisions depend
upon multiple data items, which might have been encrypted individually and
independently. Current encryption schemes do not capture this setting where
computation must be done on multiple ciphertexts to make a decision.
In this work, we seek encryption schemes which allow public computa-
tion of a pre-specified property P about the encrypted messages. That is, such
schemes have an associated property P of fixed arity k, and a publicly com-
putable algorithm Test, such that Test(ct1, ct2, . . . , ctk) = P (m1,m2, . . . ,mk),
where cti is an encryption of mi for i = 1, 2, . . ., k. Further, this requirement
holds even if the ciphertexts ct1, ct2, . . . , ctk were generated individually and
independently. We call such schemes property preserving encryption schemes.
Property preserving encryption (PPEnc) makes most sense in the symmetric
setting due to the requirement that Test is publicly computable.
In this work, we present a thorough investigation of property preserving
symmetric encryption. We start by formalizing several meaningful notions of
security for PPEnc. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that there exists a hier-
archy of security notions for PPEnc, indexed by integers η ∈ N, which does
not collapse. We also present a symmetric PPEnc scheme for encrypting vec-
tors in ZN of polynomial length. This construction supports the orthogonality
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property: for every two vectors (~x, ~y) it is possible to publicly learn whether
〈~x, ~y〉 = 0 (mod p). Our scheme is based on bilinear groups of composite
order.
8.2 Future Directions
Leakage - Resilient Functional Encryption The CP-ABE con-
struction that we presented in Chap. 5 supports any monotone Boolean for-
mula as the policy of the ciphertext. Although these policies are sufficiently
expressive for many practical scenarios, a very interesting direction is to inves-
tigate further the limits on the expressiveness of ABE systems, which in this
case are referred to as Functional Encryption Schemes [24]. While the ultimate
goal would be to construct a scheme where the policies are arbitrary Turing
machines, the state-of-the-art systems provide functionality for regular lan-
guages [109] and circuits [50, 51, 55]. So far no leakage-resilient constructions
have been presented for these schemes and it would be intriguing to investigate
whether existing techniques for leakage resilience apply on these schemes.
Practical Implementations Another promising direction is the de-
signing and testing of more practical ABE systems similar to the ones of Chap.
6. Adding more advanced features combined with fast operations might open
the way to widespread deployment of ABE systems and / or functional encryp-
tion in general. As the work of Lewko - Waters [75] suggests, novel techniques
and / or groups are needed to achieve stronger security guarantees such as full
security,
188
Appendices
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APPENDIX A
Generic Security of the Assumptions
In this section we consider the security of our assumptions in the generic group
model introduced by Shoup [104]. In this model the attacker does not receive
the actual representations of group elements in G or GT , but handles picked
from a sufficiently large handle space. Whenever a new group element has
to be given to the attacker, he receives a uniformly random handle from the
handle space; not picked before. From now on this handle is “fixed” to this
specific group element. The attacker is allowed to query for operations on the
handles he has already received. Then the challenger executes the operation
on the underlying group elements and returns either a freshly picked handle,
if the result is new, or an existing handle. The only operations available on
group elements to the attacker are multiplications in G or GT , pairings in G
and the equality checking of two group elements in G or GT by checking the
equality of handles. The main goal of the generic group model proofs is to
provide an indication of the absence of “security holes” which are independent
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from the specific group representations.
A.1 Two General Theorems
The following theorem will provide an easier way to argue about the
security of our assumptions in the generic group model.
Definition A.1 (GT -monomial assumption). A GT -monomial assumption is
parameterized by a security parameter λ ∈ N. It refers to a prime order
bilinear group D = (p,G,GT , e) with p = Θ(2λ), a matrix A ∈ ZL×K and two
target vectors A˜0, A˜1 ∈ Z1×K .
We require that A˜0 6= A˜1 and that the natural numbersK,L and the the
absolute values of the integers in A, A˜0 and A˜1 are all polynomially bounded
in λ.
The assumption is defined via a game between a challenger and an
adversary. Initially, the challenger picks K independent and uniformly random
variables X1, X2, . . . , XK
R← Zp. Then it constructs the following monomials
in these variables:
Yi =
∏
j∈[K]
X
Ai,j
j for all i ∈ [L] , Z0 =
∏
j∈[K]
X
A˜0j
j and Z1 =
∏
j∈[K]
X
A˜1j
j
Finally, the challenger picks g
R← G and b R← {0, 1}. He sends to the
adversary the description of the group D = (p,G,GT , e), the matrix A, the
vectors A˜0, A˜1, the terms
{
gYi
}
i∈[L], and the challenge term e(g, g)
Zb . The
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assumption claims that no PPT adversary has a non negligible advantage in
guessing the bit b.
We will prove the following theorem that refers to the generic security
of a GT -monomial assumption:
Theorem A.2. The above assumption is secure in the generic group model if
and only if for all i, j ∈ [L] it is true that A˜0 6= Ai + Aj and A˜1 6= Ai + Aj,
where Ai is the i-th row of A.
For the proof of the theorem A.2 we will use the following lemma:
Lemma A.3. Consider any linear combination of the form
T (X1, X2, . . . , XK) = c˜0Z0 + c˜1Z1 +
∑
(i,j)∈[L,L]
ci,jYi · Yj
with c˜0, c˜1, ci,j constants in Zp and T is not identically zero as a rational func-
tion in variables X1, X2, . . ., XK.
Then the probability that T (X1, X2, . . . , XK) = 0 (mod p) is negligible
in λ.
Proof. of lemma A.3 The proof is an immediate consequence of the Schwartz-
Zippel lemma and the fact that the total degree of each monomial is polyno-
mially bounded in λ. More specifically, consider the polynomial
T ′(X1, X2, . . . , XK) = T (X1, X2, . . . , XK) · C(X1, X2, . . . , XK)
where C(X1, X2, . . . , XK) =
∏
Xdii with di being the absolute value of the
minimum negative exponent of Xi in the monomials YiYj for any i, j and the
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Z0, Z1, or 0 if Xi has only positive exponents. As a result T
′ is a polynomial
in variables X1, X2, . . ., XK .
Since the absolute values of the elements ofA, A˜0, and A˜1 are all polyno-
mially bounded in λ, the total degree of the polynomial T ′ is also polynomially-
bounded in λ. Since T , and therefore T ′, is not identically zero we can apply
the Schwartz-Zippel lemma: the probability that T ′ becomes zero is at most
O(λc)/p = O(λc)/Θ(2λ) = negl(λ). This is equal to the probability that T is
zero or undefined (when some Xi with di > 0 is instantiated to zero). There-
fore, the probability that T is zero is at most negligible in λ. 
Proof. of theorem A.2 We will prove the forward direction first. Namely,
suppose that there exist i, j and b′ ∈ {0, 1} such that A˜b′ = Ai + Aj. W.l.o.g.
we assume b′ = 0. Since according to the definition of the assumption A˜0 6= A˜1,
we conclude that A˜1 6= Ai + Aj.
The adversary can in polynomial time find these i, j, because L is poly-
nomial, and request the handle of the term e(gYi , gYj). If this handle is equal
to the handle of e(g, g)Zb of the challenge term, it outputs 0. Otherwise it
outputs 1.
Therefore, if b is indeed 0 the adversary is successful with certainty.
If it is the case that b = 1, the adversary makes a wrong guess only when
the handle of e(g, g)Z1 happens to be the same as the handle of e(gYi , gYj).
According to the generic group model this is equivalent to Z1 = Yi · Yj (after
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the instantiations). Since A˜1 6= Ai +Aj we get that the expression Z1− Yi · Yj
is not identically zero. Therefore, according to lemma A.3 we conclude that
the error probability of the adversary when b = 1 is negl(λ). As a result the
advantage of the adversary is non negligible and the assumption not secure in
the generic group model.
For the backward direction we assume that there exists a PPT ad-
versary that breaks the assumption in the generic group model game. First,
we define a new security game where the random variables X1, X2, . . . , XK are
never instantiated and the handles returned to the adversary are the same only
when the rational functions of the Xi’s in the exponents of group elements are
formally equal. This game differs from the real generic group model game only
when two different linear combinations of monomials are instantiated to the
same value. Since the number of queries by the adversary is polynomial and
because of lemma A.3, the probability of this event is negligible. Therefore,
the adversary has a non negligible advantage in the modified game.
Since the only decision query he can ask is to compare the handles of
two terms, he can construct two terms T1, T2 ∈ GT such that T1 = T2 (in terms
of formal equality of the exponents) for one value of b but not for the other1.
According to the allowable operations and the terms given to adversary, T1
and T2 should be of the form e(g, g)
S where S is a linear combination of the
set of monomials {Zb} ∪ {Yi · Yj}i,j∈[L].
1A decision in G can be expressed in terms of GT by pairing with the same element of G
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W.l.o.g. suppose that T1 is equal to T2 when b = 0 and different
otherwise. Then if T1 = e(g, g)
S1 and T2 = e(g, g)
S2 , we get that T1 = T2 =⇒
S1 = S2 =⇒ Z0 = S∗, where S∗ is a linear combination of only the monomials
{Yi · Yj}i,j∈[L]. The coefficient of Z0 has to be non-zero because otherwise the
value of b would be information-theoretically hidden and the advantage of the
adversary would be zero in this game. Since the Z0 = S
∗ is a formal equation
and Z0 is a monomial the only way this is possible is to have Z0 = Yi · Yj for
some i, j. Therefore, A˜0 = Ai + Aj. 
The following corollary refers to a GT -monomial assumption where the
second challenge term is uniformly random from GT . The proof from theorem
A.2 is trivial and is omitted.
Corollary A.1.1. If A˜1 = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ Z1×K and 〈A˜1, Ai〉 = 0 for all i ∈ [L],
the corresponding GT -monomial assumption is secure in the generic group
model if and only if for all i, j ∈ [L] it is true that A˜0 6= Ai + Aj.
A.2 Proofs of Security in the Generic Group Model
Using the above corollary we show that our assumptions are secure in
the generic group model in lemmata A.5 and A.4.
Lemma A.4. The “q-DPBDH1” assumption is secure in the generic group
model.
Proof. q-DPBDH1 is a GT -monomial assumption with random variables x, y,
z, b1, b2, . . ., bq instead of X1, X2, . . ., XK−1. The matrix A and the target
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vector A˜0 for this assumption are shown in table A.1.
Type Given Terms Conditions x y z b1 b2 . . . bq
1 g 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
2 gx 1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
3 gy 0 1 0 0 0 . . . 0
4 gz 0 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
5 g(xz)
2
2 0 2 0 0 . . . 0
6 gbi ∀i ∈ [q] 0 0 0 [i : 1]
7 gxzbi ∀i ∈ [q] 1 0 1 [i : 1]
8 gxz/bi ∀i ∈ [q] 1 0 1 [i : (−1)]
9 gx
2zbi ∀i ∈ [q] 2 0 1 [i : 1]
10 gy/b
2
i ∀i ∈ [q] 0 1 0 [i : (−2)]
11 gy
2/b2i ∀i ∈ [q] 0 2 0 [i : (−2)]
12 gxzbi/bj ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q] with i 6= j 1 0 1 [i : 1, j : (−1)]
13 gybi/b
2
j ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q] with i 6= j 0 1 0 [i : 1, j : (−2)]
14 gxyzbi/bj ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q] with i 6= j 1 1 1 [i : 1, j : (−1)]
15 g(xz)
2bi/bj ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q] with i 6= j 2 0 2 [i : 1, j : (−1)]
A˜0 e(g, g)xyz 1 1 1 0 0 . . . 0
Table A.1: Compact form of matrix A and target vector A˜0 for the q-DPBDH1
assumption.
In order to prove the lemma we have to show that by adding any two
rows of matrix A we can not get the row vector A˜0 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
We will mainly focus on the first three columns of matrix A, i.e. the x, y, z
columns. First, we observe that the rows of types 5, 9, 11, and 15, can not be
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used since they have at least one 2 in the first three columns and all other rows
are positive in these columns. The rows 2 and 4 have “100” and “001” in the
first three columns, respectively. Since there are no rows with “011” or “110”,
they can not be used to give the required “111”. Row 1 or a row of type 6 can
only be combined to a row of type 14, and vice versa, because the former have
“000” and the later “111”. But since a row of type 14 has [i : 1, j : (−1)] in
the bi columns, it can not be used to give all zeros in them. Finally, rows of
type 7, 8, or 12, that have “101” in the first three columns, might be possibly
combined to row 3 or rows of type 10, or 13, and vice versa. However, this
still won’t give the target vector, because none of the partial vectors [i : 1],
[i : (−1)], and [i : 1, j : (−1)] can be added to any of the vectors (0, 0, . . . , 0),
[i : (−2)], and [i : 1, j : (−2)], and give the all zero vector in the bi columns.
Therefore, according to corollary A.1.1 the q-DPBDH1 assumption is
secure in the generic group model. 
Lemma A.5. The “q-DPBDH2” assumption is secure in the generic group
model.
Proof. First, notice that this is indeed a GT -monomial assumption with ran-
dom variables a, s, b1, b2, . . ., bq instead of X1, X2, . . ., XK−1. XK is the
uniformly random exponent of the second challenge term; not present in any
of the remaining terms. Thus corollary A.1.1 applies.
In table A.2 we denote by [i : x] and [i : x, i′ : y] the row vectors in
Z1×q with all components equal to 0, except the i-th component for the first
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vector and the i, i′-th components for the second. The non zero elements are x
for the first vector and x, y for the i, i′-th positions, respectively, of the second
vector. The table shows a compact form of the matrix A where rows of similar
type are shown in one line.
Type Given Terms Conditions a s b1 b2 . . . bq
1 g 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
2 gs 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
3 ga
i ∀i ∈ [q] i 0 0 0 . . . 0
4 gbj ∀j ∈ [q] 0 0 [j : 1]
5 gsbj ∀j ∈ [q] 0 1 [j : 1]
6 ga
ibj ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q] i 0 [j : 1]
7 ga
i/b2j ∀(i, j) ∈ [q, q] i 0 [j : (−2)]
8 ga
i/bj
∀(i, j) ∈ [2q, q]
with i 6= q + 1 i 0 [j : (−1)]
9 g
aibj/b
2
j′
∀(i, j, j′) ∈ [2q, q, q]
with j 6= j′ i 0 [j : 1, j
′ : (−2)]
10 gsa
ibj/bj′
∀(i, j, j′) ∈ [q, q, q]
with j 6= j′ i 1 [j : 1, j
′ : (−1)]
11 g
saibj/b
2
j′
∀(i, j, j′) ∈ [q, q, q]
with j 6= j′ i 1 [j : 1, j
′ : (−2)]
A˜0 e(g, g)sa
q+1
q + 1 1 0 0 . . . 0
Table A.2: Compact form of matrix A and target vector A˜0 for the q-DPBDH2
assumption.
In order to prove the lemma we have to show that by adding any two
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rows of matrix A we can not get the row vector A˜0 = (q+ 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0). By
inspecting table A.2 we can easily see that we have to check only the rows of
types 2, 5, 10, and 11, which have 1 in the s column.
The only rows that can be added to row 2 and give all zero’s in the bi
columns are row 1 or rows of type 3. But in both of them we can not get the
q + 1 component in the a column. Rows of type 5 can be added only to rows
of type 8 and give only zeros in the bi columns. But the term with i = q+ 1 is
excluded from rows of type 8; therefore the target vector can not be obtained.
Finally, rows of type 10 or 11 can not be added to one of the rows 1, 3, 4, 6,
7, 8, and 9 without having at least one non zero element in the bi columns.
That is because none of these rows have vectors of the form [j : (−1), j′ : 1] or
[j : (−1), j′ : 2], which are needed to cancel the bi components.
Therefore, according to corollary A.1.1 the q-DPBDH2 assumption is
secure in the generic group model. 
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APPENDIX B
Proofs of Various Lemmas Used
B.1 A Useful Lemma for Leakage Analysis
Our analysis of the leakage resilience of our system will rely on the fol-
lowing lemma from [28], which is proven using the techniques from [16]. Below,
we let dist(X1, X2) denote the statistical distance of two random variables X1
and X2.
Lemma B.1. Let m, `, d ∈ N, m ≥ ` ≥ 2d and let p be a prime. Let X R←
Zm×`p , let Y
R← Zm×dp , and let T R← Rkd
(
Z`×dp
)
, where Rkd
(
Z`×dp
)
denotes the
set of `× d matrices of rank d with entries in Zp. Let f : Zm×dp → W be some
function. Then:
dist ((X, f(X · T )), (X, f(Y ))) ≤ ,
as long as
|W | ≤ 4 ·
(
1− 1
p
)
· p`−(2d−1) · 2.
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More precisely, we will use the following corollary:
Corollary B.1.1. Let m ∈ N, m ≥ 3, and let p be a prime. Let ~δ R← Zmp ,
~τ
R← Zmp , and let ~τ ′ be chosen uniformly randomly from the set of vectors in Zmp
which are orthogonal to ~δ under the dot product modulo p. Let f : Zmp → W
be some function. Then:
dist
(
(~δ, f(~τ ′)), (~δ, f(~τ))
)
≤ ,
as long as
|W | ≤ 4 ·
(
1− 1
p
)
· pm−2 · 2.
Proof. We apply Lemma B.1 with d = 1 and ` = m− 1. Y then corresponds
to ~τ , while X corresponds to a basis of the orthogonal space of ~δ. We note
that ~τ ′ is then distributed as X · T , where T R← Rk1
(
Zm−1×1p
)
. We note that
X is determined by ~δ, and is distributed as X
R← Zm×m−1p , since ~δ is chosen
uniformly randomly from Zmp . It follows that:
dist
(
(~δ, f(~τ ′)), (~δ, f(~τ))
)
= dist ((X, f(X · T )), (X, f(Y ))) ≤ .

This corollary allows us to set `MSK = `SK = (n−1−2c) log(p2) for our
construction (we’ll have n+ 1 = m), where c is any fixed positive constant (so
that  := p−c2 is negligible).
B.2 Proof of claim 6.4
In order to prove claim 6.4 we will use the following theorem:
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Theorem B.2. Let A ∈ Z`×np be the secret sharing matrix of a linear secret
sharing scheme for an access policy A and L ∈ Zn×np be a matrix such that:
• The first row of L is (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Znp .
• The lower right matrix L′ ∈ Z(n−1)×(n−1)p of L has rank n− 1.
Then the distribution of the shares {λx}x∈[`] sharing the secret z ∈ Zp generated
with the matrix A is the same as the distribution of the shares {λ′x}x∈[`] sharing
the secret z ∈ Zp generated with the matrix A · L.
Proof. Consider the distribution of the shares {λ′x}x∈[`]. According to the
construction of LSS schemes, it is true that λ′x =
〈
~ALx, ~v
〉
where ~ALx is the
x-th row of the matrix AL and ~v is a random vector with its first element
equal to z.
This implies that λ′x =
〈
~Ax, ~Lv
〉
, where ~Lv ∈ Znp is the vector acquired
by multiplying L with ~v. Since L has the first row (1, 0, . . . , 0) we get that the
first element of ~Lv is z. Moreover the remaining n− 1 elements are uniformly
random from Zp because each one, say the i-th one, is equal to z ·Li,1 +
〈
~L′i, ~v′
〉
where ~L′i is the i-th row of L
′ and ~v′ ∈ Zn−1p are the last n− 1 elements of ~v.
Since these are uniformly random and L′ is full rank, we get that
〈
~L′i, ~v′
〉
is
uniformly random.
Therefore, ~Lv is distributed exactly the same as a secret sharing vector
of z. Thus the shares {λ′x} have the same distribution as the shares {λx}. 
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Proof of claim 6.4 To convert the matrix A to the target matrix A′ we will
apply theorem B.2. Let ~W1, ~W2, . . . , ~Wc be the first c independent rows in C.
These rows form a basis of size c of the relevant subspace and they can be
computed from C in polynomial time using linear algebra operations.
Next we are going to extend this basis to size n such that the final basis
spans the entire space. The first step is to add the row ~U = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Znp
to the set. Since the set of rows in C is unauthorized, ~U is not in in the
subspace spanned by them and therefore this is a valid choice.
We continue by picking n− c−1 rows, ~V1, ~V2, . . . , ~Vn−c−1, such that the
set {
~U, ~V1, ~V2, . . . , ~Vn−c−1, ~W1, ~W2, . . . , ~WW
}
is a basis of Znp . Using linear algebra operations this can be done in polynomial
time as well.
Finally construct the matrix
L = (L′)−1 =

~U
~V1
. . .
~Vn−c−1
~W1
. . .
~Wc

−1
∈ Zn×np
Using theorem B.2 we will argue that the matrix A′ = A · L will give
us same distribution for the {λx} shares. We should argue first that the
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matrix L satisfies the requirements of the theorem. This can be done by
trying to compute the inverse matrix, but one straightforward way is to use
the blockwise inversion formula shown in figure B.1.
[
A B
C D
]−1
=
[
A−1 + A−1B(D − CA−1B)−1CA−1 −A−1B(D − CA−1B)−1
−(D − CA−1B)−1CA−1 (D − CA−1B)−1
]
Figure B.1: Blockwise inversion formula
In our case we have A = [1], B = (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z1×(n−1)p , C =
(0, 0, . . . , 0)> ∈ Z(n−1)×1p , and D is the lower right submatrix of L′ of size
(n− 1)× (n− 1). Therefore we have that
L =

1 0 . . . 0
0
D−1...
0

Since D is of full rank, we can see that L satisfies the requirements
of theorem B.2. The only thing left to prove is that A′ has the required
form. That is, that for all rows ~A′x with x ∈ C, we have that the first n − c
elements are equal to 0. We know that for fixed x ∈ C the row ~Ax is a linear
combination of the basis rows { ~W1, ~W2, . . . , ~Wc}. Therefore ~Ax =
∑
i∈[c] γi ~Wi
with γi constants in Zp.
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Finally, notice that for all k such that n− c+ 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have that
(
n−c terms︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,
c terms
1 on the k-th position︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) · L′ = ~Wk
=⇒ ~Wk · (L′)−1 = (
n−c terms︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,
c terms
1 on the k-th position︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
Therefore the row ~A′x = ~Ax · L =
∑
i∈[c] γi ~Zi, where
~Zi = (
n−c terms︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,
c terms
1 on the i-th position︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
.
As a result the first n− c elements of ~A′x are all equal to 0.

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APPENDIX C
Source Code
C.1 KP-ABE scheme of Sec. 6.1
1 ’’’
2 Rouselakis - Waters Unbounded Key -Policy Attribute -
Based Encryption
3
4 | From:
5 | Published in:
6 | Available from:
7 | Notes:
8
9 * type: attribute -based encryption (public
key)
10 * setting: bilinear pairing group of prime
order
11 * assumption: complex q-type assumption
12
13 :Authors: Yannis Rouselakis
14 :Date: 02/12
15 ’’’
16
17 from toolbox.pairinggroup import *
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18 from charm.cryptobase import *
19 from toolbox.secretutil import SecretUtil
20 from toolbox.ABEnc import *
21 from BenchmarkFunctions import *
22
23 debug = False
24 class KPABE_RW12(ABEnc):
25 def __init__(self , groupObj , verbose = False):
26 ABEnc.__init__(self)
27 global util , group
28 group = groupObj
29 util = SecretUtil(group , verbose)
30
31 # Defining a function to pick explicit exponents in
the group
32 def exp(self ,value):
33 return group.init(ZR, value)
34
35 def setup(self):
36 # Due to assymmetry in the groups we prefer most
of the terms to be in G1
37 g = group.random(G2)
38 g2 , u, h, w = group.random(G1), group.random(G1),
group.random(G1), group.random(G1)
39 alpha = group.random( )
40 egg = pair(g2,g)**alpha
41 pp = {’g’:g, ’g2’:g2 , ’u’:u, ’h’:h, ’w’:w, ’egg’:
egg}
42 mk = {’alpha’:alpha }
43 return (pp, mk)
44
45 def keygen(self , pp , mk , policy_str):
46 # the secret alpha will be shared according to
the policy
47 policy = util.createPolicy(policy_str)
48 a_list = util.getAttributeList(policy)
49 # print ("\n\n THE A-LIST IS", a_list ,"\n\n")
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50 shares = util.calculateSharesDict(mk[’alpha ’],
policy) #These are correctly set to be
exponents in Z_p; Here alpha is shared
51
52 K0 , K1, K2 = {}, {}, {}
53 for i in a_list:
54 inti = int(util.strip_index(i)) #NOTICE THE
CONVERSION FROM STRING TO INT
55 ri = group.random(ZR)
56 K0[i] = pp[’g2’]** shares[i] * pp[’w’]**ri
57 K1[i] = (pp[’u’]** self.exp(inti) * pp[’h’])**ri
58 K2[i] = pp[’g’]**ri
59
60 return { ’Policy ’:policy_str , ’K0’:K0 , ’K1’:K1, ’
K2’:K2 }
61
62 def encrypt(self , pp , message , S):
63 # S is a list of attributes written as STRINGS i.
e. {’1’, ’2’, ’3’,...}
64 s = group.random ()
65
66 C = message * (pp[’egg’]**s)
67 C0 = pp[’g’]**s
68 wS = pp[’w’]**s
69
70 C1 , C2 = {}, {}
71 for i in S:
72 ti = group.random ()
73 C1[i] = pp[’g’]**ti
74 C2[i] = (pp[’u’]** self.exp(int(i)) * pp[’h’])**
ti * wS #NOTICE THE CONVERSION FROM STRING
TO INT
75 S = [i for i in S] #Have to be an array for util.
prune
76 return { ’S’:S, ’C’:C, ’C0’:C0 , ’C1’:C1 , ’C2’:C2
}
77
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78 def decrypt(self , pp , sk , ct):
79 policy = util.createPolicy(sk[’Policy ’])
80 z = util.getCoefficients(policy)
81 # print ("\n\n THE COEFF -LIST IS", z,"\n\n")
82
83 pruned_list = util.prune(policy , ct[’S’])
84 # print ("\n\n THE PRUNED -LIST IS", pruned_list ,"\
n\n")
85
86 if (pruned_list == False):
87 return group.init(GT ,1)
88
89
90 B = group.init(GT ,1) # the identity element of GT
91 for i in range(0,len(pruned_list)):
92 x = pruned_list[i]. getAttribute( ) #without the
underscore
93 y = pruned_list[i]. getAttributeAndIndex( ) #
with the underscore
94 B *= ( pair(sk[’K0’][y], ct[’C0’]) * pair(sk[’
K1’][y], ct[’C1’][x]) / pair(ct[’C2’][x], sk
[’K2’][y] ) )**z[y]
95
96 return ct[’C’] / B
97
98 def randomMessage(self):
99 return group.random(GT)
100
101
102 def main():
103 curve = ’MNT224 ’
104
105 groupObj = PairingGroup(curve)
106 scheme = KPABE_RW12(groupObj)
107 #print (" Setup(",curve ,")")
108
109 ID = InitBenchmark ()
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110 startAll(ID)
111 (pp , mk) = scheme.setup ()
112 EndBenchmark(ID)
113
114 #print ("The Public Parameters are",pp)
115 #print ("And the Master Key is",mk)
116 #print ("Done!\n")
117 box1 = getResAndClear(ID, "Setup("+curve+")", "Done
!")
118
119 #--------------------------------------------
120
121 policy = ’(123 or 444) and (231 or 999)’
122 #print (" Keygen(", policy ,")")
123
124 ID = InitBenchmark ()
125 startAll(ID)
126 sk = scheme.keygen(pp,mk ,policy)
127 EndBenchmark(ID)
128
129 #print ("The secret key is",sk)
130 #print ("Done!\n")
131 box2 = getResAndClear(ID, "Keygen(" + policy + ")",
"Done!")
132
133 #--------------------------------------------
134
135 m = group.random(GT)
136 #print (" Encrypting the message",m)
137 S = {’123’, ’842’, ’231’, ’384’}
138 #print (" Encrypt(", str(S) ,")")
139
140 ID = InitBenchmark ()
141 startAll(ID)
142 ct = scheme.encrypt(pp,m,S)
143 EndBenchmark(ID)
144
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145 #print ("The ciphertext is",ct)
146 #print ("Done!\n")
147 box3 = getResAndClear(ID, "Encrypt("+str(S)+")", "
Done!")
148
149 #--------------------------------------------
150
151 #print (" Decrypt ")
152
153 ID = InitBenchmark ()
154 startAll(ID)
155 res = scheme.decrypt(pp, sk, ct)
156 EndBenchmark(ID)
157
158 #print ("The resulting ciphertext is",res)
159 if res == m:
160 fin = "Successful Decryption :)"
161 else:
162 fin = "Failed Decryption :("
163 box4 = getResAndClear(ID, "Decrypt", fin)
164
165 print(formatNice(box1 ,box2 ,box3 ,box4))
166
167 if __name__ == ’__main__ ’:
168 debug = True
169 main()
C.2 CP-ABE scheme of Sec. 6.2
1 ’’’
2 Rouselakis - Waters Unbounded Ciphertext -Policy
Attribute -Based Encryption
3
4 | From:
5 | Published in:
6 | Available from:
7 | Notes:
8
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9 * type: attribute -based encryption (public
key)
10 * setting: bilinear pairing group of prime
order
11 * assumption: complex q-type assumption
12
13 :Authors: Yannis Rouselakis
14 :Date: 02/12
15 ’’’
16
17 from toolbox.pairinggroup import *
18 from charm.cryptobase import *
19 from toolbox.secretutil import SecretUtil
20 from toolbox.ABEnc import *
21 from BenchmarkFunctions import *
22
23 debug = False
24 class CPABE_RW12(ABEnc):
25 def __init__(self , groupObj , verbose = False):
26 ABEnc.__init__(self)
27 global util , group
28 group = groupObj
29 util = SecretUtil(group , verbose)
30
31 # Defining a function to pick explicit exponents in
the group
32 def exp(self ,value):
33 return group.init(ZR, value)
34
35 def setup(self):
36 # Due to assymmetry in the groups we prefer most
of the terms to be in G1
37 g = group.random(G2)
38 g2 , u, h, w, v = group.random(G1), group.random(
G1), group.random(G1), group.random(G1), group
.random(G1)
39 alpha = group.random( )
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40 egg = pair(g2,g)**alpha
41 pp = {’g’:g, ’g2’:g2 , ’u’:u, ’h’:h, ’w’:w, ’v’:v,
’egg’:egg}
42 mk = {’alpha’:g2 ** alpha }
43 return (pp, mk)
44
45 def keygen(self , pp , mk , S):
46 # S is a list of attributes written as STRINGS i.
e. {’1’, ’2’, ’3’,...}
47 r = group.random( )
48 K0 = mk[’alpha ’] * (pp[’w’]**r)
49 K1 = pp[’g’]**r
50
51 vR = pp[’v’]**r
52
53 K2 , K3 = {}, {}
54 for i in S:
55 ri = group.random( )
56 K2[i] = pp[’g’]**ri
57 K3[i] = (pp[’u’]** self.exp(int(i)) * pp[’h’])**
ri * vR #NOTICE THE CONVERSION FROM STRING
TO INT
58 S = [s for s in S] #Have to be an array for util.
prune
59 return { ’S’:S, ’K0’:K0, ’K1’:K1 , ’K2’:K2, ’K3’:
K3 }
60
61 def encrypt(self , pp , message , policy_str):
62 s = group.random ()
63
64 policy = util.createPolicy(policy_str)
65 a_list = util.getAttributeList(policy)
66 #print ("\n\n THE A-LIST IS", a_list ,"\n\n")
67 shares = util.calculateSharesDict(s, policy) #
These are correctly set to be exponents in Z_p
68
69 C = message * (pp[’egg’]**s)
213
70 C0 = pp[’g’]**s
71
72 C1 , C2, C3 = {}, {}, {}
73 for i in a_list:
74 inti = int(util.strip_index(i)) #NOTICE THE
CONVERSION FROM STRING TO INT
75 #print(’The exponent is ’,inti)
76 ti = group.random ()
77 C1[i] = pp[’w’]** shares[i] * pp[’v’]**ti
78 C2[i] = (pp[’u’]** self.exp(inti) * pp[’h’])**ti
79 C3[i] = pp[’g’]**ti
80 return { ’Policy ’:policy_str , ’C’:C, ’C0’:C0, ’C1
’:C1, ’C2’:C2, ’C3’:C3 }
81
82 def decrypt(self , pp , sk , ct):
83 policy = util.createPolicy(ct[’Policy ’])
84 z = util.getCoefficients(policy)
85 #print ("\n\n THE COEFF -LIST IS", z,"\n\n")
86
87 pruned_list = util.prune(policy , sk[’S’])
88 # print ("\n\n THE PRUNED -LIST IS", pruned_list ,"\
n\n")
89
90 if (pruned_list == False):
91 return group.init(GT ,1)
92
93 B = group.init(GT ,1)
94 for i in range(len(pruned_list)):
95 x = pruned_list[i]. getAttribute( ) #without the
underscore
96 y = pruned_list[i]. getAttributeAndIndex( ) #
with the underscore
97 #print(x,y)
98 B *= ( pair( ct[’C1’][y], sk[’K1’]) * pair( ct[
’C2’][y], sk[’K2’][x]) / pair(sk[’K3’][x],
ct[’C3’][y]) )**z[y]
99
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100 return ct[’C’] * B / pair(sk[’K0’] , ct[’C0’])
101
102 def randomMessage(self):
103 return group.random(GT)
104
105
106 def main():
107 curve = ’MNT224 ’
108
109 groupObj = PairingGroup(curve)
110 scheme = CPABE_RW12(groupObj)
111 # print("Setup(",curve ,")")
112
113 ID = InitBenchmark ()
114 startAll(ID)
115 (pp , mk) = scheme.setup ()
116 EndBenchmark(ID)
117
118 #print ("The Public Parameters are",pp)
119 #print ("And the Master Key is",mk)
120 #print ("Done!\n")
121 box1 = getResAndClear(ID, "Setup("+curve+")", "Done
!")
122
123 #--------------------------------------------
124
125 S = {’123’, ’842’, ’231’, ’384’}
126 #print (" Keygen(", str(S) ,")")
127
128 ID = InitBenchmark ()
129 startAll(ID)
130 sk = scheme.keygen(pp,mk ,S)
131 EndBenchmark(ID)
132
133 #print ("The secret key is",sk)
134 #print ("Done!\n")
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135 box2 = getResAndClear(ID, "Keygen(" + str(S) + ")",
"Done!")
136
137 #--------------------------------------------
138
139 m = group.random(GT)
140 policy = ’(123 or 444) and (231 or 999)’
141 #print (" Encrypt(",policy ,")")
142
143 ID = InitBenchmark ()
144 startAll(ID)
145 ct = scheme.encrypt(pp,m,policy)
146 EndBenchmark(ID)
147
148 #print ("The ciphertext is",ct)
149 #print ("Done!\n")
150 box3 = getResAndClear(ID, "Encrypt("+policy+")", "
Done!")
151
152 #--------------------------------------------
153
154 #print (" Decrypt ")
155
156 ID = InitBenchmark ()
157 startAll(ID)
158 res = scheme.decrypt(pp, sk, ct)
159 EndBenchmark(ID)
160
161 #print ("The resulting ciphertext is",res)
162 if res == m:
163 fin = "Successful Decryption :)"
164 else:
165 fin = "Failed Decryption :("
166 box4 = getResAndClear(ID, "Decrypt", fin)
167
168 print(formatNice(box1 ,box2 ,box3 ,box4))
169
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170 if __name__ == ’__main__ ’:
171 debug = True
172 main()
C.3 MA-CP-ABE scheme of Sec. 6.3
1 ’’’
2 Rouselakis - Waters Unbounded Multi -Authority
Ciphertext -Policy Attribute -Based Encryption
3
4 | From:
5 | Published in:
6 | Available from:
7 | Notes:
8
9 * type: attribute -based encryption (public
key)
10 * setting: bilinear pairing group of prime
order
11 * assumption: complex q-type assumption
12
13 :Authors: Yannis Rouselakis
14 :Date: 11/12
15 ’’’
16
17 from toolbox.pairinggroup import *
18 from charm.cryptobase import *
19 from toolbox.secretutil import SecretUtil
20 from toolbox.ABEnc import *
21 from BenchmarkFunctions import *
22
23 debug = False
24 class MAABE_RW12 ():
25
26
27 def randomMessage(self):
28 return group.random(GT)
29
217
30 # Defining a function to pick explicit exponents in
the group
31 def exp(self ,value):
32 return group.init(ZR, value)
33
34 def getAuth(self ,x):
35 i = x.find("@")
36 if (i==-1):
37 print("Error: No @ char in [auth@attr] name")
38 return
39
40 j = x.find("_")
41 if (j==-1):
42 return x[i+1:]
43 else:
44 return x[i+1:j]
45
46 def getAttr(self , attrWithUnderscore):
47 i = attrWithUnderscore.rfind("_")
48 if (i==-1):
49 return attrWithUnderscore
50 else:
51 return attrWithUnderscore [:i]
52
53 def __init__(self , groupObj , verbose = False):
54
55 global util , group
56 group = groupObj
57 util = SecretUtil(group , verbose)
58
59 def GlobalSetup(self):
60 g1 = group.random(G1)
61 g2 = group.random(G2)
62 egg = pair(g1,g2)
63 H = lambda x: group.hash(x, G2)
64 F = lambda x: group.hash(x, G2)
65 gp = {’g1’:g1 , ’g2’:g2 , ’egg’:egg , ’H’:H, ’F’:F}
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66 return gp
67
68 def AuthSetup(self , gp, name):
69 alpha , y = group.random (), group.random ()
70 egga = gp[’egg’]** alpha
71 gy = gp[’g1’]**y
72 pk = {’name’:name , ’egga’:egga , ’gy’:gy}
73 sk = {’name’:name , ’alpha’:alpha , ’y’:y}
74 return (pk, sk)
75
76 def KeyGenOne(self , gp, gid , sk , attr): # the
authority ’s name is included in the secret key
77
78 # check here if gid name is legal
79
80 # checking if attribute is legal
81 if (sk[’name’] != self.getAuth(attr)):
82 print("Error: Attribute ", attr , " does not 
belong to authority ", sk[’name’])
83 return
84
85 t = group.random ()
86 K = gp[’g2’]**sk[’alpha’] * gp[’H’](gid)**sk[’y’]
* gp[’F’](attr)**t
87 #K = gp[’g2 ’]**sk[’alpha ’] * gp[’F ’](attr)**t
88 KP = gp[’g1’]**t
89
90 return { ’user’:gid , ’auth’:sk[’name’], ’attr’:
attr , ’K’:K, ’KP’:KP }
91
92 def KeyGen(self , gp , gid , authSkChain , attributes):
93 #check here if gid name is legal
94
95 sks = {}
96 for attr in attributes:
97 auth = self.getAuth(attr)
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98 sk = self.KeyGenOne(gp, gid , authSkChain[auth],
attr)
99 sks[attr] = sk
100
101 return {’GID’:gid , ’Attributes ’:attributes , ’
Chain’: sks}
102
103 def Encrypt(self , gp , pks , message , policy_str):
104 s = group.random () #secret to be shared
105 w = group.init(ZR , 0) #0 to be shared
106
107 policy = util.createPolicy(policy_str)
108 a_list = util.getAttributeList(policy)
109 #print ("\n\n THE A-LIST IS", a_list ,"\n\n")
110 #for i in a_list:
111 # print(self.getAuth(i))
112
113 secretShares = util.calculateSharesDict(s, policy
) #These are correctly set to be exponents in
Z_p
114 zeroShares = util.calculateSharesDict(w, policy)
115
116 C0 = message * (gp[’egg’]**s)
117
118 C1 , C2, C3, C4 = {}, {}, {}, {}
119 for i in a_list:
120 auth = self.getAuth(i)
121 attr = self.getAttr(i) #take out the possible
underscore
122 tx = group.random ()
123 C1[i] = gp[’egg’]** secretShares[i] * pks[auth][
’egga’]**tx
124 C2[i] = gp[’g1’]**(-tx)
125 C3[i] = pks[auth][’gy’]**tx * gp[’g1’]**
zeroShares[i]
126 C4[i] = gp[’F’](attr)**tx
127
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128 return { ’Policy ’:policy_str , ’C0’:C0 , ’C1’:C1, ’
C2’:C2, ’C3’:C3, ’C4’:C4 }
129
130 def Decrypt(self , gp , sk_chain , ct):
131 hgid = gp[’H’]( sk_chain[’GID’])
132
133 policy = util.createPolicy(ct[’Policy ’])
134 z = util.getCoefficients(policy)
135 # print ("\n\n THE COEFF -LIST IS", z,"\n\n")
136
137 pruned_list = util.prune(policy , sk_chain[’
Attributes ’])
138 # print ("\n\n THE PRUNED -LIST IS", pruned_list ,"\n\
n")
139
140 if (pruned_list == False):
141 return group.init(GT ,1)
142
143 B = group.init(GT ,1)
144 for i in range(len(pruned_list)):
145 x = pruned_list[i]. getAttribute( ) #without the
underscore
146 y = pruned_list[i]. getAttributeAndIndex( ) #
with the underscore
147 #print(x,y)
148 #print(z[y])
149 B *= ( ct[’C1’][y] * pair(ct[’C2’][y], sk_chain
[’Chain’][x][’K’]) * pair(ct[’C3’][y], hgid)
* pair(sk_chain[’Chain ’][x][’KP’], ct[’C4’
][y] ) )**z[y]
150
151 return ct[’C0’]/B
152
153 def prettyPrint(initStr , myDict , tab=""):
154 typesEnum = ["ZP", "G1", "G2", "GT"]
155 if (len(initStr) >0):
156 print(initStr)
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157 for (k,v) in myDict.items ():
158 if (isinstance(v,dict)):
159 print(tab , k, ": ", type(v))
160 prettyPrint("", v, tab + "    ")
161 elif (isinstance(v,str)):
162 print(tab , k, ": ", v)
163 elif (isinstance(v,set)):
164 print(tab , k, ": ", v)
165 elif (isinstance(v,pairing)):
166 print(tab , k, ": ", typesEnum[v.type])
167 else:
168 print(tab , k, ": ", type(v))
169 if (tab==""):
170 print("\n")
171
172 def main():
173 curve = ’MNT224 ’
174
175 groupObj = PairingGroup(curve)
176 scheme = MAABE_RW12(groupObj)
177 print("Curve = ",curve)
178
179 ID = InitBenchmark ()
180 startAll(ID)
181 gp = scheme.GlobalSetup ()
182 EndBenchmark(ID)
183 boxGS = getResAndClear(ID , "GSetup("+curve+")", "
Done!")
184
185 #prettyPrint ("The global parameters are ", gp)
186
187 pks , sks = {}, {}
188
189 ID = InitBenchmark ()
190 startAll(ID)
191 (pk ,sk) = scheme.AuthSetup(gp,"UT")
192 EndBenchmark(ID)
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193 boxAS = getResAndClear(ID , "ASetup(" + "UT" + ")",
"Done!")
194
195 pks[pk[’name’]] = pk
196 sks[sk[’name’]] = sk
197
198 (pk ,sk) = scheme.AuthSetup(gp,"OU")
199 pks[pk[’name’]] = pk
200 sks[sk[’name’]] = sk
201
202 #prettyPrint ("The authority public key chain is ",
pks)
203 #prettyPrint ("The authority secret key chain is ",
sks)
204
205 ID = InitBenchmark ()
206 startAll(ID)
207 key = scheme.KeyGen(gp, "YANNIS", sks , {"STUDENT@UT
", "PHD@UT"})
208 EndBenchmark(ID)
209 boxKG = getResAndClear(ID , "KeyGen", "Done!")
210
211 #prettyPrint ("The secret key is ", key)
212
213 m = scheme.randomMessage ()
214 policy = ’(STUDENT@UT or PROFESSOR@OU) and (
STUDENT@UT or MASTERS@OU)’
215
216 ID = InitBenchmark ()
217 startAll(ID)
218 ct = scheme.Encrypt(gp, pks , m, policy)
219 EndBenchmark(ID)
220 boxEC = getResAndClear(ID , "Encrypt", "Done!")
221
222 #prettyPrint ("The ciphertext is ", ct)
223
224 ID = InitBenchmark ()
223
225 startAll(ID)
226 res = scheme.Decrypt(gp, key , ct)
227 EndBenchmark(ID)
228
229 if res == m:
230 fin = "Successful Decryption :)"
231 else:
232 fin = "Failed Decryption :("
233
234 boxDE = getResAndClear(ID , "Decrypt", fin)
235
236 #print(fin)
237
238 print(formatNice(boxGS ,boxAS ,boxKG ,boxEC , boxDE))
239
240 if __name__ == ’__main__ ’:
241 debug = True
242 main()
C.4 Implementation of Dual Vector Spaces
1 ’’’
2 Class to create the Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
3
4 :Authors: Yannis Rouselakis
5 :Date: 4/24/12
6 ’’’
7
8 from toolbox.pairinggroup import *
9 from charm.cryptobase import *
10
11 debug = False
12 class DualVectorSpace ():
13
14 def __init__(self , groupObj , dim , psiSet = 0):
15 global group
16 group = groupObj #we will use Charm to do
the modular arithmetic for us
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17 #global Base # a 2 x dim x dim matrix
18 #global Psi # the common inner product of all
d_i d*_i
19 if (type(psiSet) == int):
20 self.Psi = group.random(ZR)
21 else:
22 self.Psi = psiSet
23 self.Base = [None ]*2
24 self.Base [0] = self.createRandomMatrix(dim)
25 self.Base [1] = self.gaussElimin(self.Base [0])
26
27 def getVector(self , b, i):
28 return self.Base[b][i]
29
30 def getPsi(self):
31 return self.Psi
32
33 def createRandomMatrix(self ,dim): #this
function will return a random matrix in Z_p of
dimension dim x dim
34 return [ [group.random(ZR) for i in range(0,dim)]
for j in range(0,dim)]
35
36 def gaussElimin(self , mat):
37
38 work = [ ([mat[i][j] for j in range(0,len(mat))]
+ [(self.Psi if (i==j) else group.init(ZR, 0))
for j in range(0,len(mat))] ) for i in range
(0,len(mat [0]))]
39
40 # self.printOneBasis(work)
41
42 (h,w) = (len(work),len(work [0]))
43
44 #making it upper triangular
45 for i in range(0,h):
46 for i2 in range(i+1,h):
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47 c = work[i2][i] / work[i][i] #I should
check here for singular matrices (no: negl
prob)
48 for j in range(i,w):
49 work[i2][j] -= work[i][j] * c
50
51 # print ("")
52 # self.printOneBasis(work)
53
54 #backsubstitution
55 for i in range(h-1, 0-1, -1):
56
57 # Normalize row i
58 c = work[i][i]
59 for j in range(i, w):
60 work[i][j] /= c
61
62 for i2 in range(0,i):
63 c = work[i2][i]
64 for j in range(i,w):
65 work[i2][j] -= c * work[i][j]
66
67 # print ("")
68 # self.printOneBasis(work)
69
70 # transposing + cropping
71 result = [ [work[i][j] for i in range(0,h)] for j
in range(int(w/2), w)]
72
73 # print ("")
74 # self.printOneBasis(result)
75 return result
76
77 def printBases(self , full = False):
78 for b in range (0,2):
79 if b==0:
80 print("Normal Basis:")
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81 else:
82 print("Star Basis:")
83 self.printOneBasis(self.Base[b],full)
84
85
86 def printOneBasis(self , mat , full = False):
87 if full:
88 print(mat[i])
89 else:
90 for i in range(0,len(mat)):
91 bigStr = "["
92 for j in range(0,len(mat[i])):
93 cut = (int(mat[i][j]) > 999)
94
95 smallStr = str(int(mat[i][j]) % 1000)
96 extraSp = 3 - len(smallStr)
97
98 if cut:
99 bigStr += ".."
100 for k in range(0, extraSp):
101 bigStr += "0"
102 else:
103 bigStr += "  "
104 for k in range(0, extraSp):
105 bigStr += " "
106 bigStr += smallStr
107
108 if j!=( len(mat[i]) -1):
109 bigStr += ", "
110 else:
111 bigStr += "]"
112 print(bigStr)
113
114 def checkOrthogonality(self):
115 dim = len(self.Base [0][0]) # getting the
dimension
116
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117 res = [ [group.init(ZR, 0) for i in range(0,dim)]
for j in range(0,dim)]
118
119 # matrix multiplication (the naive way)
120 for i in range(0,dim):
121 for j in range(0,dim):
122 curr = group.init(ZR, 0)
123 for k in range(0,dim):
124 curr += self.Base [0][i][k] * self.Base [1][j
][k]
125 res[i][j] = curr
126
127 print("B times transpose B*")
128 self.printOneBasis(res , False)
129
130
131 def main():
132 groupObj = PairingGroup(’MNT224 ’)
133 DV = DualVectorSpace(groupObj ,10)
134
135 DV.printBases ()
136
137 DV.checkOrthogonality () #visual check ;)
138
139 if __name__ == ’__main__ ’:
140 debug = True
141 main()
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